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New Order and Its Enemies:  
Opposition to Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1789–1807 
Kadir Ustun 
This dissertation is a study of the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedid) army and the 
opposition it triggered during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807). It aims to present an 
alternative perspective on the Ottoman military reform and its implications for the course 
of the imperial transformation. It hopes to contribute to the social history of Ottoman 
military reform through an investigation of the challenges the state faced as well as the 
motivations of political, military, economic, and social groups in opposing the new army. 
This period represented a moment of crisis of great magnitude for the Ottoman 
imperial center. However, in military and financial terms, it was also a moment of 
reconfiguration and restructuring of Ottoman state power. Constant contestation and 
continuous renegotiation of state power occurred between the state elites and various 
societal actors. These actors did not necessarily have a fixed position on military reform. 
In fact, the military reform measures were part of the bargaining process and both the 
state elites and different political actors shifted their positions depending on the 
circumstances. This study aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the causes of 
resistance by various groups such as the janissaries, local notables, and common people. 
It argues that their resistance shaped the possibilities of the Ottoman military reform by 
challenging the centralized, rationalized, disciplined, and bureaucratic new logic of the 
modern state.  
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 This dissertation is an examination of the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedid) army and 
the opposition it triggered during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807). By undertaking a 
critical historical reevaluation, the study aims to present an alternative perspective on the 
Ottoman military reform and its implications for the course of the imperial 
transformation. It hopes to contribute to the social history of Ottoman military reform 
through an investigation of the challenges the state faced as well as the motivations of 
various socio-economic and political groups in opposing the new army.  
One of the main assumptions of this project is that once we manage to consider 
this period free of predetermined and anachronistic explanations, we can see that the 
Ottoman reform efforts broadly defined could have evolved in a variety of directions. 
That is to say, a closer look at the New Order and the opposition to it reveals a picture far 
more complicated than the conventionally linear as well as binary explanations have 
allowed. The strongest tendency has been to frame this period within the Ottoman 
modernization story in such a way that the possibilities for the state elites as well as 
various actors such as the janissaries were very limited. The “reform or perish” paradigm 
told us that the Ottomans had no choice but to keep up with the “rise of the West.” It 
further argued that their reform efforts were doomed from the beginning as is clear in the 
eventual collapse of the empire.  
This argument assumed that what needed to be done in terms of military reform 
was clear given the proven “western superiority” in the battlefield. There was in fact a 
series of consequential changes taking place in Western Europe in terms of military 
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technology, discipline, tactical organization, and regularized drill.1 However, these 
changes resulted from the broader development toward commercialization of the war 
making enterprise. Strengthening of the relationship between financial profit and military 
adventures was the crucial characteristic that made innovations possible and sustainable 
in the long run. Furthermore, regular tax income allowed the disorderly bands of fighting 
groups to be brought under the control of the central government through predictable 
taxes.2  
While the Ottoman center’s employment of the notables in wars could be likened 
to private profiteering from wars in the West, the center could no longer offer lucrative 
war contracts in the eighteenth century in the wake of the disastrous wars against the 
Austrians and particularly the Russians. The state’s regular income from tax collection 
was not sufficient to remedy the situation. In other words, the Ottoman state’s financial 
ability to make wars profitable and desirable enterprises was compromised. Furthermore, 
the main challenge against the Ottomans did not come from the Western European 
powers but the Eastern European powers: Austria and Russia. Thus, the argument that the 
Ottomans failed to appreciate western superiority in the battlefield and to adopt the 
necessary innovations falls short of explaining the broader conditions that account for the 
effectiveness of military innovations.   
The Western superiority in battlefield argument does not take into account what 
military reform meant for the Ottomans in the first place. It argues that the Ottomans 
were simply behind their contemporaries in the West and they failed miserably in 
                                                            
1 McNeill credits Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange with “developing modern routines 
of army drill.” William Hardy McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, 
and Society Since A.D. 1000 (University of Chicago Press, 1984), 126. 
 
2 Ibid., 140. 
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implementing reforms mainly because of cultural opposition from a traditional society, 
which explained their eventual demise. This did not allow much room for the relevance 
of Ottoman conceptualization of their own problems as well as their solutions. It is 
crucial to appreciate how the Ottomans perceived of the threats facing them because their 
conception of military reform would necessarily differ depending on their threat 
perceptions. That is to say, if the Ottomans perceived a “rising West” that threatened their 
very existence, their response would be different than if they regarded their problems 
only in terms of military efficiency. In the absence of a clear understanding of how the 
Ottomans defined their problems, we cannot appreciate the nature of reform measures 
they implemented nor can we arrive at the reasons why there was continuous yet ever-
evolving opposition from within diverse societal groups.  
This was clearly a moment of crisis especially in military and financial terms but 
it was also a moment of reconfiguration and restructuring of the Ottoman state power. 
Renegotiation was happening between and among state elites as well as between the state 
elites and various political actors. These actors did not necessarily have a fixed position 
on the Ottoman’s army’s military reform. In fact, the military reform measures were part 
of the bargaining process and both the state elites and different political actors often 
shifted their positions depending on the political circumstances. It is crucial for us to have 
an in-depth understanding of the reasons for resistance from various groups such as the 
janissaries, local notables, and common people, as their resistance shaped the possibilities 
of the Ottoman military reform.  
When the state elites set out to build a new army alongside the old one and 
introduced measures to reform the existing forces, they did not readily submit to a single 
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model imported from elsewhere. At the same time, the logic of these measures included 
some of the features of the rationalizing and disciplining character of the emerging 
modern state.3 In other words, the Ottomans were re-producing hallmarks of the modern 
state without necessarily directly copying the West in a non-western context. For 
instance, when the Ottomans attempted to undertake reform measures, such as creating a 
dedicated budget for the new army or assigning one pay ticket per one janissary, they 
were in fact employing the very logic of fiscal rationalization and discipline as well as 
legibility.4 Furthermore, the new logic of the state now sought to monopolize violence5 in 
its struggle against and at the expense of the regional power brokers. The notables’ 
resistance was thus compounded because they both sought to rebuff the center and to 
protect their overlapping interests with various societal groups. 
The conventional view has been to argue that the Ottomans were following the 
West but they failed because they did not go far enough and that their conservative 
society did not allow them to introduce modernity. I would argue that the Ottomans were 
employing modern forms of power, which provoked resistance by the society not because 
of a religious conservative backlash but because the new logic of the modern forms of 
power violated the local and regional interests of notables, communal rights of the 
common people, and the sense of group solidarity of the janissaries among others. 
Resistance could occur in a variety of more direct ways such as open revolt and more 
                                                            
3 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish  : the Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995). 
 
4 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
 
5 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1992). 
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subtle ways such as tax evasion.6 The overlapping of a broad and diverse group of 
interests created a common front against the creeping new logic of the modern state. 
Contestation by these groups was neither uniform nor purely ideological. For example, 
there were significant regional differences among the janissaries, which make it difficult 
to attribute a certain attitude to all of the janissaries. Their position vis-à-vis the new 
army could vary depending on the local political conditions they were engaged in. This 
again brings us back to the importance of appreciating the magnitude of local grievances 
that matched up with the interests of notables and janissaries. In the face of such broad 
discontent, the logic of the modern state had to adjust itself to the conditions and it was 
redefined as a result of societal resistance. 
In this dissertation, I have utilized contemporary histories, archival documents, 
and secondary sources. In terms of archival sources, the documents come mainly from 
the imperial rescripts (hatt-ı hümayun) collection located in the Prime Ministry Ottoman 
Archives in Istanbul. To gain a broader regional comparative perspective, I used 
documents from regions as far apart as Vidin and Aleppo. Imperial rescripts are rich and 
diverse sources. They are mainly reports and correspondences sent by the government 
officials addressed to the sultan. One finds the sultan’s brief remarks on the documents 
and they are quite telling in some instances, as they reflect urgency as well as frustration 
in the sultan’s tone.  
Officials appointed from the center often either exaggerated the threats to receive 
stronger support from the center. Officials also downplayed threats and risks when they 
tried to appear as fulfilling their tasks efficiently. I have tried to note both instances in the 
                                                            
6 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
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dissertation. The documents cited in the bibliography are only a fraction of what is 
available and they await further scholarly scrutiny to arrive at a more comprehensive 
perspective on this period.         
Chapter 1, “Historiography on the New Order and Its Opponents,” provides a 
critical overview of various theoretical frameworks and historiographical traditions. In an 
attempt to focus on how particular intellectual, historiographical and political concerns 
have come to shape our understanding of the New Order, the discussion in the first 
chapter tries to unpack some of the deeply entrenched and long held views. The main 
rationale for this chapter is to complicate the story first by exposing the inadequacy of the 
historiographical frameworks and theories that continue to dominate our perception of the 
New Order.   
 Chapter 2, “The Meaning of the New Order,” focuses on the factors that led to the 
Ottoman elites’ conclusion that they needed to reform their military in the first place. 
How the Ottomans diagnosed the problem at hand is crucial in understanding the very 
solutions they sought. Whether this was simply a matter of adopting a given model, 
whose effectiveness and adequacy had been proven, is a central concern of this chapter. 
The way in which the elites conceptualized the political, military, and economic state of 
affairs reveals much about their reform proposals (layihas), which are also discussed 
extensively in this chapter.  
 Chapter 3, “The New Order Army,” investigates the implementation of the New 
Order army as well as the problems it faced in the meantime. By exploring the financing 
mechanisms and manpower resources, this chapter scrutinizes whether the creation of the 
new army escaped the handicaps of the old army. It also seeks to answer what kind of 
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problems the new enterprise met in trying to harness financial resources and overcome 
recruitment challenges. This chapter addresses the issue of resistance against the 
establishment of the new army, a theme discussed in the last two chapters more broadly. 
In this chapter, only the resistance to recruitment and expansion of the new army are 
discussed to study the direct impact of the efforts to finance and man the new army. 
 Chapter 4, “Janissary Soldiers and Social Networks Resist the New Order,” 
discusses the ways in which the Ottoman elites attempted to integrate the janissaries into 
the new army through establishing order and discipline among them. Whether the central 
government was able to enlist the janissaries in the war effort through financial incentives 
is also explored. The relationship between the government’s inability to marshal large 
sums of money for the military and lack of janissary mobilization is also analyzed. 
Furthermore, the janissaries’ complex relations with the broader societal groups are 
outlined. This chapter helps us understand why disciplining and rationalizing the 
janissaries may have proven difficult.   
 Chapter 5, “Local Notables and the End of the New Order,” attempts to 
demonstrate the connection between the local notables and the eventual failure of the 
New Order. Local notables are discussed in regard to their politics vis-à-vis the imperial 
center but also in terms of their ability to shape the local and regional dynamics to their 
advantage. In a time of great disorder, the Balkans provides a case study of how the 
center’s willingness to introduce military reform played itself out. Paspanoğlu’s activities 
is discussed at length as his relationship to the janissaries and other local bandit groups 
gives us clues as to how the opposition to the new army may have transpired. This 
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discussion furthers our understanding of the emergence of the alliance that ended Selim 
III’s reign in May 1807.
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Chapter 1 – Historiography on the New Order and Its Opponents 
 
Conventional Wisdom  
This chapter provides a discussion of historiography on the New Order (Nizam-ı 
Cedid) and the opposition to it by various social, economic, and military groups. 
Reorganization of the existing army and establishment of new army units alongside the 
old ones were met with opposition from various groups for different yet often 
overlapping reasons. The New Order’s detrimental effects triggered resistance and 
opposition from various social groups, who often had conflicting interests among 
themselves. Few studies deal with the New Order as a social phenomenon. Most studies 
focus on the military and political implications of the establishment of the New Order 
army during the reign of Selim III. Furthermore, the majority of historical studies on the 
New Order suffer from inherent deficiencies of the modernization and decline paradigms, 
which offer dichotomous frameworks. These theories were commonly applied to many 
other subjects in Ottoman historiography and revisionist Ottoman historians have been 
trying to grapple with their legacy. This kind of historiography’s detrimental impact has 
been that the New Order is presented in an exclusively positive light and opposition to it 
from broad segments of society is often disregarded.    
As will be discussed in this chapter, much of this was the result of anachronistic 
approaches by modern historians as well as their ideological priorities. Historians applied 
the parameters of the political struggles of their time to the New Order. Theirs was an 
effort to trace back the roots of the ideologically tainted “modernity vs. tradition” 
struggle. The New Order, in that sense, represented the beginnings of a new era, where 
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the modern enlightened elites failed to lead the empire towards modernity because of 
their defeat by the conservatives in a predominantly Muslim society. The backdrop of this 
framework was the question of whether Islamic societies could be modern in the first 
place. By scrutinizing historiography as such, I aim to demonstrate that the bulk of the 
discussions on the New Order prevent us from capturing the complexities of the reform 
efforts and the broader society’s response.  
There is a perceptible imbalance between the amount of studies on the New Order 
and those on the opposition. While the specific measures implemented in the context of 
the New Order is studied much more in depth, albeit mostly military and political aspects 
of it, the opposition to the New Order is often associated with regressive forces and is 
often dismissed as reactionary. The New Order is hailed as a progressive attempt at 
reforming the empire’s institutions. In contrast, the resistance to the New Order, which 
often came from a broad variety of societal groups, is reduced to a primitive self-
interested approach of the resisting groups. While the Ottoman elites were honorable in 
their efforts to implement true reforms, the backward looking societal groups prevented 
the society from adapting to change. As we look closer, however, we see that neither 
picture does justice to the complexities of this period’s deeper transformations in state-
society relations. 
Revisionist historians of our day have to rely on information and analyses 
provided by the early Turkish republican historians (e.g. Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı)7 and 
                                                            
7 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından: Kapukulu Ocakları (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943). 
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court historians (e.g. Es’ad Pasha),8 neither of which groups is immune to prejudices and 
ideological struggles of their time. This is unavoidable to some extent, as historians in 
general always have to tackle these kinds of problems in historical analysis. Our purpose 
in this chapter is not to show whether these works are biased but rather in what ways they 
might have influenced and defined our understanding of the New Order and the 
opposition.  
In evaluating the approaches of the early Turkish republican historians, the 
ideological interpretations seem easier to identify, as there exist many studies on the 
secularist and nationalist agenda of the new republican historiography. As we go further 
back in history, however, the Ottoman historians who supply much of the information on 
the New Order are concerned with ideological confirmation of their own theories as well. 
There exists a tendency in Ottoman historiography to treat contemporary works as more 
immune to ideological distortions and closer to historical reality. Not only were they 
closer in time to the events that took place but also they can be supported through the use 
of archival documents.  
Revisionist historiography scrutinizes court historians just as much, if not more, 
both because they often reflected the government’s official view and they produced 
overwhelmingly elitist perspectives on societal movements. Today’s revisionist historians 
have to often search for a glimpse of an indication of social movements in such histories. 
Yet, on the subject of the New Order, we still need to rely on court historians and classic 
nationalist narratives of the early republican historians. Thus, in this chapter, a discussion 
of the approaches of Ottoman court historians and commentators will be provided in 
                                                            
8 Mehmed Es’ad Efendi, Üss-i Zafer: Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılmasına Dair, trans. Mehmed 
Arslan (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2005). 
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addition to those of republican and modern historians, who built and applied their 
theories upon the data provided by the Ottoman court historians and official documents. 
This discussion will shed some light on how the modern approaches inherited elitist 
prejudices of the Ottoman court historians in addition to the their own ideological ones.  
 
Legacy of the Decline Theory 
Delving into a comprehensive discussion of the decline and modernization 
theories and their shortcomings would be a redundant and perhaps an impossible task for 
the purposes of this chapter. These theories have lost much of their relevance as 
analytical frameworks in the way they were prescribed in the 1950s and afterwards 
thanks to many revisionist historians in the post-1980s.9 Yet, the legacy of the decline 
and modernization theories is still pertinent to the historiography on the New Order and 
its opponents. Many of the assumptions inherited from these theories about the nature of 
the measures implemented in the name of the New Order and the reasons for resistance to 
these measures survive. Hence, a discussion of these theories as they relate to the New 
Order is necessary. Only by recognizing some of these influences will we be able to 
situate late eighteenth and early nineteenth century changes in a framework that does 
justice to the time period and its own dynamics as opposed to a rigid linear progression 
towards an ultimately inevitable collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                            
9 For a broad outline of major historiographical approaches in Ottoman historiography 
since the 1950s, see Cem Emrence, “Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography,” 
Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 41, no. 2 (2007): 137–151. 
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The so-called decline theory can be cited as one of the most debated issues among 
Ottoman historians in terms of historiography.10 The decline theory argues that the 
Ottoman state exercised a great degree of control over the lands it ruled during the 
heyday of the empire until around the end of the sixteenth century. During the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed its ‘Golden Age’ as it reached the 
zenith of its power in terms of its imperial institutions, military and economic power, and 
large territory. The internal disturbances and chaotic situation created by the Celali 
rebellions in late sixteenth century, according to this argument, indicated that a general 
decline in the imperial institutions was already underway by the end of the sixteenth 
century.11 Military defeats in the “post-classical” era and rise of the local notables later in 
the eighteenth century were some of the signs of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.  
This decline would necessitate the reform efforts in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Everyone did not appreciate this obvious fact though. Despite the good-willed 
efforts of few enlightened reformer bureaucrats and rulers (such as Selim III), the Empire 
was destined for its eventual collapse because the Ottoman recognition of the superiority 
of the West arrived too late.12 Due to this late appreciation of Western supremacy 
                                                            
10 For a brief review of the literature on the “decline” and modernization theories, see 
Donald Quataert, “Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes Towards the Notion 
of ‘Decline’,” History Compass 1 (2003): 1–9. For a review of the decline literature of 
the earlier centuries, see Douglas A. Howard, “Ottoman Historiography and the 
Literature of ‘Decline’ of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of Asian 
History 22 (1988): 52–77. 
11 See also Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society,” in An Economic 
and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald 
Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11–409. 
12 For a classic formulation of the theory, see Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the 
Decline of the Ottoman Empire,” Studia Islamica 9 (1958): 111–127. 
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(evidenced by the European military’s success), the only remaining question for 
Ottomans was whether and how they could actually catch up with the West. In fact, this 
theory had its firm roots in the eighteenth century European intellectual tradition, which 
argued that the eighteenth century in the Orient represented an “era of political and 
societal decay and intellectual stagnation.”13 
The decline theory as such and its application to the Ottoman context have widely 
been criticized and its basic assumptions have been closely scrutinized. In terms of 
historiography, this was a rigidly linear perception of history that confined any Ottoman 
effort at modernization as an inherently futile attempt. The process of change had a single 
target, namely Western modernity and there was no room for hybridity or an alternative 
modernity. This inevitable progress towards Western norms and ideas was destined to 
triumph despite the regressive forces in society and any modifications along the way 
meant shirking the fundamental logic of change. By judging that the eventual collapse of 
the empire was evidence of earlier incapability to adopt and change, decline theory 
provided historians with a fundamentally anachronistic framework.    
In addition to its anachronism, the decline theory prioritized political and military 
success by stripping social, economic, and cultural processes of their relevance for 
history. Economic, social, and cultural histories written on various regions of the Empire 
over the past several decades have emphasized change as an analytical category as 
opposed to decline.  
Historians have debated some of the basic assumptions of the decline theory. In 
fact, the amount of revisionist discussions reached a point that Dana Sajdi now refers to 
                                                            
13 Jamal Malik, “Muslim Culture and Reform in 18th Century South Asia,” Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society 13, no. 2 (2003): 229. 
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the existence of an “anti-declinist literature.” However, despite the rich criticisms leveled 
against the decline theory, it is still too early to declare the end of decline versus anti-
decline debate.14 As Sajdi notes, the declinist arguments are still being put forward15 due 
in large part to the current post-9/11 political climate.16 As a result, inquiring into the 
reasons why Islamic societies in general have failed to modernize has become quite 
popular.17 While the Ottoman historians are in agreement to a large degree on the 
analytical shortcomings of the decline theory, they have yet to liberate18 general histories 
on the Middle East from the baggage of the decline and modernization theories. Scarcity 
of such revisionist general histories results in repetition of the decline theory by non-
Ottomanists who are interested in broader questions about imperial longevity and 
comparisons between early modern empires.19  
                                                            
14 For an overview of the debate on the decline theory, see Dana Sajdi, “Decline, Its 
Discontents and Ottoman Cultural History: By Way of Introduction,” in Ottoman Tulips, 
Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century (London, New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2007), 1–40. See also Virginia H. Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans,” History 
and Theory 47, no. February 2008 (2008): 109–122. 
15 Sajdi singles out Bernard Lewis as one scholar still insisting on the decline theory. 
Sajdi, “Decline, Its Discontents,” 26. 
16 There is resurgence in the “Islamophobic” literature especially in the U.S. and Europe. 
In an attempt to explain what they see as the conflict between Islam and the West, many 
writers (often in organized and concerted efforts) are resurrecting and promoting views 
that place Islam and the West in diametrically opposed positions. Surely, these positions 
are not equal to one another, as the West represents the more progressive and advanced 
civilization against the regressive Islamic cultures. Hence, it becomes legitimate to ask 
questions about the reasons for the backwardness and decline of Muslim societies in 
history.   
17 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response 
(Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
18 Sajdi, “Decline, Its Discontents,” 38. 
19 For an example of this approach, see Manfred Pittioni, “The Economic Decline of the 
Ottoman Empire,” in The Decline of Empires, ed. Emil Brix, Klaus Koch, and Elisabeth 
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Ottoman historians have yet to produce narratives that provide a substitute for the 
decline theory. This has an important role in the continued utilization of the decline 
theory by non-Ottomanists. However, discussions of the decline theory do not take place 
solely because scholars are unaware of the accomplishments in the field of Ottoman 
history in terms of producing a discourse of change and transformation instead of decline. 
The decline theory has relevance conceptually, especially for scholars interested in 
exposition of the reasons for the disintegration of imperial structures. Since disintegration 
did actually take place, what were the causes of it? There seems to be a tension between 
trying to provide causes for the end of empires in a comparative perspective20 and 
avoiding linear explanations culminating in the collapse of the empire and emergence of 
the modern Turkish republic,21 especially because the latter perception would ignore 
growth in certain areas such as trade, manufacturing, and the strength of the local 
powerbrokers.  
We cannot deny the fact that the Ottoman Empire as a political entity has 
disintegrated.22 Yet, we also need to avoid some of the earlier scholarly perceptions such 
as to attribute cultural causes for the demise of the empire, to read Ottoman history only 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Vyslonzil (Wien, München: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik; Oldenbourg Verlag, 
2001), 21–44. 
20 Charles Tilly, “How Empires End,” in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-
Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, ed. Karen 
Barkey and M. Von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). 
21 Kemal Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 3 (1972): 243–281. 
22 Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” Harvard Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Review 4, no. 1 (1998): 30–75. 
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through the eyes of the disgruntled critiques within the Ottoman elite,23 and to privilege 
the Ottoman center’s concerns and ideology by ignoring the vitality of the periphery as 
well as the non-elite groups. Hence, it may be premature to claim that the decline theory 
has lost all its relevance as a result of the proliferation of social and cultural histories 
produced during the last couple of decades largely because the field has a long way to go 
in producing general Ottoman histories free of declinist frameworks.  
Social and cultural histories have shown the depth and richness of the institutions 
in transformation. They have shown that the apparent decline in the military and political 
realm did not necessarily translate into decline in other areas. What remains to be 
accomplished is to present a balanced picture of the Empire’s declining political power 
while simultaneously showing how various institutions (such as a modern bureaucracy) 
may have thrived. Furthermore, it will have to be demonstrated that the triumph of these 
new institutions was not necessarily at the expense of the center.  
It is not an easy task to reassert the decline theory without fundamental 
conceptual modifications that take into account the institutional and social 
transformations of the later centuries. Such a balancing act, namely explaining the 
imperial disintegration without ignoring the internal dynamics, flexibility, change, and 
growth seems imperative. This endeavor is especially crucial if we are to answer the 
question of how the Ottoman imperial structures did not survive at the end, despite their 
efforts to remain flexible and adaptable.24 Rethinking how decline and growth happened 
                                                            
23 Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline,” Islamic Studies 1 (1962): 
71–87. 
24 Karen Barkey, “A Perspective on Ottoman Decline,” in Hegemonic Decline: Present 
and Past, vol. XXVI-b, Political Economy of the World-System Annuals (London: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 135–151. 
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in parallel may prove to be a more fruitful endeavor.25 As Jane Hathaway points out, the 
majority of modern studies on the eighteenth century posited the eighteenth century as a 
“period when decline finally caught up with the empire … decentralization finally won 
out over sporadic attempts at recentralization.”26  
Historiography on the New Order also suffers from this idea of an inevitable 
decline and portrays the New Order as an effort that was too little, too late on the part of 
the Ottoman elite to catch up. Framing the decline in terms of military and political 
power along with increased centralization and fiscal rationalization (not necessarily 
positive developments for all segments of the society), for instance, could prevent us 
from presenting a distorted vision and overemphasizing the decline in all imperial 
institutions. The creation of the New Order army can be construed within the process of 
“adjustment of Ottoman methods of rule and the balance of power within the empire to 
changing circumstances”27 instead of the imperial decline perspective, which hyper 
focuses on the center’s receding power.      
The crucial mistake we need to avoid, however, is to take growth in one area (for 
instance, Janissaries’ increasing power in politics) and treat is as corruption or some sort 
of aberration, which was the view of various segments within the elites of the Ottoman 
government. The New Order historiography is full of narratives that depict the non-elite 
groups’ involvement in politics as an anomaly. This was precisely the viewpoint of the 
Ottoman court historians who wrote that the ideal order was being upset by the 
                                                            
25 Kafadar, “Question of Ottoman Decline,” 71. 
26 Jane Hathaway, “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History,” Mediterranean 
Historical Review 19, no. 1 (2004): 46. 
27 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 250. 
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emergence of non-elite groups, such as the Janissaries, the esnaf, or even the notables. 
Later historians took this perception at face value without considering the idea that “elites 
and non-elites can be seen to participate in a cultural continuum.”28 
The non-elite groups, especially within the context of the New Order narratives, 
were predominantly presented as troublemakers causing the decline of the state. This 
perception helped modern republican historians in constructing a narrative that presented 
these groups as regressive forces resisting the necessary changes and refusing to adapt to 
the needs of the time. There was, of course, a nuance involved in moving from the 
narrative of the “troublemakers” to that of the “regressive forces.” This shift in discourse 
was closely related to the secularist language and radical reform agenda of the early 
republican historiography.  
The Ottoman court historians and the early republican historians agreed on the 
concept of decline, but their narratives differed in that the former focused on the 
upsetting of the Ottoman ideal order while the latter proposed a so-called historic struggle 
between progressive and regressive/conservative forces. For the Ottoman historians, 
societal groups were causing trouble and preventing the empire from returning to its 
supposed imperial glory back in the sixteenth century. For the early republican historians, 
there was no emphasis on past glory but instead on the present glorious revolutionary 
agenda of the new Turkish republic. They were much more focused on showing that what 
they considered to be the regressive forces of their own time were remnants of the 
troublemakers of the past, who had ostensibly inherited the task of hindering Turkey’s 
march towards modernity.  
                                                            
28 Hathaway, “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History,” 47. 
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A Military Society? 
One of the influences of the decline theory has to do with assumptions about the 
military nature and strength of the Ottoman state in its earliest stages and during its 
Golden Age. The relatively rapid expansion of the Ottoman state in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries was puzzling to historians.29 How was it that the Ottomans were able 
to bring under their rule such varied territories in such a short time and sustain their rule 
for such a long time?30 Among many answers given to this question, military discipline 
epitomized in a devoted military corps, symbolized by the Janissaries, scored highly.31 In 
fact, the Ottomans owed their greatness to the janissaries.32 Yet, since the Empire was no 
longer expanding territorially after the sixteenth century, it was concluded that the 
military capabilities of the Ottoman state must have been declining. Military losses 
experienced during the eighteenth century were deemed evidence of this decline long in 
the making. It was argued that because the Ottoman Empire owed its strength to its 
military nature, weakening of this essential feature would lead the Empire to its ultimate 
failure.  
The idea that this was a society with clearly compartmentalized social classes 
attributes successes and failures to this essentially militaristic feature of the Ottoman 
                                                            
29 For an in-depth analysis of the historiography on the foundation of the Ottoman state, 
see Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995). Kafadar shows the degree to which modern 
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30 Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), 5. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Arthur L. Horniker, “The Corps of the Janizaries,” Military Affairs, 1944, 203. 
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society. Just as the Golden Age was due to the military strength of the Janissaries, it was 
only logical that decline of the Empire was also because of the military weakness of the 
army, i.e. the Janissaries. The portrayal of the Ottoman government as a two tier system 
(secular and religious powers working side by side in incredible harmony thanks to their 
clearly defined roles) where the Janissaries displayed an unprecedented level of 
selflessness, discipline, and commitment to the sultan himself contributed to a perception 
of the Janissaries as almost supra-human soldiers comparable to the guardians of Plato’s 
Republic.33  
This representation was not seriously challenged nor was it the subject of a 
critical scholarly debate.34 Yet, it pervaded much of the idealized view of the janissaries 
in the classical age among modern historians.35 Just as Plato had argued that the 
intermingling of the different classes in the Republic would lead to inferior forms of 
government,36 the most fundamental institution in the Ottoman society would deteriorate 
in the 17th and 18th centuries because of the janissaries’ involvement in the economic and 
social spheres. The janissaries’ relations with societal groups were thus seen as clear 
                                                            
33 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman 
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signs of deviation from the ideal order where the ruler and the ruled were strictly 
separate.37 
The notion that the Ottoman state was actually able to maintain such a strict 
separation between the military classes (askeri) and the commoners (reaya)38 during its 
heyday and that any movement between these two classes would be a violation of the 
ideal order is highly questionable to say the least. This perception fits well with 
Orientalist preconceptions about the nature of Islamic societies,39 a discussion that cannot 
be dealt with extensively here. For our purposes, it should suffice to recall Roger Owen’s 
critique of Gibb and Bowen’s understanding of Ottoman society as an Islamic society 
that was divided between the rulers and the ruled.40  
However, this does not mean that the idea of a strict separation between the ruling 
elite and society was a mere creation of the Orientalist historians. The viewpoint of the 
Ottoman court historians, who often shared the state-centered view of the Ottoman elite, 
                                                            
37 H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact 
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has contributed immensely to this perception. Adoption of their narratives by later 
historians has often resulted in negligence of social groups including craftsmen, peasants, 
and women.41 Even some of the earlier critics of the classic state-centered understanding 
of the Ottoman state-society dynamics were not immune from reproducing the 
supposedly rigid separation, as they interpreted the empire as essentially a feudal state. 
The military class with the exclusive right to bear arms was pitted against the producing 
class of peasants and farmers within a Marxist framework.42 The idea of a strict 
separation between the military and non-military groups was thus maintained and even 
reproduced by historians. 
The Ottoman ruling elite perceived the relations between the military and non-
military groups in society as an anomaly contributing to the failures of the Ottoman state. 
The ideal order (if it ever existed) could only be maintained through a clear stratification 
of society. The Ottoman court historians’ elitist and often self-serving rhetoric reflected 
their positions as Ottoman officials, who “subscribed to the Ibn Khaldunian notion that 
the ruler and his entourage should not engage in commerce or similar money-making 
                                                            
41 Adanır and Faroqhi calls for a “critical contextualization of the relevant authors” and 
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activities.”43 Blaming the janissaries and their relations with the society at large for the 
military failures of the Ottoman state fits well this ideological outlook.  
Especially in a time period such as the late eighteenth century when imposition of 
new regulations and discipline needed to be justified, the idea of an ideal past epoch 
when there existed a clear stratification of society was used as a trope in the writings of 
Ottoman court historians. They spoke of a golden age when the military and non-military 
classes in the Ottoman society had supposedly remained within their own classes and 
avoided intermingling with each other. However, as we know well, the Ottoman elites 
themselves did not abide by this rule. For instance, they had no qualms about arming the 
Ottoman subjects, hence violating the alleged military versus non-military distinction, in 
the name of “protecting the common people from their oppressors (the Celalis)” in the 
1590s.44 This concept of justice, namely protecting the subjects from oppressors,45 was 
employed even if it meant going against the ideal stratification of society. Political 
expediency required that the state use such an ideology to respond to the realities on the 
ground. In a similar vein, the eighteenth century court historians’ complaints about 
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mingling of the military and non-military classes as a cause of decline derive from their 
current political agendas rather than the realities of the Ottoman history.46  
Among the historians who have questioned the existence of military and non-
military separation, Cemal Kafadar has disputed the idea that the janissaries were ever in 
such an ideal state disconnected from society at large. He has shown that the alleged 
demarcating lines between the subjects (reaya) and the military (askeri) classes were far 
from rigid and the engagement of the military classes in the economic sphere need not be 
interpreted as a sign of corruption and decline of the Ottoman military institutions.47 Even 
the sultan himself would occasionally violate this alleged rule that the state be separate 
from society.48 Mingling of soldiers with local people of Istanbul as well as other 
provinces, especially during long periods of peace, was not a novel phenomenon peculiar 
to the 18th century.  
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From a military history standpoint, janissaries’ relations with the society at large 
raise some valid questions about their efficiency as a military corps. Historians find it 
difficult to avoid the janissary corps’ presentation as a corrupt and decaying institution 
that once was free of corrupting influences of non-military activities.49 After all, was it 
not this highly disciplined corps during the height of the Empire that secured victories for 
the state? The reason for the military losses must have had something to do with the 
Janissaries who no longer functioned as they used to. However, this cannot be identified 
as the cause of military failures, which resulted from a complex set of political, military, 
economic, and social reasons. For instance, Robert Zens charges “inefficiency and 
corruption that plagued the janissary corps” concluding from Virginia Aksan’s reference 
to Baron de Tot’s claim that only 10% of the 400.000 registered janissaries could be 
considered soldiers in wartime.50  
It is true that the janissaries’ extremely low participation in the war effort pose 
serious questions about military efficiency of the janissary corps. However, was the low 
participation of the janissaries in the military enterprise due to their inefficiency and 
corruption only? Deeper causes of this phenomenon have yet to be explained and they are 
related to broader socio-economic conditions in the late eighteenth century. The 
inefficiency and corruption was, at the same time, an effect of the Ottoman government’s 
inability to conduct warfare as an attractive enterprise both socially and economically for 
the individual soldiers.  
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The corruption charge assumes an earlier ideal situation from which deviation 
occurred. It prevents us from understanding the larger janissary phenomenon with its 
economic and social implications for the Ottoman society as a whole because of the focus 
on the military efficiency of the janissaries. It also lacks a comparative perspective on the 
pre-modern armies that shared similar problems with regard to organizational 
capabilities, efficiency, and corruption. The Russian army, for instance, which the 
Ottomans found it difficult to deal with throughout the eighteenth century, suffered from 
corruption in their supply system, to cite only one problem area.51 It is clear that we also 
need a comparative perspective in evaluating the nature of corruption and inefficiency in 
the eighteenth century to be able to identify the distinct qualities of the Ottoman army 
that may have pushed Ottoman elites toward reform of the janissaries. 
Decline theory has provided historians with an account of the New Order that 
suffers from analytical problems such as anachronism, elitism, and reductionism among 
others. It has argued for the inevitability of decline, rigid social stratification between 
military and non-military groups, and janissaries as the responsible party for the ultimate 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It has failed to enrich our understanding of the New 
Order as one of the instances where the Ottoman society interacted and tried to engage 
with “modernity” as they experienced it in an attempt to produce their authentic version. 
Dismissing this experience with the narrow perspectives offered by the decline theory 
hampers a fuller understanding of the New Order and its opponents and ultimately fails to 
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account for the processes of change, adaptation, mutual recognition, and negotiation 
between the supporters and opponents of the New Order effort.  
 
Modernization Paradigm 
The decline paradigm often goes hand in hand with the so-called modernization 
paradigm. The modernization paradigm picks up where the decline paradigm leaves off. 
Since the military and political power of the empire had declined, now it was only natural 
that the Ottomans try to adopt and imitate the ways of the Western powers owing to their 
technological, economic, and military superiority. Before the implementation of the 
Western techniques of statecraft, there needed to be recognition on the part of the 
Ottomans that they were in fact behind their western counterparts. After all, “even if the 
industrial states of Europe were willing to share their military technology, the Muslim 
dynastic states could not have mastered the new skills without simultaneously changing 
their societies and their economies.”52 The realization of Western superiority, however, 
did not come about for a long time and that it was only after the French Revolution that 
the Ottomans saw no choice but to imitate the West.53 By then, salvaging the deteriorated 
state of affairs and turning the imperial decline around had become extremely difficult, if 
not impossible. Nevertheless, the impact of the West was an inherently progressive force 
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that helped the empire alter its archaic structures to evolve toward a modern nation state 
eventually.54 
There were a few brave souls and western educated reformers to undertake this 
task of enlightened westernization and modernization of the imperial institutions. Highly 
privileging the Enlightenment ideals and the ideological impact of the French Revolution 
in modern times, historians presented Selim III and Mahmud II as the enlightened 
despots55 trying to adhere to those ideals by instituting modern institutions. The 
enlightened bureaucrats these sultans’ reforms created were considered beacons of 
change. However, the traditional Muslim society stood in the way of these good-willed 
sultans and enlightened bureaucrats by resisting their progressive reforms and delaying 
the necessary modernization of the imperial institutions.56  
The so-called reform era (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) would prove to be 
a long period of struggle between the reform-minded ruling elite and the traditional 
forces of society, i.e. the janissaries, the ulema etc. ultimately leading to emergence of 
secularism in an essentially Islamic society.57 As Niyazi Berkes argued, “the 
impoverished social classes and estates were in common opposition to reform, 
irrespective of their original differences and antipathies, in order to maintain their 
parasitical status. Their primary opponents were the men who stood for reform, above all 
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the rulers and secular minded statesmen who aimed at creating an effective, scientifically 
trained officer corps.”58 Through casting the struggle as one between the reformists and 
conservatives and by reducing the opposition to reform to a single group seeking to retain 
their “parasitical” status, historians made an argument that projected the ideologically 
charged debates on secularism and capability of Islamic societies to modernize onto the 
historiography on the New Order. Furthermore, in discussions of modern Turkish history, 
the period under discussion here has often been treated as a prelude to Ottoman 
westernization and modernization in a teleological fashion.59  
Intellectuals of the eighteenth century who were greatly concerned with the 
European advances were often presented as the harbingers of secularism in the 
preordained story of Turkish modernization. More careful consideration of such Ottoman 
intellectuals, such as Ibrahim Müteferrika, has revealed that they were in fact in awe of 
the order and discipline of the European armies and virtually obsessed with the idea of 
order. Müteferrika, for instance, proposed that Ottomans reorganize their military on the 
model of the Europeans and Russians under Peter the Great while asserting Muslim 
superiority.60 The presentation of Ottoman elite intellectuals as early enlightened 
secularists who were rebuffed by their conservative religious countrymen curtails the 
complex dynamics at work in the reform efforts of the eighteenth century and inhibits our 
ability to develop an alternative framework.   
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One of the arguments of modernization theory contributing to the perception of 
the New Order has to do with the nature of the Ottomans’ relationship with the West. The 
Ottoman society’s belonging to the Islamic world meant that it was supposed to be 
demarcated from the Western world and would not be influenced by it until it was 
confronted with the challenge of the West.61 The problem with this approach, besides its 
Eurocentric bias, is that it assumes that the West influenced the Ottoman political, 
economic, social, and intellectual currents in a unidirectional manner;62 suggesting, 
“change in the Ottoman Empire came from without, namely, from the West.” According 
to this framework, Ottomans were simply imitators who “could not even appreciate their 
own backwardness.”63  
This perspective privileges political changes by ignoring mutual social and 
cultural exchanges as well as the Ottoman influence on the West. For instance, new 
studies show that Ottoman military music exerted strong influence on European court 
festivals.64 The Ottoman military’s influence on the European militaries remains an under 
researched area of study, inhibiting our ability to analyze mutual exchanges. As early as 
the sixteenth century, the Ottoman merchants were vehicles of similar economic and 
cultural exchanges with the West through their engagement in domestic and international 
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trade.65 Even at its inception, as Kafadar demonstrates, the Ottoman state emerged out of 
a deeply hybrid society with both Muslims and Christians as its foundational elements. 
The relationship between the early Ottomans and the Christians living in western 
Anatolia went beyond simple interaction between two distinct societies.66 As the Ottoman 
state transformed into an empire, this multicultural and multiethnic character became 
even stronger and more structural. Arguing that this empire was essentially an Islamic 
empire, and therefore, isolated from the Christian West is to do injustice to history to say 
the least.  
The Ottomans were neither hesitant nor incapable of adopting foreign 
technologies and to import foreign expertise whenever necessary in earlier centuries,67 as 
well as in the late eighteenth century. As William McNeill writes, the “sultan hired 
Christians from Transylvania to build and operate the cannon he needed to overcome the 
famous and formidable defenses of Constantinople attests to the superiority that 
European metalworkers and gunsmiths had achieved, as well as his eagerness to acquire 
what he recognized as a clearly superior weapon.”68 Neither did the Ottomans have a 
serious resistance to Western influence in cultural terms as is exemplified by the 
architectural influences throughout the eighteenth century.69 Nevertheless, the Ottomans’ 
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making good use of foreign technologies were not limited to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries when they may have felt powerful enough not to be threatened by 
such imports. In Aksan’s words, “the imperial bureaucracy both recognized the necessity 
of importing, or manufacturing, what they saw merely as weapons, while remaining 
wedded to the cultural system of which they were the principal beneficiaries.”70  
The idea that the Ottomans imported superior technologies once they recognized 
the superior Western ideas and technologies has been criticized for missing the 
interaction inherent in any such occurrence of technology transfer between cultures as 
well as the dialectical nature of the conversation.71 Even in the time of Selim III, when 
one might expect a haphazard import of technology because of political instability and 
social unrest, the Ottomans imported weapons and expertise from multiple sources 
(French, Russian, Austrian, Spanish, and British) and only those that had “proven their 
worth on the battlefield.”72 Ottomans were close observers of developments in the West, 
including the historic transformations taking place such as the French Revolution;73 even 
Selim III himself corresponded with Louis XVI prior to assuming the throne.74 It is 
difficult to determine to what extent the Ottomans fully grasped the pace of the 
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technological developments in the West but it is safe to argue that the Ottomans were 
neither simple importers of nor resisters against foreign ideas and technology.75 On the 
contrary, they were selective in adopting what would work best for their needs at the 
time. Whether this was sufficient is another debate but it is difficult to argue that the 
Ottomans had a cultural disposition to oppose foreign ideas or reform.  
Ottoman resistance to the innovation argument is often based on eyewitness 
accounts of Ottoman military practice by Western travelers, diplomats, and military 
advisors. Such observers came not only with their preconceived notions about how the 
Eastern societies are supposed to operate but also with their conviction that the West was 
inherently superior to the East.76 Even those who observed the Ottoman army on the 
battlefield made such overly simplistic generalizations that one needs to be very cautious 
in using them at face value.77 Their formulations such as despotism as an explanatory 
framework of the oriental governments such as the Ottoman Empire represented 
discourses that belonged to the European context where the thinkers argued against their 
own kings in favor of concepts such as the rule of law, good government etc. It was 
established among eighteenth century European thinkers, based on their extremely 
                                                            
75 Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace  : Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 
1700-1783 (Leiden  ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1995). 
76 Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to 
Montesquieu,” Journal of Early Modern History: Contacts, Comparisons, Contrasts 9, 
no. 1–2 (2005): 109–180. 
77 Langeron wrote, “A Turkish general never knows the number of men which he has 
under arms.” George F. Jewsbury, “Chaos and Corruption: The Comte de Langeron’s 
Critique of the 1787-1792 Russo-Turkish War,” Studies in History and Politics iii (1984 
1983): 81. 
 35 
skewed knowledge about the Ottoman governing practices, that the Ottoman government 
rule was inherently despotic.78  
Traditional historiography has often taken these accounts at face value and 
adopted their approach to explain why the military reform had been unsuccessful. One of 
the most famous accounts of this kind belonged to Baron de Tott. Such accounts were, in 
Virginia Aksan’s words, “imbued with their own progressive, superior view of the world, 
were neither able to recognize that Ottoman resistance to social and cultural change 
might have had causes other than religious fanaticism.”79 Surely, this was not uncommon 
and the strange reports from strange lands were filling the imagination of the European 
reading public over the course of the eighteenth century. Especially in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, European officials increasingly circumscribed the main 
characteristics of reform through a modernization discourse expressed within the 
framework of a religious clash between Islam and “European Christian rationality.”80  
Simplistic dichotomies were not necessarily subjected to scholarly criticisms of 
our day and they were often part of the political debates within Europe such as the nature 
of despotism81 rather than carefully researched accounts of non-Western realities. These 
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works could become standard readings about other cultures. Tott’s writings conveyed a 
standard story about Ottoman military modernization. Tott’s memoirs’ popularity at the 
time was “attributable as much to the entertaining stories as to the information about the 
Ottomans it supplies.”82 The problem for later historiography was, however, that they 
took the writings of Tott at face value, inherited assumptions about the nature of the 
Ottoman culture, and built their historiographical theories based on such tainted 
reporting. 
Advocates of modernization theory often took the European travelers’ accounts as 
evidence for two separate closed worlds, the West and the East. Although sharing many 
prejudices and preconceived notions about the Orient, these travel accounts were not 
necessarily monolithic in their conception of the Orient.83 Nonetheless, the modernization 
discourse was intent on showing that the trajectory of the early modern history led to the 
modern state, the best example of which was in Europe. It was argued that only a small 
portion of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite, who had previously been closed to the 
developments in the West, started only in the eighteenth century to realize Western 
superiority.84  
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The enlightened sultan, Selim III, was viewed as the first courageous sultan to 
attempt to reform the society along western lines, although he “lacked the necessary 
ruthlessness and cunning”85 in implementing the necessary radical reforms against the 
likes of the janissaries. As Avigdor Levy put it, the “reforms failed essentially for lack of 
a determined and stable leadership that could sustain them in the face of strong popular 
opposition.”86 He was a “man lacking in determination and foresight.”87 Selim III’s so-
called “limited concept of reform”88 met stiff resistance from a conservative society, 
which was not ready to emulate and benefit from Western progress. According to this 
framework, the fundamental flaw in Selim III’s reform measures was that he did not go 
far enough and he was too conservative in his approach89 bowing to internal pressures. 
The tenacity of reactionary forces was contrasted with the courage of the reforming 
sultan and the elite.90 Such scholarship privileges any contact with the West during this 
time period as a progressive step in the right direction and treats any opposition to new 
measures as a reactionary and conservative force. A small-enlightened elite had started to 
realize the trajectory of history but it was again “too little, too late.”  
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The modernization paradigm posits that there is only one type of truly authentic 
modernity, i.e. the Western version. The rest of the world, by definition, is not capable of 
reaching the level of modernity the West has built in isolation. Proponents of this 
paradigm considered the “non-Western world as taking a historical course different from 
Europe’s, one in which no significant change took place until the ‘impact of the West’.”91 
If non-Westerners attempted to imitate the West, it remained as a limited (and ultimately 
a futile) attempt by the elites, as they were not as radical as they needed to be to push 
through the necessary revolutionary reforms in the face of their conservative societies.  
There was no room in this paradigm for hybridity or an alternative modernity, as 
non-Westerners did not go through the necessary stages of progression leading up to the 
emergence of modern states, rendering them simple followers of the West. Others have 
convincingly disputed the validity of Western uniqueness in this manner and suggested 
that the “transition from medieval segmentary states to stable empires, from localized to 
globalizing economies, and from inward-looking to expansionist policies took place in 
the Middle East at the same time as in Europe”92 in the sixteenth century. If the Ottomans 
went through similar processes as the Europeans in terms of state development in early 
modern times, the argument that the Ottomans did not realize the West’s supposed 
superiority until they were finally awoken to this reality in late eighteenth century 
becomes difficult to justify.   
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Early Republican Histories 
Arguably, the strongest proponents of modernization theory were the early 
Turkish nationalist historians because of the outlook of the newly created secular republic 
in the 1920s. The Turkish nationalist historiography projected its anxiety over secular 
versus religious dichotomy unto Ottoman history.93 Turkish nationalist scholars rejected 
the Ottoman past for its corruption and degeneration94 because of the impact of religion.95 
The main concern for the historiography of the 1930s was to explain the fatal decline96 of 
the Ottoman Empire, which, according to them, resulted from the religiously minded 
conservatism of the ulema and bureaucrats of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. What they claimed as their progressive predecessors in the Ottoman past were 
the reformers who tried to adopt the Western institutions in an effort to save the empire. 
Even then, what they applauded was not the effort to save the empire, which we knew 
was futile, but the elite’s recognition that they were behind the West and they needed to 
radically reform just as the nascent Turkish republic was in the process of doing. The 
alleged historical struggle between the reformists and conservatives97 as well as the need 
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for adoption of Western institutions were used as the ultimate explanatory models 
reflecting the concerns of the western-aspiring modern Turkish nation-state.  
In this context, everything modern was identified with the notion of an advanced 
and progressive West. This did not start with the new republic’s nation-state project. 
Republican historians inherited the legacy of the late nineteenth century Ottoman 
Orientalism, which “implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of 
progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theater of backwardness.”98 The 
discourse of westernization among Turkish intellectuals has been an ongoing political 
and historical obsession99 perhaps understandably given the context of a need to build a 
new nation and the legacy of more-than-a-century-long effort to confront the West in 
political, military, economic, and cultural terms.  
Under the influence of French sociologists such as Durkheim and Comte in 
particular,100 the late Ottoman and early republican intellectuals (sociologists, historians, 
politicians such as Namık Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, Ahmed Refik, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 
Enver Ziya Karal) employed a discourse of modernization with varying degrees of 
emphasis on westernization. As they felt different from Westerners, they sought non-
Western models of modernization especially in the wake of Japan’s 1905 triumph over 
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Russia.101 These historians may have settled for the Islamic and near Ottoman example of 
Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt in their search for a non-Western model for development.102 
Nevertheless, they considered the West as the ultimate defining model of modernization 
and nation-state even as they looked to the East for a model.103 Traumatized not only by 
the impending disintegration of the empire but also specifically the loss of the Balkans in 
the eve of the First World War104 and in search of a new history for the new nation, they 
discussed what the appropriate place of Ottoman history with reference to the new 
republic should have been.105  
A recent study by Can Erimtan demonstrated skillfully how one such historian 
Ahmed Refik redefined and reconstructed the so-called Tulip Era (1712 – 1730) as, in 
Refik’s own words, a “brilliant age of awakening, the first stage of serious dissemination 
of European civilization in the East.”106 Refik used the very term new order in discussing 
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the intentions of Damad İbrahim Pasha during the Tulip Era107 so as to argue that the 
Western-influenced efforts to reform the society had already started at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century only to be continued in Selim III’s time. Yet again, this short-lived 
progressive epoch would be disrupted by a coalition of the janissaries and the ulema,108 
which represented the usual reactionary forces opposing “innovations imported from the 
West.”109 Tulip Era was considered not only the beginning of Westernization110 but also 
the end of the Ottoman classical age according to this framework.111 Reconsideration of 
the so-called Tulip Era and the political, economic, and social dynamics of the rebellion 
that ended it would arrive much later.112 Historians of this era portrayed the usual 
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suspects (a coalition of like-minded conservative forces such as the janissaries, ulema and 
the riff raff of Istanbul) as responsible for putting an end to a progressive attempt at 
modernization and westernization. Historiography on the New Order era shares a similar 
fate as that of the Tulip Era because of this ideologically motivated anachronism of the 
early Republican historiography. 
The dilemma for the intellectuals during this transitional period (early Republican 
era) was to explain the current political weakness of the Ottoman polity and justify the 
need to modernize moving forward without necessarily abandoning the Turkish culture 
(especially in the case of Ziya GGökalp).113 The resulting formulation epitomized in 
Kemalist historiography included aspects of both the decline and modernization 
discourses. The decline of the Ottoman Empire would justify the need for modernization 
along western lines. In this context, the New Order would appear to be a failed attempt at 
modernization. This required radical measures to be undertaken, a task the Republican 
intellectuals set for themselves. Thus, in line with this ideological reshaping of history, 
Turkish nationalist historiography defined and situated the New Order within a 
traditionalist versus progressive framework. 
Another framework the Republican historians relied on was the opposition 
between the central and peripheral forces with sympathies placed with the central 
government. The reason for that was the Republican historians were instrumental in 
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constructing the new nation state’s centralizing discourse. They blamed the Ottoman 
decline on the weakness of central authority. This approach reflects their desire to justify 
the nascent nation state’s highly centralized authority and the late eighteenth century 
phenomenon of diffused structures of power was not regarded as a positive development 
for the empire. On the contrary, this was the very reason the state had disintegrated at the 
end. The history of the New Order taught the Republican historians the value of being as 
radical as possible in the new nation’s reform agenda and avoid at all costs decentralized 
sources of power.   
 
Ottoman Court Historians 
Having demonstrated some of the main assumptions and the preconceived notions 
of the modern or republican historians, one might be inclined to think that we can avoid 
these assumptions if we abandon these modern histories in favor of contemporary sources 
or archival documents. However, the earliest archival sources and accounts on the New 
Order pose historiographical and textual problems for the historian of our day. In the 
name of “approaching the Ottoman Empire on its own terms,” historians have often fallen 
into the trap of viewing “all phenomena through the eyes of the central bureaucracy and 
gave an exaggerated picture of the state’s power and actual control.”114 The often 
criticized Ottoman historians’ obsession with the archival materials, or document-
fetishism in Berktay’s wording,115 has had its impact on the New Order historiography as 
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well, as the complaints of the Ottoman reformist elites about the opponents of the New 
Order were taken at face value. The perspective of the imperial center with regard to 
military reform dominated the debates, resulting in the rendition of opponents of the New 
Order as a nuisance rather than a social reality. 
Historians interested in inter-textuality and discourse analysis116 have argued that 
any text is to be treated in relation to other texts and discourses. Yet, some historians 
have taken this to the point that all texts are mere constructions (which they are) that have 
no relation to reality (which they do). That is to say, the fact that any text, hence any 
historical narrative, is to be understood as an inter-textual construction does not mean that 
it has no relation to reality.117 The historian’s job seems to be critically engaging with the 
text by identifying and situating the text in relation to reality as much as we are able to 
understand that reality.  
Historiography on the New Order is not a mere construction of modern historians 
reflecting the concerns of their time. The official historians of the Ottoman state provided 
modern historians with plenty of ammunition about the need for reform and corruption of 
the janissaries as well as the broken ideal order of the golden age. Critical reading and 
deconstruction of the narratives of the court historians have been accomplished by a 
handful of historians especially for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.118  
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Contemporary sources on the New Order and especially on the 1807 rebellion that 
brought an end to the New Order project119 are much more diverse in their presentation of 
the political polarizations and struggles of their time. They often differ on their 
perceptions of the New Order measures and the janissaries, providing us with a more 
complex picture. This demonstrates the hazards of reducing the New Order and its 
opponents to a struggle between two ideological camps, i.e. the reformers and the 
conservatives. As a result of the eventual abolition of the janissary corps in 1826, 
however, historiography has favored the view that the janissaries constituted the main 
problem at the time whereas contemporary sources often blamed different individuals and 
trends (such as the New Order elite’s personal enrichment through the new taxes and 
their corruption). Some of these sources expressed views that identified the Janissaries 
and their elite affiliates as the main source of the problem while others found the New 
Order elites responsible. Later historians favored the former view.120 
Much of the republican and modern historiography overlooked these nuances and 
overwhelmingly interpreted Selim III’s reign through the Tanzimat elites’ lenses. For the 
late eighteenth century, the Tanzimat intellectual and historian121 Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s 
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canonical 12 volumes, Tarih-i Cevdet122 continues to shape our understanding of the New 
Order despite the fact that a critical assessment of this narrative exposing its Tanzimat-
minded reform agenda has already been written.123 Carefully crafted as a virtual 
commentary on the Tanzimat reforms through the use of history, this work has been the 
main source for New Order although Cevdet Pasha himself was not a contemporary. 
 As a scholar and statesman involved in the conception and implementation of the 
Tanzimat reforms, Cevdet Pasha was commissioned to write his history,124 which covers 
the period from 1774 to 1826.125 Even the choice of these dates as the beginning and end 
of his history reflects the reading of history by the bureaucrats of the Tanzimat period. 
The catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Russians and the pursuant embarrassing 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 would serve as the beginning of his narrative to be 
concluded with the destruction of the Janissary Corps by Mahmud II as the end of an era. 
 What we need to pay attention is how the account of Cevdet Pasha, as a reform-
minded historian, might have been crafted as he clearly saw himself in direct 
conversation with those dates. Cevdet Pasha’s interpretation of the destruction of the 
janissary corps as the beginning of a new era of Tanzimat reforms126 reflects the 
consciousness on the part of the Tanzimat intellectuals that the reforms they aspired to 
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implement could not be possible if the janissaries were around. As such, their very 
position in history as reformers and their reformist aspirations were indebted to the 
absence of the janissaries, or so they perceived.   
Cevdet Pasha’s main concern in his Tarih seems to be to explain the reasons for 
the collapse (çöküş) of various Ottoman institutions, specifically the military and the 
Muslim religious education (ilmiye), as well as the need for reform in these areas.127 
Cevdet Pasha presents Selim III as a precursor to post-Tanzimat reformers and whose 
dethronement would legitimize the violent end of the janissaries.128 His narrative is 
crafted in a somewhat manipulative way that eliminates the potentially pro-janissary 
statements or comments in the contemporary sources he uses in writing his history.129 
The commonly used portrait of Selim III as a well intentioned but somewhat naïve sultan, 
who had been ill advised, is also a construction of Cevdet Pasha.130 What needed to be 
done, according to him, was to act decisively, which Selim III could not do because of his 
lack of resolve.131 Such a description serves the idea that the reformers are more 
enlightened and progressive but their opponents were ignorant and bigoted. More 
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importantly, the implication is that the Tanzimat reforms needed to be resolute in the face 
of opposition and avoid the mistakes of Selim III while following the successful example 
of Mahmud II. 
Cevdet Pasha’s narrow focus on the janissaries as the enemies of the New Order 
efforts draws attention away from the broad societal support for the opposition. This 
allows him to construct a narrative that pits reformers against reactionaries. In Cevdet 
Pasha’s account, the janissaries are accused of lack of discipline and order, harassing the 
population, and disobeying the sultan,132 which later became the standard accusations 
against the janissaries. Some of the Republican era historians set out to document the 
instances of janissary disobedience and corruption, taking Cevdet Pasha’s framework 
without questioning its Tanzimat era prejudices and priorities.133  
Historians enumerated instances of janissary participation in economic activity, 
failure to respond to government’s call to arms, and occasions of harassment of the local 
population among other acts of corruption.134 In fact, the “unintended union of the 
military with the populace,” as McGowan puts it, was a “political problem with a long 
past,”135 which was not unique to the Ottomans of the late eighteenth century but to pre-
modern imperial statecraft. In the absence of professional standing armies at the absolute 
disposal of central modern states, military men’s relationship to the rest of the society 
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was much more complex than an anomaly (the janissary involvement in economic 
affairs) as the late eighteenth century Ottoman elites illustrate.  
In this ahistorical history writing, janissaries were represented as a source of 
trouble rather than a social reality as part of the Ottoman social fabric. There remains 
little room to explain how janissary rebellions could have been possible without any 
societal support. In fact, Cevdet Pasha acknowledges that popular opinion has to be on 
the side of the rebels for a rebellion to succeed,136 however, he sees reaction from the 
society in a negative light. What mattered to the historians such as Cevdet Pasha more 
than anything else was the establishment and maintenance of order. He would consider 
any reaction to order a regressive act.  
Cevdet Pasha argued for the legitimacy of the state’s power over the messy 
multiplicity of society in the context of Tanzimat era’s emerging state versus society 
dichotomy. He utilized the framework that a ruler’s main duty was to protect his subjects, 
which required him to be a strong ruler. In his view, “only a strong ruler can be a good 
ruler, because only he is able to protect the weak.”137 A ruler, he suggested, “should take 
any step, which will serve to better secure the control of the state over society.”138 His 
perspective on state-society relations privileged the state’s absolute power and rendered 
the janissaries and their societal ties as harmful to the wellbeing of the state as a whole.   
                                                            
136 Neumann, Amaç Tarih, 117–118.  
137 Neumann, “Bad Times,” 76–77. 
138 Ibid. 
 51 
One of the major sources on the New Order belongs to Ahmed Vasıf Efendi. In 
addition to Mehasinü’l Asar,139 written in a traditional court historian style,140 Vasıf 
Efendi authored a treatise in which he used a pseudonym, Koca Sekbanbaşı, disguising 
himself out of fear of reaction from the janissaries. The treatise, until recently known as 
Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi,141 was written in defense of the New Order. In this treatise, 
Vasıf Efendi equates his time period with that of Suleiman the Magnificent and argues 
that both epochs experienced similar problems when new laws and institutions were 
introduced and implemented.  
The historian claims that the rabble142 of this kind (i.e. the janissaries) had 
disliked and resisted the new laws (kanun-ı cedid) in Suleiman’s time just like the 
janissaries of his day. Vasıf Efendi continued the sixteenth century Ottoman elites’ 
tradition of contrasting the ancient tradition (kanun-ı kadim) with what they saw as the 
needs of their time in an attempt to legitimize the reform efforts with a historical 
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example.143 According to Vasıf Efendi, Suleiman the Magnificent had used violence 
against opponents, which they had deserved, and made an example out of them by 
hanging their ears and tongues for the public to view. The same necessary punishments, 
according to Vasıf Efendi, are not exacted in his day because of what he calls the 
leniency of his time. All these people, who had been created just so that the “world may 
not remain empty,” these “company of hogs, corrupt and degraded” ones “assemble in 
taverns, coffee-houses, and brothels” and express their ignorant opinions.144  
Vasıf Efendi’s hostile and derogatory language towards common people 
discussing politics and minding state’s business in public places is striking. He goes 
further by saying that these people were “outwardly Muslims” but had no idea about 
“cleaning after themselves when they go to bathroom,” implying they lacked the 
fundamentals of cleanliness and religious purity. In an attempt to belittle the opposition, 
Vasıf Efendi provides us with clues as to their social and economic profile when he says 
that they were actually a bunch of boatmen, fishermen, porters, coffeehouse keepers, and 
similar persons. He asserts that although these people should be punished and even 
“killed for opening their mouth” about state affairs, ignorance and inattention of the times 
(as opposed to the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent) prevent it from happening.145  
Vasıf Efendi’s claim that Suleiman the Magnificent had established the janissary 
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Corps and given it to the care of Hadji Bektash,146 which is historically inaccurate, is 
used as a rhetorical tool to identify the opponents of the New Order as the opponents of 
the very establishment of the janissary corps. He conveniently forgets that the inception 
of the janissary corps as the “first standing army in Europe”147 happened in the 1360s.148 
By drawing a similarity between dissenters in his time and those of the golden age, Vasıf 
Efendi aims to accomplish two things: 1- he can argue that he is the real voice of the 
janissaries unlike these ignorant opponents of the New Order, 2- he can delegitimize the 
opposition by laying a claim to real representation of the ideal order. In fact, the literary 
works of the period under discussion employed similar techniques, by naturalizing 
“policies at the time widely perceived to threaten traditional prerogatives in the political 
sphere, making the new seem approved by convention of centuries old practice.”149  
Another important contemporary source on the period under discussion here 
belongs to Cabi Ömer Efendi,150 a preacher of Ayasofya (Hagia Sofia) Mosque in 
Istanbul.151 Cabi does not seem particularly hostile towards the janissaries throughout his 
narrative. His descriptive style makes his account appear more neutral and he even relates 
some of the janissary arguments. Yet, Cabi dismisses the janissaries’ side of the story by 
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calling them mere “pretexts.” He reveals his distaste for the janissaries by speaking about 
their unruliness (serkeşlik).152 Cabi Efendi does not appear to be ideologically motivated 
particularly against the janissaries and provides a lot of useful information on social and 
cultural history. His account is not as embellished and ideologically constructed as the 
aforementioned court historians and it provides historians with many anecdotes with 
glimpses into the usual villains’ side of the story. Nevertheless, Cabi clearly shares in the 
milieu of Istanbul elites who saw the janissaries as disorderly and called for a new order 
in the face of political activism and opposition led by the janissaries.  
As should be clear by now, the court historians described the New Order and its 
opponents through the prism of the political debates and struggles of their own times. In 
the case of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, his Tanzimat reformist agenda was deeply influential in 
how he situated himself in relation to New Order reformers and the opposition. Vasıf 
Efendi entertained a clear distaste for the dissenters and tried to claim real ownership of 
those truly committed to the janissary corps while making hugely anachronistic 
statements about how the janissaries were in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent. Cabi 
Ömer, for his part, was quite neutral in his description but could not avoid revealing his 
elitist view of the janissaries. Accounts of the key Ottoman historians that the later 
historians have relied on to construct the history of the New Order and its opposition pose 
unique challenges for revisionist historians. 
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Modern Historiography 
As has been argued above, the historiography on the New Order and its opponents 
has been shaped by the decline and modernization theories as well as the Ottoman court 
historian’s elitist and state-centered accounts of the historical events. In the past several 
decades, however, there have been a number of social and cultural histories that have 
abandoned these conventional assumptions about Ottoman history. Yet, Nizam-ı Cedid 
still retains its perception as a comprehensive reform program and its dissenters as 
reactionary forces. This is because a thorough examination of the general histories as well 
as contemporary sources for this era is yet to be accomplished. As a result, historians 
incorporate the prejudices of these works in their own work.  
For instance, one historian ends up repeating some of the common accusations 
found in the works of the Ottoman court historians about the janissaries.153 Two reasons 
are apparent for this reproduction of the typical conventional arguments about janissary 
corruption. One is that the historian is not critical enough of the very sources he is using 
in his narrative.154 The second is that most of the secondary literature is also based on the 
narratives of the court historians, who often wrote for propaganda of imperial policies for 
readers among the Ottoman elite as well as for the general public.155 The historian 
acknowledges that the janissary power may have functioned as a check on the power of 
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the Ottoman state in favor of the common people in Istanbul,156 a point originally made 
by Cemal Kafadar.157 Yet, Çaksu repeats the theme of janissary oppression over the 
common people of Istanbul, a theme developed and embellished by the Ottoman elite 
historians, especially in the aftermath of the destruction of the janissaries.158  
Historians, who suggest a different approach to the janissaries in late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, remain exceptions. Christine Philliou suggests a 
comparison of the janissary networks with the Phanariot networks. Such networks were 
the “means” for groups like the Phanariots, janissaries, and ulema to gain a share for 
themselves in Ottoman governance.159 Instead of seeing these networks as detrimental to 
the imperial governance, she suggests that uncoupling the “demise of Phanariots from 
the Balkan national narrative and that of janissaries from the talk of imperial 
modernization” could provide us with a comparative perspective on imperial institutions 
rather than placing them within broader trajectories that ultimately lead to an inevitable 
end in both cases. Modern histories discuss the Phanariot network within the context of 
the emergence of the Greek nation. Similarly, the story of the janissary networks gets lost 
in the teleological story of imperial modernization.160 These networks were not simply 
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the objects of or obstacles before the processes such as modernization or nationalism but 
active participants of imperial transformation.  
Historians have started to entertain the idea, albeit only recently, that the 
janissaries could not have been the sole reason for the demise of the empire; and that 
broader political, social, and economic reasons would have to be accounted for.161 Some 
recent studies have suggested that the historiography needs to break away from the 
Enlightenment’s decline-reform-revolt-abolition linear framework in discussing the 
janissary-reform dynamics as well as the broader changes in the state organization in late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.162 Such perspectives applied to the period 
under discussion here are still in their beginnings and we have yet to come up with an 
alternative interpretation of the redefinition and reorganization of the state free of the old 
versus new or reform versus reaction dichotomies. Even fewer are comparative studies 
that consider the dynamic interplay between Ottoman efforts to adapt, change, and 
modernize and the opposition these reform measures created; ones that can place this 
vigorous change in a difficult imperial moment within the broader context of evolution of 
state-society relations in Europe and elsewhere.  
One of the most distinct characteristics of the modern state is that it tries to 
govern instead of simply ruling.163 The early modern Ottomans during Selim III’s era 
were transitioning to this new logic but this change was incomplete, as is evidenced by 
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the way the foundation and operation of the New Army was handled. Lack of a dedicated 
budget, ad hoc recruitment practices, and inability to discipline the soldiers demonstrate 
that the adoption of certain aspects of the modern state’s disciplinary rationale164 did not 
yield a full-fledged transformation into a centralized modern state.  
Differences in the New Order army’s varying degrees of capabilities between the 
center and the periphery emanate from the “complex division of organizational and 
administrative labor.”165 Salzmann discusses this division of labor to argue that the shift 
of power from the center to the peripheries did not necessarily mean loss of imperial 
power. According to Salzmann, there is no reason to assume that there was a direct 
correlation between this shift and the so-called decline of the Ottoman Empire.166 
However, in the case of building a fully professional army dedicated to war making and 
at the disposal of the center, division of labor between the center and the periphery 
resulted in the inefficiency of the military reform because the periphery did not 
necessarily embrace the new project. The very reason why a new army was to be erected 
was because the center wanted to rid itself of what it considered the inefficiencies of the 
old army. However, the new army was not necessarily free of the handicaps of the old 
army. This partly emanated from the transitional nature and hybrid logic of the period in 
that the center could not afford to give up the old army immediately. Thus, division of 
labor between the center and the periphery may have been possible in other areas but not 
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in terms of achieving military effectiveness because the center’s approach to military 
reform directly contravened the interests of the periphery. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to unpack a variety of theories and historical traditions 
that have shaped our understanding of the New Order and the opposition to it. Decline 
paradigm and modernization theories weigh heavily on debates regarding the Ottoman 
reform efforts. They provide us with dichotomies such as reformist elites versus 
reactionary forces (i.e. janissaries, ulema), reductionist approaches such as inevitable 
decline, or anachronistic frameworks such as secularist elites versus narrow-minded and 
religious conservatives. Ottoman historiography in general has made great strides in 
overcoming and going beyond many of these rather problematic explanatory frameworks 
but the studies dealing with the New Order remain largely replete with them.  
 The problem may not necessarily lend itself to a solution if we ignore the modern 
historiographical traditions and focus instead on contemporary sources. As this chapter 
has shown, contemporary sources have their political agendas and they have been 
interpreted under the influence of the political debates of the Tanzimat and Republican 
eras. For example, many historians simply go back to Ahmet Cevdet Pasha to read the 
New Order but he was heavily invested in a struggle as part of the newly emerging 
bureaucratic elite of the Tanzimat era to bring about reforms. For him, elimination of the 
janissaries could only be considered a step in the right direction, as it foretold the 
Tanzimat reforms. For historians like Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, contemporary accounts that 
were for the New Order and against the opposition were of higher value, as they fit the 
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frameworks the Pasha had in mind.  
 Imposition of later theories anachronistically, historical bias, and political 
colorings of contemporary sources may all be considered challenges typical of any 
historical inquiry and the New Order historiography was no exception. This chapter has 
pointed out simply that we need to be particularly mindful of these handicaps if we were 
to develop a serious debate about the beginnings of Ottoman state transformation in late 
eighteenth century. If we can avoid these theoretical deficiencies, we may be able to have 




Chapter 2 – The Meaning of the New Order 
 
Why Reform the Military? 
 This chapter aims to analyze the Ottoman center’s conception and rationale for 
the establishment of the New Order army as well as the logistical and financial 
difficulties that triggered a rethinking of the military posture of the state during Selim 
III’s reign. Discussing the reasons why the military effectiveness of the Ottomans had 
diminished by the late eighteenth century is a trying task and the debate over the military 
and socio-economic reasons for it has been ongoing among Ottoman historians. My aim 
in this chapter, however, is only to point out the factors that shaped the rationale behind 
the idea of the reorganization and discipline of the Ottoman army in late eighteenth 
century rather than trying to discuss the causes of the Ottoman military failures in a 
comprehensive manner. This rationale gave way to the measures of the New Order as a 
remedy for the fiscal and military difficulties of the Ottoman government. Analyzing the 
conditions, which shaped the way the Ottoman elite perceived reform in this period, is 
crucial in helping us understand the reasons why and how implementation of reform may 
have triggered opposition from various military and societal groups.  
 An analysis of the Ottoman elite’s intentions, rationale, and strategies in 
implementing the new measures allows us to understand the Ottoman elite’s attitude 
towards societal groups affected by the so-called “reforms.” This analysis should provide 
us with important clues as to the motivations for resistance against and negotiation with 
the establishment of the New Order army. This does not mean that understanding 
resistance is possible only through understanding the Ottoman elite’s actions but rather 
that the rationale of the resistance can be understood better if we explain what “reform” 
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really meant at this time period. This is important especially for understanding the New 
Order’s social and economic impact, which provoked reaction from the society at large.  
 The following questions will be explored in this chapter: what were the reasons 
that pushed the state to undertake first a reorganization of the existing military and then 
the foundation of a new army? Was the Ottomans’ capacity to reform their military 
inhibited by their opposition to innovation? What kind of problems did the Ottoman 
ruling elite identify as the problems facing the state? How did they think they could 
remedy the dismal state of affairs? What specific measures did the Ottoman advisors 
recommend in the name of the New Order and how were they justified?  
 The New Order (Nizam-ı Cedid) army was created in 1793, as a new army with its 
dedicated revenue source (İrad-ı Cedid), during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807). The 
context within which the New Order was instituted has been called “the greatest moment 
of crisis the empire had yet faced.”167⁠ Much of the eighteenth century, in fact, was a 
“period of recovery, stability, and economic expansion”168 after the fiscal and military 
difficulties and internal conflicts in the seventeenth century. Late eighteenth century, in 
contrast, witnessed unprecedented fiscal and military problems combined with immense 
pressure on the central government created by external wars as well as internal 
disturbances.  
 The Ottoman government was unable to resist the military advances of the 
Habsburgs and the Russians in the Balkans, especially in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. The Ottoman central government’s ability to mobilize resources for 
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the war effort in general had diminished by the late eighteenth century. This was made 
clear to the Ottomans by the military defeats they suffered at the hands of the Austrian 
and Russian armies in the wars of 1768-74 and 1787-92. Modern historiography provides 
us with a variety of explanations as to the causes of the Ottoman military ineffectiveness 
in the eighteenth century ranging from the so-called European military revolution169 to 
the general decline of the Ottoman Empire.  
 The material and psychological consequences of these wars were monumental for 
the Ottomans. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 stipulated that the Crimea and the 
northern coasts of the Black Sea would be independent of the Ottoman Empire. Article 
VII opened the door for Russia to claim the “right to make representations at the Porte on 
behalf of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the sultan.”170 Russia’s annexation of the 
Crimea in 1783 led the Ottomans to declare war on Russia in 1787. When Selim III 
ascended to throne in 1789, the most pressing issue was the Russian military threat in the 
Balkans. Continuing the war against Russia with the hopes of retrieving the Crimea 
proved unsuccessful and the loss of the Crimea was definitive by 1790.171 This was the 
latest chapter of the Ottoman military and political retreat in the face of the Russian 
threat. The loss of a predominantly Muslim province to Russia seems to have had a 
chilling effect on the Ottomans. 
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 At the domestic level, the phenomenon of banditry throughout the Balkans during 
Selim III’s reign was connected at various levels to the military failures suffered at the 
hands of the Russians. Domestic political implications of external military defeats should 
not be underestimated. For example, Suraiya Faroqhi draws attention to the 
“delegitimizing effect” of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774.172 ⁠As the Ottoman 
troops withdrew from the Balkan frontiers, “irregular troops, no longer needed to harass 
the opponent, usually cut loose and terrorized the local population instead.”173 This not 
only led to de-legitimization of the Ottoman rule but also local populations’ allegiances 
became more fluid. Furthermore, in the absence of a strong financial commitment by the 
Ottoman center to shape their behavior, bandits wreaked havoc in the countryside.  
The central government could not prevent local notables from increasing their 
regional influence through employing such irregulars. Small and large bands of former 
soldiers – at times under the patronage of local notables – created a banditry 
phenomenon, which complicated the capital’s efforts to control the countryside. 
Diffusion of power away from the center toward the provinces was not unique to the 
Ottomans; it was a contemporary reality in Europe as well. The wars and the revolutions 
of the eighteenth century generated “immense opportunities for contraband and 
speculative profiteering,” which often benefited intermediaries such as local notables, tax 
farmers, merchants, and money lenders (and their affiliates such as bandits and irregulars 
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in the countryside) more than the central government itself.174 The imperial center sought 
to reassert its control through a variety of strategies that often implied centralization, re-
appropriation of resources, fiscal discipline, and military reform. 
 
Financial Crisis 
 The Ottoman central state was scrambling to exert control over not only the 
provinces and the periphery but also the forces stationed at the center because of the 
financial woes of the state. While historians hailed the newly established army as part of 
a broad reform program, we need to keep in mind that the new army was created in one 
of the most financially difficult periods over the course of the eighteenth century.  
It has been argued that the New Order reforms were initiated by the state 
voluntarily instead of reforms stemming from financial difficulties.175 However, the fiscal 
crisis at the end of the eighteenth century was paramount and the initiative to draw up a 
new army alongside the old one needs to be considered within the context of deep 
financial crises. While the Ottoman center’s assessment was that it needed a more 
disciplined army to be able to fight the external powers, the financial crises informed how 
they viewed this endeavor.  
The state lacked the funds to finance a brand new army at the level that could 
make a difference in reversing the tide against the Russians and Habsburgs in battlefield. 
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Thus, much of the financing relied on rationalization of financial practices and 
redirection of existing revenue. Financial rationalization went hand in hand with 
implementation of discipline within the military corps. In the earlier centuries, the state 
commanded much stronger resources and directed more revenue to the military when 
compared to the late eighteenth century. As such, it will be crucial to discuss the fiscal 
situation the empire found itself in at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 Part of the reason why the state did not enjoy the cash to finance wars at this time 
seems to have derived from structural reasons and new external economic dynamics 
throughout the eighteenth century. According to Mehmet Genç, three pillars of the 
Ottoman economic logic were provisionism, fiscalism, and traditionalism in the 
eighteenth century.176 The Ottoman state, he argues, was concerned with maintaining a 
balance in the domestic market in terms of supply and demand as well as state 
expenditures and prices of goods.177 This framework explains why the Ottomans may 
have chosen to stay away from adopting a “competitive” logic in managing the imperial 
economy. Others fault the Ottoman government’s customs policies, which favored 
imports while discouraging exports, resulting in a consistent trade imbalance with the 
exception of the capital, Istanbul.178 This policy is considered a clear symptom of the 
Ottomans’ failure to appreciate the “emergent world trade system” in the eighteenth 
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century.179 While the Ottomans adapted themselves to “unexpected rises in prices of 
import items and sharp decreases in the quantity of goods imported from the West” 
through maintaining a balance of supply and demand, they were unable to avoid ending 
up “dependent on foreign goods”180 as a result of pressures of financial crises, wars and 
internal disorder. Lack of competitiveness in economy, financial crisis, and internal 
political problems prevented the imperial center from relying on a strong economic base 
to sponsor an advanced army capable of overcoming internal and external security 
problems in a short amount of time. 
 The structural weaknesses of the Ottoman economy and increasing dependency 
on the West may be blamed for lack of strong financing of the wars. At the same time, 
military defeats at the hands of the Russians and Habsburgs contributed to this vicious 
circle. Ariel Salzmann argues that the fiscal crises caused by military commitments of the 
Ottoman state over the course of the eighteenth century constituted the “first blow to the 
old regime.”181 The fundamental challenge for the Ottoman polity did not derive from a 
breakdown of a certain political or ideological relationship between the sovereign and the 
subject populations but rather from the insurmountable fiscal crises encountered by the 
state. Neither the defeats nor the inherent weaknesses in the economy could be posited as 
the sole reasons for the financial crises. In any case, the state’s ability to finance wars was 
severely restricted and the same was true for drawing up a new army altogether.  
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 The state elites’ recommendations focused on financial discipline as a remedy to 
lack of resources. It was no coincidence that fiscal discipline and financial rationalization 
(though not necessarily pronounced as such) were concepts included in the New Order 
debates among the ruling elite. The establishment of a new revenue source (İrad-ı Cedid) 
was part of an effort to finance the new army, which was meant to put an end to the 
military defeats suffered by the Ottoman army. This revenue relied on exploitation and 
redirection of existing sources of revenue while introducing a level of fiscal discipline 
and financial rationalization as it was supposed to be used solely for the New Order army.       
 
Recruitment Problems prior to the New Order Army 
 One of the biggest problems for the Ottomans prior to the establishment of a new 
army was mustering and financing enough manpower for the military campaigns. Many 
archival sources document enormous financial and logistical problems the military was 
faced with in trying to keep up with the Russian armies. Prior to the establishment of the 
New Order army, a variety of resources were relied upon to recruit soldiers for the 
campaigns: the cavalrymen (sipahi), men supplied by local notables, the Janissaries, and 
other irregulars.182 These sources, however, proved insufficient when confronted with the 
immense manpower of the Russian armies, which relied on forced conscription.183  
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 In the absence of a strictly professional modern standing army in the late 
eighteenth century,184 the Ottomans relied on a flexible but not-so-efficient method of 
recruitment whereby a relatively small central army would be supported and enlarged by 
a combination of imperial soldiers stationed in various regions, local irregulars (levend), 
and manpower provided by the various local notables. Relying on the “commanders and 
suppliers of militias drawn from the countryside power brokers” in the late eighteenth 
century meant that the tax farmers and tax collectors came to play a critical role in the 
Ottoman campaigns’ success.185 In addition, the Ottomans practiced ad hoc conscription 
from among the Muslim peasants during the war of 1768-1774.186 Mobilization of a 
“largely untutored and undisciplined force” not only ensured defeat but also resulted in 
widespread desertion and banditry.187 This eclectic method could have worked if the state 
could make it financially and psychologically attractive for soldiers and local notables to 
go to war.  
In the winter of 1790, the janissaries being assembled in the capital to be 
deployed to Bosnia were given ten piasters each as campaign stipend (ulufe). The official 
remarked, “because most of the janissary soldiers are meager and lonesome, but it is a 
requirement of their obedience that they would serve with their bodily strength in the 
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campaign.”188 Sekbanbaşı Agha’s description of the janissaries in this report is clearly 
aimed at soliciting campaign stipends (ulufe) since the document includes an order to pay 
10 guruş to each soldier along with the sultan’s approval. It seems that the financial 
award was not necessarily ensured given that Sekbanbaşı Agha had to ask for it. 
However, it can also be argued that the government’s failure to honor such commitments 
could create a less-than-enthusiastic spirit in preparing for the campaign. Especially after 
the disastrous defeats against the Russians, it was more difficult than ever to motivate the 
forces traditionally relied upon to go to war. Nor was it possible to rely on the local 
power brokers to put up an effective campaign as they sought to increase their regional 
influence instead of strengthening the reach of the imperial center. 
 The Ottoman government also experienced serious problems in providing grains 
and provisions for the war effort. Canikli Ali Pasha189 outlined the inefficiency caused by 
the state officials’ inappropriate and often corrupt behavior.190 He drew attention to the 
blurred line between the military officers and civilian population resulting in 
“disorder.”191 He suggested that the local people should be compensated for the 
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provisions in a timely manner.192 As a result of some of the tax exemptions provided for 
the residents of Istanbul, immigration had already become a major problem for the 
capital.193 However, this was a problem for the rural populations as well because the state 
continued to make up for the lost tax revenue as a result of migration by demanding extra 
taxes from the rural population that decided to remain in their lands.194 Overall, the war 
effort put extra strain on the rural populations, which inhibited the state’s ability to 
muster human resources and provisions to wage effective wars. 
 The state lacked the necessary financial resources to attract power brokers and 
individual soldiers for the war effort. Yet, the Ottoman elite opted to create a new 
professional army financed by extra taxes instead of trying to increase its fiscal health of 
the state through non-military reforms. The Ottoman government found economic 
problems insurmountable and focused on quick fixes to its military in a rush to respond to 
external and domestic threats. This was accompanied by the broader phenomenon of 
moving towards professional armies at the disposal of the imperial center during this time 
period. 
 One of the major arguments for establishing a new army was inefficiency and 
lack of discipline of the Ottoman forces proven especially during the 1787-92 Russo-
Ottoman wars. Not only did the palace cavalrymen’s (sipahi) rebellious behavior cause 
trouble for the government, but also the forces brought to the front by local power 
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brokers, like those of Cabbarzade and Karaosmanoğlu, proved to be lacking the discipline 
needed to overcome the Russian forces.195  
 Unable to muster enough manpower for the reasons outlined above, the Ottoman 
government faulted the janissaries’ failure to show up for the military campaigns as the 
main reason for insufficient mobilization.196 During this time period, the Ottoman center 
relied on intermediaries to bring janissary soldiers to the war front. Since the janissaries 
had been scattered around the empire, bringing them to the war front fell upon the 
shoulders of the janissary officers (ağa). When the sultan asked for a certain number of 
soldiers, usually only a fraction of the demanded number could be mustered.197 The 
Ottoman administration’s frustration was expressed in the following manner, “so many 
soldiers are receiving salaries in the army and in Istanbul, where are they and who are 
taking these salaries?”198 What was the reason for such low participation of the 
janissaries? 
 The government frequently delegated the command of janissaries in a certain 
locality to various governors and local officials in an effort to increase the janissaries’ 
contribution to the war effort. Controlling (zabt u rabt) the janissaries was a problem and 
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appointing non-janissary state officials was meant to alleviate the problem as they were 
thought to have less in common with the janissaries.199 However, these measures must 
have contributed to the janissary corps’ inefficiencies as well as the unruly behavior the 
Ottoman elites complained about in the first place. In one such instance, the janissaries 
expressed their disapproval that Poyraz Seyyid Halil Aga was appointed as a janissary 
officer (zabit) in İbrail, Hotin, and Salonika. It was reported that he could not “get along 
with” them. Poyraz Seyyid Halil Aga had to be taken off duty for thirty to forty days as a 
result. Officials recommended that a certain janissary officer, Mehmed, who had already 
earned the trust of the serdars, ayans, aghas, and alemdars in these localities, be 
appointed instead. In doing so, the officials judged, the fears of the local notables could 
be deflected.200  
 It should be noted that the janissaries continued to be part of the effective fighting 
forces despite the recruitment problems discussed in this chapter. In the fall of 1789, for 
example, a total of 2,500 janissaries from Aleppo were given to the command of the 
serasker in Egypt to fight the invading French troops. After some 150 men died in 
clashes in Jaffa, the janissaries reassembled in Aleppo and joined forces from Rakka and 
Diyarbakir to be redeployed against the French.201 It is difficult to impose uniformity on 
the janissaries across the empire and across time; there were great differences between 
different regions in janissaries’ response to the government’s demands. 
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Instead of attributing inefficiencies in the janissary corps to corruption and 
insubordination (which was a common trope dating back to sixteenth century Ottoman 
historians),202 we need to remember that the state often failed in its basic commitments to 
its soldiers. The financial difficulties the state faced directly affected the army and the 
soldiers, specifically the janissaries. A document from 1789 mentions that the janissaries 
stationed in the fortress of Bender had not received their salaries from the year 
1784/1785. The total owed to these janissaries was 153,718.5 piasters. The janissaries 
were reported to be in Keşnu, an area eight hours away from Bender, from where they 
might attack Bender if the money owed them was not paid very soon. The government 
official writing the report expressed fear for infighting and revolt among the soldiers.203  
 The janissaries stationed in the fortress of Bosnia were in a similar predicament. 
Their salaries for the year 1774 was paid only in 1788 and the government had to sell 
some imperial property in the area just to pay the 289,000 piasters owed to the janissaries 
for their salaries, provisions, and broadcloth allowance.204 The government was trying to 
pay them at least a year’s worth of salaries so that it could ask these soldiers to defend 
their fortresses.  
 It seems that the Ottomans were trying to compensate the soldiers for their 
services especially when a new confrontation was to occur or when the soldiers were 
stationed in a strategically sensitive borderland. In a report reminding the central 
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government of the special position of Vidin, as a large frontier area, the sultan was 
advised not to withhold a portion of the salaries for the janissary corps in Istanbul but to 
pay the janissaries in Vidin in full.205 The government’s inability to provide for its 
soldiers led the janissaries in Vardar to become indebted.206 For those janissaries who 
were not stationed in strategic locations, not receiving their salaries for extended periods 
of time must have been an important factor in avoiding recruitment for the military 
campaigns.  
 The common complaint that the janissaries did not show up for duty when needed 
has to be reconsidered since abuse by the Ottoman officials themselves must also have 
contributed to the unwillingness of the janissaries to fight in wars or putting down 
rebellions. During the fall of 1789, the Ottoman officials decided to assemble and send 
five thousand janissaries to Albania, where the Ottoman control had relatively been weak 
because of the terrain. The cost of bringing these soldiers to Albania amounted to close to 
eighty thousand piasters.207 The commander of the Imperial Guard in Edirne 
(bostancıbaşı) was given the responsibility to bring these soldiers to Albania. The 
commander was warned that he would be severely punished “if he touched even one 
piaster.”208 On the one hand, there was the urgency to send soldiers as soon as possible to 
control Albania. On the other hand, there was an anxiety over the possibility that the 
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Ottoman officials would misappropriate the funds destined for the maintenance of the 
soldiers. 
 The banditry phenomenon in the Balkans in the late 1780s inhibited the 
government’s ability to effectively raise armies against the Russians and the Austrians. In 
a competition with the local notables to establish effective control over the bandits in the 
Balkans at this time, the central government was faced with a plethora of small and large 
bands of brigands whose allegiances were often rendered to the highest bidder. As the 
government lacked the financial resources to attract their services, the local power 
brokers such as Paspanoğlu were better positioned to utilize the strength of the banditry 
in the Balkans. Furthermore, “great pool of potential soldiers … were tied up in ayan 
squabbles,”209 which complicated the government’s recruitment efforts.     
In an order sent to the administrators in Hezargrad, the government asked that 
1,500 soldiers be raised quickly to launch an attack on the Austrians who had captured 
Bucharest in June 1790. The order includes complaints about the quality of soldiers 
raised and incidents of desertion.210 In addition to the inefficiency of the local officials 
and unwillingness of the soldiers, the center had its share in the recruitment problems as 
it often failed to provide the necessary financial resources for effective recruitment.  
Requests for mobilization of soldiers in a short time had become commonplace as 
the center desperately sought ways to man its armies. For instance, an order sent to 
Trabzon requested that “some soldiers” be raised within 20 days. But the correspondence 
indicates that the local governor did not receive half the funds necessary to feed the 
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soldiers.211 It is clear that the government’s estimates of the number of soldiers and the 
time frame did not necessarily correspond with the reality on the ground.   
Financial troubles of the state were so extreme that the increase of a disabled 
veteran’s salary, which seems to have been an established practice, was a matter of 
discussion among the Ottoman officials. Upon the request of a certain Bekir, a disabled 
veteran swordsman and a janissary of the forty-third regiment, the grand vizier 
(sadrazam) expressed his concern that such soldiers may claim such disability assistance 
twice, once from the army and once directly from the sultan. Yet, the sultan decided to 
give the ten piasters (akçe) this janissary had asked for, saying that turning him down 
would not “suit his exalted imperial fame given that the soldier had sacrificed his arm for 
the sake of religion.”212 Financial concerns of the central state seem to have interfered 
with the traditionally enjoyed privileges of the soldiers in this way. A show of generosity 
on the part of the sultan was a psychological motivator for the soldiers. The Ottoman 
government failed to deliver its basic commitments and encourage the soldiers for 
recruitment through financial and psychological incentives.  
 In searching for ways to assert the center’s will, the Ottoman elites deemed it 
necessary that the center’s ability in exerting its coercive powers213 be rebuilt and 
enhanced. From their perspective, the inefficiency of the Ottoman army was because of 
lack of discipline among the troops. Hence, it was only natural that a disciplined army at 
the disposal of the center should be organized. In this way, the center could not only 
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respond to external threats but also assert its power internally, especially against the local 
notables and local rebellions. While the government experienced serious recruitment 
problems as it failed to provide financial resources, the elites identified lack of discipline 
among soldiers as the chief reason why the military defeats had been experienced. 
   
Military Technology Debate: Adaptation or Resistance to Innovation? 
The Ottoman military’s failures during the eighteenth century have been 
attributed to conditions outside their control, i.e. the new military technologies and 
techniques that revolutionized warfare in the West.214 From the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries, the Ottomans were able to conduct warfare efficiently thanks to 
their ability to organize and provide for military campaigns better than their western 
counterparts. In ‘early modern’ warfare, military undertakings entailed movement of 
large masses of humans and material resources across long distances. In a time when land 
armies were the norm, the Ottomans excelled in supplying provisions for and organizing 
their armies, which was key in their military successes.215 Neither the material resources 
nor politics (and even ideology) should be considered separate from one another as they 
both feed off each other. Technological changes should be treated in relation to financial 
and political realities without which specific military techniques could not prove 
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revolutionary. As Geoffrey Parker puts it, “even in the twentieth century, the outcome of 
wars has been determined less by technology than by better war plans, the achievement 
of purpose, greater economic strength and, above all, superior discipline.”216 The ability 
to maintain such vast land armies and their mobility in early modern warfare owed itself 
to the availability of material resources as much as political tools for rendering allegiance 
from subjects in various regions throughout the empire. 
 Attributing Ottomans’ so-called failure to adapt to new methods and technologies 
to cultural reasons in the late eighteenth century is very similar to explaining their success 
in earlier centuries in ideological terms. Ottoman state’s successful emergence had been 
attributed to various reasons among which religious conquest (ghaza) ideology as the 
basis of a warrior culture remained at the top of the list.217 Just as the earlier rise of the 
Ottomans was attributed to the strength of their ideology, their military failures in the 
eighteenth century were also attributed to the Ottoman refusal to engage with relevant 
technological innovations at the time due to their ideological outlook and religiosity.218  
However, the very content of the ghaza ideology has been modified and revisited 
by prominent Ottoman historians who have established to a great extent how it could 
serve such disparate purposes as conquest, trade, or alliances with former enemies. Now, 
we are much more comfortable in asserting the ever changing content and fluidity of the 
ghaza ideology. Its strength for the purposes of political justification as well as military 
conquests has to be acknowledged. Surely, this ideology (very often as a rhetorical tool) 
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helped organize large numbers of people and provided legitimacy for the Ottoman 
expansion; yet, this was only part of the story. Political legitimacy, by itself, could not 
bring about success for the Ottomans.  
 The Ottoman military failures in the eighteenth century have also been attributed 
to the technological gap between the Western powers and the Ottomans. It has been 
argued that the Ottomans had lagged behind in military technology due to their cultural 
resistance to imitation of the infidels. Culturist explanations as to why the Ottomans were 
unable to keep up with their Western counterparts have been discredited through various 
studies focusing on technology exchange between the Ottomans and the Christian powers 
in the earlier centuries. According to Gábor Ágoston, the argument that the Ottomans 
were resistant to adaptation of foreign technologies due to “extreme conservatism” is a 
flawed one given the Ottomans’ extensive experience with firearms in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.219 “Ottomans not only successfully adopted and integrated 
gunpowder technology into their armed forces and navy, but until the seventeenth century 
remained a strong “gunpowder empire,” indeed stronger than their immediate neighbors, 
both Christian and Muslim.”220 
For the late eighteenth century, Jonathan Grant’s comparison between the 
Ottomans and the Europeans in terms of military technology concludes that the Ottoman 
military capabilities (arms production, arms transfers, and technological diffusion) 
remained competitive throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Grant argues 
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that the Ottomans maintained their “third tier” producer position in the “international 
production hierarchy” by continuing to “copy and reproduce” the technologies produced 
by the “first tier” producers.221 Grant reminds us that the real competitors for the 
Ottomans were not the first tier producers but the third tier producers, like Russia and 
Venice. The Ottomans were able to adopt the military technologies produced in Western 
Europe until the mid-nineteenth century. Grant considers the military “reforms” (naval 
production increase, artillery production) during Selim III’s reign within the framework 
of military technology diffusion.  
 Notwithstanding the difficulty of testing some of his assertions (such as his claim 
that the Ottoman fleet became “competitive with Atlantic Europe” as a result of the naval 
reforms of Selim III),222 Grant successfully discounts the argument that the Ottomans 
were unaware of the developments in the West and that they resisted those developments 
as a result of their conservative outlook. Yet, while the Ottoman conservatism is an 
outmoded and untenable argument to explain away the technological gap, it may be 
difficult to argue that the military reforms during Selim III’s reign made the Ottomans 
truly competitive with their counterparts as Grant argues.  
The Ottomans clearly faced a significant threat from the Russians throughout the 
eighteenth century, which pushed them to adopt new military methods and organizational 
models for their army. Some scholars working on military diffusion have argued that 
states such as the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century that faced greater security 
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threats were more likely to adopt new technologies.223 However, they have also asserted 
that the Ottomans resisted innovations based on the existence of a cultural orthodoxy. In 
contrast to Europe in the midst of Enlightenment, as the argument goes, the Ottoman 
elites in this century were “dismissive of outside scientific, technical, and political 
knowledge.”224  
For the period under study here, it is very difficult to point out a certain cultural 
orthodoxy that may have prevented the Ottomans from suggesting reform and elimination 
of janissary corruption. In fact, the opposite could be argued, namely that the Ottomans 
sought to adopt new military techniques and methods in order to prevail over the enemy. 
In the summer of 1780, for instance, an envoy from India arrived in the capital and told 
the sultan Abdulhamid I that if they wanted to beat the Russians, they needed to “imitate 
the ways of the enemy.” The Indians did not know about rifles and war but the British 
introduced them so they had to respond with the same weapons and fighting techniques 
as well as “drills.” He reported that they had been able to capture some sixteen fortresses 
from the British. Having completed some demonstrations in Kağıthane, the envoy was 
told that the Ottoman soldiers do not conduct drills in peacetime.225 Our source does not 
make it entirely clear but the Indian envoy was most likely from Mysore during the reign 
of Tipu Sultan. This anecdote shows that debates about adopting new technologies and 
techniques were taking place in the Ottoman court even before the reign of Selim III. 
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Furthermore, this debate was happening between imperial powers that experienced a 
similar challenge, namely turning their armies into efficient fighting forces.  
The question does not appear to be whether or not new methods should be 
adopted to remedy the dismal military situation the Empire found itself in. The debate 
revolved around what the causes of the failures were and the various features of 
modernity such as rationalization of finances and disciplining the military corps were 
proposed as solutions, in a “matter-of-fact” fashion. That is to say, the Ottoman elites did 
not oppose rationalization and discipline out of a cultural orthodoxy; on the contrary, 
these were their very solutions to what they diagnosed as the consequences of janissary 
corruption and military inefficiency.  
The argument that it was the division between the religious and the secular as 
representing the official orthodoxy that prevented the Ottomans from adopting a full-
scale reform project in favor of a piecemeal reform remains a simplistic interpretation of 
Ottoman elites’ approach to reform. For instance, Emily Goldman’s sources on the 
Ottoman reform belong to the modernization school, as the dualistic framework she 
attributes to Ottoman statecraft is overly simplistic.226 More importantly, it contradicts 
the kinds of discussions that took place among the supporters and opponents of a new 
army in late the eighteenth century. In fact, the perspective on military reform was not 
“uniquely determined by religious concerns” in the Ottoman periphery either.227 The 
suitability of reform to cultural norms was definitely a concern and it could become a 
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rallying cry for the opponents of military reforms. However, this does not justify the 
argument that Western induced military reform met resistance out of a given cultural 
orthodoxy.  
According to Ágoston, it was better drill, command and control, and bureaucratic 
administration rather than “better guns” that may have given the Europeans the edge in 
military competitiveness during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.228 The failure on 
the part of the Ottomans to adopt the “new techniques and discipline” as a result of the 
“military revolution” in the West229 was not due to cultural reasons. Rather, it stemmed 
from the absence, in the Ottoman context, of political and socio-economic conditions that 
gave way to the rise of the logic of discipline and rationalization of warfare in western 
European armies, such as the Dutch and the Prussian armies. They perfected and 
successfully implemented this logic of discipline in their armies. Both the 
commercialization of warfare and competition among bands of warriors in the West had 
critical importance for the emergence of modern disciplined armies.230  
In the eighteenth century, the main adversaries of the Ottomans were not the 
highly disciplined Dutch and Prussian armies but instead the Austrian and Russian 
armies. They were arguably more disciplined than the Ottoman army and the Russian 
army had the additional advantage of relying on immense sources of manpower. Even if 
the Ottomans were successful in adopting new military methods, technologies, and 
tactics, these can become effective only if other aspects of the war enterprise are 
effectively administered, such as manpower, financing, logistics, political legitimacy, and 
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even ideology. In the late eighteenth century, the Ottomans experienced significant 
challenges in all these areas while trying to introduce the logic of discipline in the New 
Order army. Broader challenges rendered immediate military success rather difficult and 
costly. A reductionist approach (i.e. West’s advances in military technology and Ottoman 
resistance to change) appears untenable and insufficient in addressing the broader 
structural problems that had to do with the socio-economic conditions within which the 
Ottoman army was embedded.  
The example, in the eighteenth century, of the overhaul of the gunpowder 
production demonstrates that the problem had to do more with the government’s ability 
to provide financial incentives and encourage investment in new technologies than a 
cultural resistance to new methods. As it was diagnosed that the gunpowder production 
was insufficient and ineffective, the government started with doubling the price it paid for 
saltpeter. A thorough upgrade of the facilities, employment of engineers able to design 
most modern grindstone machines, and doubling the salaries of the workers led to 
production of higher-grade level gunpowder.231  
When Selim III set out to modernize the navy, neither the importation of foreign 
advisors and engineers nor the employment of European techniques of shipbuilding 
seems to have met resistance by the military establishment on religious grounds or 
otherwise.232 On the contrary, adoption of new knowledge and techniques depended on 
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whether they served as remedies to the problems on the ground. In Tuncay Zorlu’s words, 
“Particularly, in such fields as military technology, firearms, mining, cartography, 
compasses and clock making, the Ottomans had a tendency to adopt and apply new 
developments efficiently without much time lapse.”233 The question was not necessarily 
being ignorant of progress taking place in military science in the West or elsewhere but 
rather whether adoption of innovations was financially feasible and economically 
sustainable.  
Observers of the foundation and the development of engineering schools find that 
despite the fact that the Ottomans set up military and naval engineering schools as early 
as 1775, these institutions could not transform into engines of rapid change in military 
and naval technology largely because of the lack of funding and administrative 
failures.234 The question of adoption of innovation was much more of a question of the 
Ottomans’ ability to provide the necessary resources for modernization of the military 
than a feature of cultural opposition to innovation. When the state was able to direct 
sufficient resources to taking advantage of the latest techniques and technologies in the 
military sciences, successful results could be obtained.  
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New Order Army as a Response to Internal Threats 
 The establishment of a new and disciplined army was conceived of as a response 
to external threats, Austrians and Russians. Yet, this was only part of the story. While the 
Ottoman center was having difficulty mobilizing its resources, this was not necessarily 
the case for the local notables in various provinces. Notables themselves were able to 
muster enough manpower and resources to protect and enlarge their spheres of influence. 
However, this imbalance between the center and the local notables in terms of 
mobilization of resources did not translate into an immediate disintegration of the empire. 
Tendency to see the struggle between the center and the provincial notables as a zero sum 
game was at the heart of the decline paradigm as discussed in the first chapter. More 
recent scholarship, however, has shown that this center-periphery relationship was 
anything but unidirectional. Instead, actors on both sides were active participants in the 
production of power through allegiance as well as rebellion and dissent.  
 Diffusion of the imperial center’s power to local notables in the provinces 
throughout the eighteenth century has been called “decentralization”235 of state power 
and “privatization”236 of economic resources. It was argued that this diffusion of power 
away from the center toward the provinces started much earlier and peaked in the 
eighteenth century but this was not necessarily a destructive or destabilizing phenomenon 
for the empire. Shifts in international trade in the eighteenth century, for instance, were 
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not necessarily negative for the empire, as a whole; however, they often benefited local 
notables and other smaller power brokers rather than the imperial center.237 Simply put, 
power was being re/produced and re/negotiated in a different manner. Emergence of the 
local notables could only point to the flexibility of the Ottomans in terms of co-opting 
and integrating various elements in the provinces into the imperial structure,238 an ability 
historians detect in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well.239  
 These arguments have been made to show that the diffusion of power from the 
center to the provinces did not mean the “decline” of the Ottoman Empire in the 
eighteenth century. At the same time, the Ottoman center’s power relative to the 
periphery was diminished and it can be argued that the imperial center sought ways to 
strengthen its reduced role. Both the imperial center and the local notables attempted to 
protect their spheres of influence and assert their competing superiority over one another. 
The establishment of a new army and a so-called “new order” should be understood in 
this context. It was not only a response to the military advances of their northern and 
western neighbors, the Russians and the Habsburgs. The unreliability of the janissaries 
                                                            
237 Roger Owen, “Introduction,” in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 133–151. 
238 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Karen Barkey, “In Different Times: 
Scheduling and Social Control in the Ottoman Empire, 1550 to 1650,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 38, no. 3 (1996): 460–483. 
239 Suraiya Faroqhi, Coping with the State  : Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1550-1720 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995); Suraiya Faroqhi, “Coping with the 
Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the 
Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century,” in The Ottomans and the Balkans: A 
Discussion of Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 351–381. 
 89 
against the center’s struggle against Paspanoğlu in the Balkans is an example of why the 
center may have felt compelled to institute a new army.  
The idea of strengthening the central authority through the establishment of an 
efficient, disciplined and loyal fighting force also governed the logic of reform proposals 
in the seventeenth century.240 The center’s ability to project its power at the expense of 
the periphery could only be possible, reformers reasoned, through a capable and 
disciplined army at the capital’s disposal. Selim III was faced with multiple regional 
powerbrokers that sought to extend their influence often at the expense of the center.  
It was an Ottoman art to coopt and integrate such contenders but when the state 
had very little to offer in this time period, local notables had other options including 
international alliances.241 The Ottoman center not only had to push back against the 
Russians and Austrians in the Balkans and the French in North Africa, but also against 
local notables such as Paspanoğlu, who complicated the center’s efforts to reassert 
control. While the center used to be able to rely on the support provided by local 
notables, this was no longer the case. Military reform had in its rationale that the 
reformed forces would be utilized against such domestic contenders as much as against 
foreign armies.242 Such “dual use” of the new forces was supposed to enhance the 
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position of the reforming elite and the sultan and it was not only the Ottomans but also 
the Iranians who followed their example in conceiving of western style militaries as a 
tool to establish modern autocratic rule.243  
One of the incentives for the center to use New Order soldiers against internal 
threats was to prevent soldiers from wreaking havoc in post-conflict situations. For 
example, soldiers, who had successfully suppressed a rebellion in a village in Dubrovnik, 
were ordered to return to their barracks without damaging the environs of the village.244 
Such instances of soldiers’ unruly behavior especially in the Balkans in this time period 
were partially responsible for the widespread “banditry” problem. The government must 
have calculated that the more disciplined and organized New Order soldiers could help 
avoid local backlash and chaos caused by bands of soldiers creating instability. 
  
The Ottoman Elite’s Conception of Military Reform 
 The advisors to the sultan submitted their opinions and suggestions about 
reorganization and improvement of the Ottoman army in the form of treatises (layiha). It 
has been argued that with the treatises, Selim III asked his advisors to submit their 
opinions with regard to the reform of the army, a practice modeled after the French 
cahiers.245 There are some common and diverging features of these treatises, which will 
be examined here. Our analysis will seek to understand how the Ottoman administrators 
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and statesmen identified and conceived of the problem and what kinds of solutions they 
offered. What they may have ignored or failed to see will shed light on the rationale in 
constructing a new army as well as the reasons for resistance to the new army.  
 Although dubbed as the “new order,” what the “reformers” at the time had in 
mind was “restoring the old order” in the sense that the newly established military 
barracks and new recruitment would bring back the glorious past of the Ottoman “golden 
age.” In order to accomplish this, they would overhaul the recruitment and discipline 
practices in place in the existing corps while creating new barracks along with setting up 
military schools to train officers in the “military science.”246 According to this 
framework, the old order (kanun-ı kadim) had been corrupted and the “spirit of the times” 
required new measures and reform.247 Taking a political position on reform either to 
advance the interests of a certain group within the elite or to promote a reformist agenda 
was nothing new. Even in the “classical age,” various treatises had complained about the 
decadence of the janissary corps and the ease with which one could buy his way into the 
corps.248 Ottoman elites had always used these frames of reference to justify their 
political agendas in their particular time period. Thus, dismal state of affairs they 
portrayed needs to be viewed with a critical eye. 
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The Ottoman elite’s conception of the solution, in late the eighteenth century, 
envisioned a combination of reform measures to render the army more efficient in order 
to restore the old glory of the empire. This was partly to avoid the political costs 
associated with disbanding the existing forces. The Ottoman decision to avoid an outright 
confrontation with the existing military corps was criticized by modern historians who 
charged that the Ottomans did not “realize” that achievements of modern Europe was no 
match for the achievements of the sixteenth century Ottomans.249 Leaving aside the 
Orientalist tendency of such an approach, the Ottoman reformers of the late eighteenth 
century tried to use the golden age trope to implement certain policies they deemed 
necessary for the strengthening of the Ottoman military might. As such, the idealized 
discipline of the Suleiman the Magnificent era Ottoman army, according to these 
observers, could be restored through “drills” conducted in peacetime.  
“Drill” (talim) and “rifle practices” (tüfenk talimi) became almost magic words in 
the late eighteenth century. The advisors presented the drills of the golden age as key to 
military success without direct reference to the drills practiced in the western European 
armies. In fact, although the janissaries were supposed to practice twice a week, regular 
drills had already been somewhat abandoned by the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
Janissaries were not always given the gunpowder needed for such regular practice.250 It is 
not entirely clear if an imperial decision to stop drills was made or this was an 
incremental drift away from regular drills due to lack of immediate external threats. It is 
also not clear if it was a function of the janissaries’ merger with the broader society or 
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their refusal to obey orders. It was probably due to a combination of all these factors 
reflecting a larger reality that constant drills were not as central for conducting warfare. It 
is thus difficult to explain lack of drills among the janissaries merely with their 
insubordination or disorderliness.    
The majority of the treatises of the late eighteenth century used phrases such as 
“sciences of warfare” or “bearing arms according to the new sciences of battle” to 
describe what they considered to be the European war craft. As such, regular drills would 
be critical to setting up a modern capable military force. However, this would be 
presented as the “law of the Suleiman the Magnificent” to prevent backlash against drills, 
against which resistance among soldiers were clearly anticipated by the authors of the 
treatises.251  
The rhetorical use of the disciplined and orderly soldiers of the golden age, 
however, was not only connected to the effort to make proposed changes acceptable to 
soldiers. It seems to have also provided somewhat of a concrete reform proposal in the 
minds of the reforming elite. Mehmed Raşid Efendi, for example, argued that the youth 
recruited from Anatolia and attached to the janissary corps in the capital used to spend 
their time conducting constant drills and learning the “science of war making.”252 He 
recommended that the recruits should be paid salaries reflective of the commodity prices 
in order to prevent them from engaging in “profit making” to support themselves.253 
Defenders of the New Order army made the argument that the janissaries had been 
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central to the Ottoman success during the time of Suleiman the Magnificent whose law 
required that the janissaries devote all their time to the “art of war” in their barracks.254 
As time passed and conditions changed, the “languor of peacetime” led to the 
disobedience and disrespect of the janissaries for the “ancient laws.” Selim III, in an 
effort to reverse this “decay,” ordered that they train regularly in using rifles.255  
Clearly, the New Order army’s defenders sought to justify the forging of a new 
order with the glory of a past golden age. This was not necessarily an easy sell and the 
rhetoric could only go so far. In trying to rally support for the establishment of the new 
army, for instance, Selim III tried to appeal to the elites and bureaucrats that the New 
Order could bring about the restoration of the time of Suleiman the Magnificent. 
Frustrated, Selim III complained that he was not the “only one with a stake in the fate of 
the state” but his bureaucrats, whom he ordered to carry out measures to implement the 
New Order, should be deeply involved.256 To what extent restoring the golden age may 
have seemed like a lofty goal is hard to judge. Yet, it clearly was part of the discussion as 
an important rhetorical tool for political justification, ideological legitimacy, and 
bureaucratic goal setting.   
In addition to the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, reformers could draw upon 
more contemporary examples outside the Ottoman realm to justify their agenda. The 
most obvious choice would have been the very armies the Ottomans failed to confront 
and defeat effectively such as the Austrian army. One of the important advisors of Selim 
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III was Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, who reportedly had advised the sultan even before his 
accession to the throne while Selim corresponded with King Louis XVI of France about 
reform.257 He drafted his memorandum about military reform in the Ottoman Empire 
during his less than a year presence as an ambassador to Austria in 1792. During his time 
there, Ratıb Efendi was supposed to observe the institutions of the Austrians to 
understand their military success. Carter Findley has convincingly argued that Ratıb 
Efendi was propagating the reform efforts in the Ottoman Empire rather than trying to 
understand the Austrian institutions in their own context. Hence, his writings produced in 
Austria are prescriptions for reform in the Ottoman Empire rather than accurate 
observations of the situation in Austria.258 Ratıb Efendi’s use of Austria instead of 
observing it industriously indicates that the image of the West as the superior model that 
needed to be emulated was not yet established. 
 Findley also points to the overwhelming emphasis (about eighty percent) on 
military matters in Ratıb Efendi’s writings. Furthermore, he raises a question as to how it 
was possible that Ratıb Efendi could draft such a long report in such a short amount of 
time without even speaking the language of the country he was writing about.259 It is 
clear that Ratıb Efendi held strong personal views as to the necessity for a new order and 
he only needed his Austrian experience to serve as confirmation. Ratıb Efendi described 
an ideal age from which the Ottomans had declined due to the later rulers’ inability to 
                                                            
257 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Selim III’ün Veliaht Iken Fransa Kralı Lui XVI Ile 
Muhabereleri,” Belleten II (1938). 
258 Carter V. Findley, “Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi’s Vienna Embassy Narrative: Discovering 
Austria or Propagandizing for Reform in Istanbul,” Wiener Zeitschrift Fur Die Kunde 
Des Morgenlandes 85 (1995): 40–80. 
259 Ibid., 45–47. 
 96 
make changes necessitated by the new conditions. Since they had not reformed, the 
military power of the Empire declined and the soldiers lost their former discipline.260 
 A treatise in defense of the New Order submitted to Selim III, until recently 
known as Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi,261 belonged to the court historian Ahmed Vasıf 
Efendi.262 Written in the aftermath of a loss against the Russians in April 1791, the author 
blames the janissaries for the defeat.263 It is also argued that this treatise was written 
following the first success of the New Order forces in Acre against Napoleon’s forces in 
order to both defuse the janissary reaction and to underline the significant achievement of 
the new forces.264 
 Vasıf Efendi claims that he and his father were janissaries.265 In his account, the 
janissaries were attacked vehemently for their connections with various segments of 
society. The author projects the concerns of the pro-New Order camp in terms of 
efficiency, discipline, and composition of the army back to the sixteenth century. He 
portrays an ideal age (the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent) when the janissaries would 
not allow any outsiders into their ranks.266 But nowadays, the janissary corps was full of 
people from all sorts of backgrounds (converts, gypsies, foreign spies etc.) The logical 
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extension of this accusation was that the army was supposed to be disciplined and rid of 
any outside influences.  
 Vasıf Efendi holds the janissaries responsible for allowing non-Muslims into their 
ranks, employing a vocabulary appealing to Islamic sensibilities of the people.267 The 
janissaries, in return, were also invoking such language when they criticized and refused 
the uniforms and drills of the new army. Religious language used by both the reformers 
and the janissaries point to a competition over legitimacy, as both sides were seeking 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people through the use of religious symbols. After all, 
military reform did not entail a “simple process of borrowing” but “competitive 
emulation, reform, and creative adaptation of existing religio-political discourses for 
purposes of legitimation.”268 This creative yet contested process of legitimization entailed 
the idealization of a so-called golden age and vilification of various classes in society, 
which were some of the tools used to delegitimize the janissaries and justify the 
establishment of the New Order army. At the same time, efforts to legitimize the new 
army were not as superficial as they may sound. Proponents of the New Order army did 
not see a mutually exclusive relationship between reform and religion. In fact, reform, 
according to them, was being undertaken for the success of Islam.269  
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 The Ottoman advisors commonly cited absence of registered soldiers in 
battlefields as a cause for the military defeats. The most organized group among these 
soldiers was the janissaries who, according to these advisors, avoided performing their 
duties as a result of their corruption. The janissaries would be the ones to express the 
discontent of the army in general, as they were organized into regiments (orta) that 
expressed their discontent in a variety of ways including mutinies initiated with the 
symbolic overturning of the cauldron of the janissary corps (kazan kaldırma).270 
Historically, it was the janissaries that led such rebellions within the army and ended the 
reign of sultans such as Osman II.271 Ottoman advisors of the late eighteenth century 
identified the janissaries as the source of the problem because they were the most 
organized military corps with a strong sense of comradeship and their absence from the 
battlefield would exasperate the army’s mobilization problem.  
 Some Ottoman historians, like Enveri,272 recognized the voice of the soldiers 
themselves, who complained about not having enough provisions and even having to sell 
their property to continue the campaign. As the soldiers’ complaints indicate, the 
inefficiency was the result of the government’s inability to muster resources, financial 
and otherwise, for the campaign to make the war effort attractive enough for the soldiers. 
When the soldiers did not yield the victories expected of them but rather showed 
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rebellious behavior, the Ottoman center diagnosed the problem as a matter of training and 
discipline of the soldiers. However, the late eighteenth century campaigns were not 
militarily and economically appealing for the soldiers, as they often lacked prospects for 
winning the war and handsome financial incentives such as war stipends (ulufe). Even if 
the Ottomans were able to pay war stipends as they used to, this would have gone against 
the logic of modern warfare, which increasingly relied on disciplined soldiers who did 
not seek additional financial incentives to embark upon campaigns. One of the main 
strengths of the Ottoman army during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been 
how well they were provided for by the state.273 In the eighteenth century, unable to rely 
on highly disciplined soldiers, the Ottomans could not afford to pay for war making in the 
way they used to but instead viewed the soldiers’ unruly behavior as the main problem. 
 Tatarcık Abdullah Efendi, another famous advisor to the sultan, suggested that it 
was necessary to convince the disorderly janissaries that learning the art of war was in 
line with the laws of Suleiman the Lawgiver whose reign was idealized as the golden age. 
However, he opined that disciplining the janissaries would not be enough, so a new army 
should be built. Some forty to fifty unmarried soldiers from within among the janissary 
regiments should be recruited to man the new army. In this way, some forty to fifty 
thousand soldiers could be trained within five to eight years.274 This proposal may have 
been motivated by a desire to integrate the janissaries into the new project while defusing 
their potential opposition through transforming them into the New Order soldiers. Such 
proposals reveal the logic that guided the Ottoman military reform in that what was 
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essentially being proposed was a new form of military. Whereas the janissaries had had a 
corporate culture and a stake in the successes and the prestige of the empire, the new 
soldiery was meant to be disciplined cogs in a machine.  
 In his advice to the sultan in 1803 about how they should go about implementing 
changes in the janissary corps, Ramiz Efendi, the Minister of Artillery (Humbarahane), 
suggested that the janissaries should not be told the details of the new measures at the 
beginning. The measures would ultimately provide the Corps with orderliness and unity, 
which are necessary for the strength of the Corps itself. Even the janissaries themselves 
want to have a strong order. However, Ramiz Efendi claims, these ‘brainless soldiers’ 
(bimağzan asakir) are incapable of comprehension. Hence, the suggested measures 
should be implemented one at a time so as not to cause a rebellion among them. The 
janissary officers would be told the details of the new requirements to prevent gossip. 
The sultan responded to these suggestions positively and ordered the grand vizier to 
attach this opinion piece to the law. These matters were to be discussed more in detail in 
a council that would include Ramiz Efendi as well.275 
 It is clear that advisors to the sultan were aware of the possible consequences of 
implementing the new measures and suggested careful strategies to avoid a revolt by the 
janissaries. Their elitist perspective is also clear from Ramiz Efendi’s remark about the 
intellectual capabilities of the opposing parties. Furthermore, Ramiz Efendi hoped to 
convince the janissaries that these measures are for the strength of their own corps. 
Clearly, there was a tension between an elite surrounding the sultan and especially the 
lower echelons of the janissary corps. 
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 Yusuf Pasha in his treatise complained that when prompted to provide soldiers for 
new campaigns the janissary corps responded by suggesting that new dalkılıç soldiers 
should be recruited, which would have required extra financial resources. Yusuf Pasha, in 
this way, expressed his frustration with the difficulty in convincing existing soldiers to 
join the war effort. Thus, he suggested that new barracks similar to Tophane, 
Humbarahane, and Talimhane should be established and “ten or twelve thousand youths 
who have not been to the vicinity of these [existing barracks] from Anatolia and Rumelia 
in a similar fashion as the earlier times [referring to the devshirme] should be recruited.”  
By suggesting that these youths should be from among those who have not been 
to the existing barracks, Yusuf Pasha was expressing the belief that such youth would not 
be corrupt as the janissaries he complains about. These youths, he suggested, should be 
taught the cannon making and humbara science and drilled in these areas. He also 
suggested that they should be kept in their region instead of being brought to the capital 
to be ready for the war effort when needed.276 He further recommended that a single 
youth from households with 2-3 youths should be registered as gunners (tüfengci) and 
they should be exempt from taxes. They should drill in the presence of their officers 
twice a week and be subject to tri-monthly inspections. If any would die, others from 
outside should be registered anew in order to prevent duplicate pay, a measure meant to 
prevent the common practice of pay ticket transfers within the corps.277 In these 
suggestions, we can see the search for an orderly recruitment and drill structure proposed 
as a solution to the military woes of the government.  
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Abdullah Berri Efendi concurred with Yusuf Pasha on the socio-economic 
background of the new recruits. He suggested that rural youths who had not experienced 
cities and towns but grown up in villages should be targeted. There were many orphans 
who would make brave soldiers. He noted that those youth who had not been circumcised 
should be circumcised by the state and taught religion, indicating the need to civilize 
them. He suggested that these recruits be trained under the direction of fifty to a hundred 
officers to be brought from Prussia.278 Within a couple of years, twenty thousand youths 
could be recruited and they would “easily do whatever is asked of them anywhere in the 
empire.”279 
Another treatise submitted by Abdullah Molla Efendi identified 1768 as the date 
when the janissaries began to be ineffective compared to their glorious days as a Bektashi 
dominated institution in earlier centuries.280 Abdullah Molla Efendi cited the janissaries 
as saying that it was because the imperial government tended to favor the Turks and 
Turcomans that they were ineffective and that it was out of their hands.281 He recounted 
that the janissaries themselves said, “One cannot overcome the infidel’s firepower, 
cannons, and rifles and enter their wheel of fortune.”282 The janissaries would complain 
that the corps used to be favored in the time of the Suleiman the Magnificent but not 
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anymore. It seems important that the advisor relayed that the janissaries admitted to their 
own ineffectiveness along with their complaints that they felt they were not treated in the 
same way as they used to be during the Golden Age. It is interesting to note that both the 
proponents of reform and the janissaries themselves referred to the time of Suleiman the 
Magnificent for justification of their respective positions.  
On specific military measures, Abdullah Molla Efendi recommended that 40-50 
janissaries from each regiment should be enlisted and offered salaries and extra payments 
(ulufe).283 By enlisting from within the corps, advisors might have aimed at a gradual 
transformation of the corps, and simultaneously, incorporation of the janissary corps in 
the new army. By continuing to import military advisors such as Baron de Tott, newly 
recruited soldiers could be taught the military sciences in a few years. And in 7-8 years, 
the number of soldiers who were trained in these sciences and drilled accordingly could 
reach a contingent of 40-50 thousand strong.284 In order to prevent the soldiers from 
having a permanent residence in Anatolia and Rumelia, they would be often recalled to 
the capital to demonstrate their newly acquired skills and would be redeployed by 
rotation to different provinces of the empire. He suggests that the drills and study of the 
new military sciences shouldn’t be restricted to the janissary corps but should be applied 
to others such as Cebeci, Topçu, and Arabacı.285  
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 It was not only the advisors to the sultan who expressed their opinions on how to 
reform. Members of the ulema286 as well as senior officers and elders of certain corps 
were asked about their opinions.287 Although they have discussed these matters in detail 
in the imperial councils, we do not quite know of their approach to reform in general 
since they did not submit formal treatises on the matter. It would be revealing to know to 
what extent the formal treatises and the opinions of the military officers overlapped.  
 The common thread in the treatises submitted to the sultan on military reform 
seems to be the suggestion to discipline and reorganize the janissaries while 
simultaneously establishing a new army. According to them, the combination of 
overwhelming firepower of the Austrians and Russians288 and the disobedience of the 
undisciplined janissaries was responsible for the military failures of the empire and this 
could only be resolved through discipline and constant drills.289 The janissaries as well as 
the traditional corps of the army operated within the logic of comradeship and lacked the 
modern bureaucratic hierarchies and forms of power exerted through mechanisms of 
discipline.290 There should have been no surprise about this. However, while the advisors 
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were focused on the corruption and inefficiency of the janissaries, the social and 
economic reasons for this situation were not explored, nor the implications of 
transitioning from comradeship to disciplined re-ordering of the army.  
 In terms of the prejudices of these advisors, studies show that those educated in 
the newly founded engineering schools291 saw themselves as somehow superior in their 
understanding of “science.” Their special insight into science privileged them as the 
educated ones in opposition to the “ignorant” ones.292 Furthermore, this new class of 
educated men equated the adoption of new military “science” and establishment of new 
military schools and barracks with loyalty to the sultan.293 In presenting the issue of 
military reform in this manner, this group of men did not shy away from labeling the 
opponents of the New Order Army “a class of idiots and superstitious [people].”294  
 
Conclusion 
The “New Order” has been hailed as a full-fledged progressive modernization 
project with a high level of coherence and an internal logic modeled on Western 
standards. As the argument follows, the understanding on the part of the Ottoman ruling 
elite that they lagged behind their European counterparts prompted them to attempt to 
catch up with the West. Thus, they endeavored to modernize their army, rationalize their 
military and civilian administration, and discipline their finances following the European 
                                                            
291 Kemal Beydilli, Türk Bilim Ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishâne, Mühendishâne 
Matbaası Ve Kütüphânesi: 1776-1826 (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Eren, 1995). 
292 Ibid., 41. 
293 Ibid., 76. 
294 Ibid., 79. 
 106 
example. This ‘imitation of the West’ argument overlooks the fact that the Ottomans 
were creating and experimenting with new forms of power themselves in an effort to 
confront the political, economic, and social costs created by the military defeats and their 
decreasing influence in the international arena. Financial rationalization, fiscal discipline, 
rationalized re-ordering of military corps, and regular drills were some of their solutions 
to problems, which they did not necessarily see as “copying” the West but necessities for 
military effectiveness. Thus, there was not an ideological and psychological duality or 
incoherence in their approach to reform as a result of their aspiration to keep up with a 
“superior” center of power.    
 Fiscal rationalization (dedicated new budget), military discipline (continuous 
drills), efficiency (reform of the janissary pay tickets), and conscription were not simple 
imports from superior counterparts but the Ottomans’ arguably imperfect and insufficient 
responses and solutions to the political and financial crises of the time. These responses 
were not immediately effective in achieving military victories but it is clear that they had 
long lasting institutional legacies for the evolution of the Ottoman state. The immediate 
military challenge posed by the Russians and the Habsburgs externally and the political 
challenge posed by the local notables internally constituted distinct confrontations that 
forced Ottoman elites to rethink their military, administration, and finances with 
increasing emphasis on efficiency, rationalization, and discipline, features of the modern 
state’s logic.  
As the Ottoman elites implemented hallmark features of the modern state as such, 
they were not necessarily committed to a single model. Only by abandoning the idea that 
there was a straightforward imported model from the West can we capture the complexity 
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and nuances of the late eighteenth century’s reform efforts. This approach explains better 
the diversity of references the elites used to push forward their specific recommendations. 
While some argued that these measures had constituted the very basis of success of the 
Ottoman “golden age,” others pointed to the success of the Europeans as the proof that 
their specific recommendations of reform were valid. Neither argument dictated a single 
approach to be implemented in this time period. Both the proponents and the opponents 
of reform in this period entertained diverse as well as conflicting conceptions of what the 
New Order army signified. Consequently, the opposition to reform was not an opposition 
to the West per se but to the dictates of modern forms of power the Ottoman statesmen 
sought to implement in a non-Western context. 
The social reality on the ground did not matter all that much in the Ottoman 
elites’ analyses. Rationalization and discipline of the finances and the soldiers 
represented the crux of their suggestions. By adhering to the idea of a golden age, the 
advisors sought to legitimize their efforts to make the army more efficient and 
rationalized. The narrow focus on creating an effective disciplined army prevented the 
advisors from addressing the more difficult and broader economic and social problems 
hindering military efficiency. Furthermore, they failed to discuss the social implications 
of rationalizing the military enterprise through establishing a new army by ignoring the 
connections the janissaries had with various societal groups. These groups benefited from 
affiliation with the janissaries through tax exemptions and evading recruitment. The elites 
did not adequately consider the possible consequences of recruitment from a society with 
such complex set of ties to the janissaries.  
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Chapter 3 – The New Order Army 
 
Establishing the New Order Army 
The Ottoman efforts to prevent the Austrian and Russian encroachments upon 
Ottoman lands during the wars of 1787-1792 were largely unsuccessful. Through the 
Treaty of Sistova in 1791 with Austria and the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 with Russia, the 
Ottomans officially recognized the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 and loss of 
control over the Black Sea to Russia. Crimea’s loss was a serious trauma for the 
Ottomans, as it represented the forfeiture of a Muslim majority land to the Russians for 
the first time. Since the end of the Ottoman advance towards Europe at the beginning of 
the century,295 difficult years and successive defeats at the hands of the Russian armies 
throughout the eighteenth century culminated in the loss of the Crimea, laying bare the 
military failures of the empire, prompting debates over the overall outlook of the army 
and military reform.  
The Ottomans decided to move forward with the establishment of a new army 
alongside the old one in this political context under the psychological impact of 
disastrous military losses suffered throughout the eighteenth century. Many reasons 
contributed to the Ottoman elites’ decision to establish the New Order army at this point, 
some of which are discussed in the second chapter. Failed attempts at effective 
recruitment for the wars against Austria and Russia in addition to the reluctance and 
resistance of local notables in providing manpower and resources for the war efforts 
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ensured that the central government found itself fighting various internal rebellions.296 
When combined with the military inefficiency of the janissaries as well as of other corps, 
the recommendations of the advisors (layihas) convinced Selim III that he had to create a 
disciplined army at the disposal of the center beyond and in addition to the old units he 
could no longer count on.  
In an attempt to create a formidable force at par with their contemporaries, the 
Ottomans were intent on transforming their existing army and add new units through 
constant drills and discipline. “Endless, repeated, systematic” drills had already proved to 
be crucial to military success in Europe.297 The New Order army’s establishment was to 
be guided by the same principle, i.e. the centrality of constant drills to create a disciplined 
and loyal force. In the European armies, “obedience no longer depended on personal 
connections and inherited social ties, but on bureaucratic appointment and promotion” 
and “soldiers became replaceable parts in a sort of a human machine.”298  
Initially, the new army was a modest attempt to create professional army units in 
the capital. Two new barracks were founded in the eastern and western parts of Istanbul, 
namely in Üsküdar, and Levend. By the end of 1806, the size of the new army reached 
some 1,590 officers and 22,685 men, half of them stationed in Istanbul and the rest in 
different barracks throughout Anatolia.299 This is a considerable growth over the course 
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of Selim III’s reign but both the financial constraints and resistance by the existing corps 
and the society would prevent a true transformation of the Ottoman fighting force as a 
whole. 
 It is difficult to speak of a full-fledged launching of a new army, especially at the 
beginning. Prior to establishing the Üsküdar barracks, the government first set up the 
Levend barracks, which housed a mere 468 men and 20 officers and lacked the 
“magnificence” its name implied. The soldiers had to live in wooden shacks during the 
first year because the construction of the regular barracks was incomplete. Within three 
years’ time, the construction of “three barracks, a rifle factory, two mosques, and a 
school” was completed. Regular training and drills went on under the direction of foreign 
military advisors and the sultan would frequently inspect the barracks.300 Although we do 
not have the exact details of the new training and drills conducted in the new barracks, 
references to basic training twice a day indicate that the soldiers were subject to regular 
training and drills.301 Training was most regular and intense in barracks in the capital and 
was probably less so in the barracks established later in various towns throughout 
Anatolia.302  
At the time of the establishment of the new barracks, the government avoided a 
fanfare surrounding the new army corps out of concern for reaction by the existing forces 
including the janissaries.303 The government named the new units “magnificent soldiers” 
and attached them first to the old Imperial Guard corps (Bostaniyan-ı Hassa) as its 
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infantry-rifle branch (Bostani Tüfenkçisi).304 The old army units, who would have viewed 
the new ones as rivals to themselves, could have created problems for the government’s 
efforts to establish a new corps. Thus, the decision was made to set up the new army in a 
seemingly subordinate position to the imperial guard within the context of an apparent 
reorganization of the army units. The government had the high level janissary officers 
sign a deed promising that they would not oppose the reorganization efforts in the 
army.305  
In order to reduce a possible janissary reaction, the government also asked that the 
janissary regiments provide soldiers for the new army in addition to new recruitment 
from elsewhere. The janissaries were expected to conduct drills in the same way that the 
New Order soldiers did. Such precautions clearly helped the government avoid an 
immediate reaction by the existing army units but they would prove insufficient to stop 
janissary participation in the downfall of the New Order experiment. This was probably 
due also to the lack of a clear strategy to create an effective fighting force in the long run 
and transform the existing army units into stakeholders in the new effort.  
This effort was more an “experiment” in creating disciplined professional army 
units than a full attempt at a solid new army to replace the old one. Nor can it be called a 
“state-of-the-art army” even in comparison to the janissaries and provincial troops,306 as 
the New Order army cannot be treated as entirely outside the traditional forces. The 
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establishment of a new army entailed integration of those existing forces as well. We 
cannot definitively prove that Selim III already had a plan to eliminate eventually “one of 
the best organized groups” in society307 by wiping out the old army and replacing it with 
the New Order forces. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the reformists were simply paying 
lip service to the old forces by including the reorganization of the old corps in the New 
Order measures. The evidence suggests that the elites did not necessarily envision a 
radical change to the entire imperial army structure but conceived of the newly created 
corps as part of a broader agenda that included restructuring of the old forces. The 
hybridity in the reform efforts, reorganization and disciplining of the old forces while 
setting up new corps, may not necessarily have been intentional but a consequence of the 
financial constraints and the fear of a backlash.   
 
Funding the New Army: The New Revenue (İrad-ı Cedid) 
The Ottoman elites understood the need for a separate budget for the new army if 
the new corps were to truly serve as a modern standing army in the long run. The New 
Revenue (İrad-ı Cedid) was set up to fund the new army on March 1, 1793 under the 
directorship of Mustafa Reşid Pasha to function as a dedicated source of revenue for the 
financing of the New Order army. As it was not conceived of as a proper “budget,” it was 
not, especially at the beginning, non-military technocrats experienced in budgetary 
matters who oversaw the New Revenue. Mustafa Reşid Pasha assumed military 
responsibilities as the supervisor of the trained soldiers (Talimli Askeri Nazırı) as well as 
the financial management of the new revenue. It was only in 1801 when the New Order 
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Army had grown close to 10,000 soldiers and officers that financial and administrative 
duties were detached from the military duties of the Supervisor.308 
This was clearly not a “budget” in the modern sense of the term, as the effort was 
primarily focused on “recovering or confiscating abandoned tax farms or military 
fiefs.”309 Financing the increased costs of raising and maintaining large land-based armies 
proved difficult for the pre-modern imperial administrations. The Ottomans were not 
alone in their inability to increase tax revenues.310 Neither was privatizing the war effort 
through “outsourcing” to wealthy individuals, an Ottoman practice like their European 
counterparts.311 On the contrary, the state was very much interested in shoring up the 
political and financial control it exerted over the provincial notables and administrators. 
The state’s efforts to find new revenue and to redirect existing sources through setting up 
a new fund were probably aimed at ensuring recentralization of lost revenues through the 
invention of new financial mechanisms.312 To finance the new revenue, the state relied on 
redirection of existing resources while also exacting some new taxes, which caused 
displeasure and triggered reaction from various groups of power brokers as well as the 
general public. 
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 The resources for the New Revenue would consist of extra taxes the government 
exacted on the population and some of the existing sources the government redirected 
towards the new fund.313 A new tax on cereal grains in the amount of 10,000 piasters 
(guruş) was imposed and the income was to be channeled into the New Revenue. In 
addition, a new officer to oversee the cereal grains was to be appointed. Compulsory 
taxes were imposed on wine314 and spirits,315 which would be overseen by a new officer 
as well. Various other taxes such as customs taxes and taxes from sales of various goods 
(walnuts, coffee, grapes, wool etc.) were directed to the new revenue as well.316 Some 
taxes that were considered relatively “easier to collect such as Rüsum-ı Zecriyye (revenue 
collected from the consumption of tobacco, rakı, wine, and coffee), wool, lint, bristle, 
cotton, and cotton-thread, gale-nuts, dyes, and acorn revenues were increased one para 
for the İrad-ı Cedid Treasury.”317 These additional sources of income and new taxes were 
supposed to fund the clothing, boots, and rifles for the new “magnificent soldiers” (New 
Order soldiers) to be recruited for the Levend and Üsküdar barracks.318 New taxes were 
imposed on sheep’s wool and goat hair, which had not been taxed previously.319 
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 More efficient collection of existing sources and their redirection helped 
contribute to the growth of the New Revenue. Cotton mukataa income was in the hands 
of several large estate (malikane) holders and the government judged that true potential 
of this source could not be realized as it was subject to a monopoly of large estate holders 
and they could not cope with the collection of all the cotton taxes throughout the empire. 
The government decided to redirect this source to the New Revenue administration.320 
The government had to ensure the safety of the sources for the new treasury. For 
example, the local officers in Belgrade had to make sure that the sources directed toward 
the İrad-ı Cedid were properly protected.321 The task at hand for the officials was 
manifold, as they had to manage redirection, protection, and continuation of revenue 
sources.    
In addition to new taxes and more efficient collection of existing sources, the 
fund’s supervisor moved to channel income from vacated tax farms and fiefs in the 
provinces into the new revenue. In the wake of the end of war on the Austrian front in 
1790-1791, the government conducted a survey of small and large fiefs to determine the 
absentee fiefs. Such revenues were reallocated to new individuals to avoid revenue loss. 
The government also used punitive measures to prevent holders of such revenue from 
remaining on the sidelines during the war campaigns while benefiting from the fief 
revenues.322  
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 By the end of 1792, more than four hundred fiefs brought revenues of seven 
thousand piasters monthly.323 In 1798, such income had reached 6,500,000 piasters, 
1,000,000 of which were paid to the imperial treasury to make up for lost revenues. The 
remaining balance paid for the salaries and expenses of the new recruits for the New 
Order army but training and creating a modern army was not the sole focus of the New 
Revenue. Funds were allocated for military campaigns against internal enemies, such as 
the mountain bandits in the Balkans and in Anatolia.324 In a way, income from local 
sources was being channeled back to the same regions to finance the fighting against the 
local notables who were not always seen as illegitimate by the local population. The 
revenue was not dedicated exclusively to building a modern army but to wage the 
center’s wars against decentralized loci of power. Lacking a modern “budget” constituted 
a problem for the new army while the state was struggling to come to terms with fiscal 
rationalization in general.      
 The New Revenue did not create or rely on new economic resources; instead, it 
focused on redirection of existing resources such as local fiefs325 previously distributed to 
local notables. In 1800, for example, revenue of the districts of Bolu, Bursa, and 
Karaman were seized for the new fund.326 This also created one of the sources of 
grievance against the New Order army, as it caused reshuffling of sources of income at 
the imperial as well as provincial levels. The revenue would now support the soldiers of 
the new army instead of supporting the local forces that would be recruited and trained by 
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the local notables.327 While some local notables participated in the new arrangement, 
others did not. Thus, the imperial government created a certain level of tension in the 
provinces between the new army’s supporters and opponents, which also reflected the 
center-periphery conflict with regard to military reform.      
 The New Revenue’s total income had reached some 32,250,000 piasters and 
growing by 1798.328 However, the dire fiscal situation the empire found itself in and the 
fact that the revenue from the already collected tax resources was insufficient led the 
Ottoman elites to expect relatively marginal benefits from political conflicts in Europe. 
For instance, the Ottoman envoy to Paris, Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, hoped that the 
European merchants’ displeasure and concerns about the war between France and Austria 
might result in an influx of merchants into the Ottoman Empire, which could bring about 
increased trade and increase sources of tax income for the Ottoman state to finance the 
New Order army.329 Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi does not seem to have outlined a clear 
strategy to enable European merchants’ influx into the empire but instead relied on a 
hope that never seriously materialized. Ratıb Efendi may not have presented this idea as a 
serious option but what is significant is that he recognized that the Ottoman government’s 
lack of resources was a serious obstacle for the funding of a new army.  
 While a certain degree of fiscal discipline was envisioned to enable the creation of 
the new revenue, the central government still used it to pay for salaries of soldiers in 
various fortresses instead of dedicating it fully to the New Order army’s expenses. The 
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new revenue, however, was not sufficient. For example, the janissaries of the Anapa 
fortress could not be paid, so the government officials had to stall them with excuses in 
an effort to prevent their reaction.330 The sultan’s repetitive calls to bring order to the 
Ottoman state’s finances were met with the harsh reality that the Ottomans could not 
financially sustain the military forces. Thus, the discontent of the soldiers, be it the 
janissaries and the new recruits, was unavoidable.  
 The Ottoman government found it difficult to reach a targeted number of soldiers 
and to keep the new soldiers within their barracks because of financial constraints. In an 
undated document, we learn that the number of soldiers in the newly established Palace 
Guard Rifle Corps (Bostancı Tüfenkçileri) had reached a combined six thousand in 
Istanbul and in the provinces. The document details the expenses to be incurred to reach 
the targeted number of ten thousand soldiers. The chief accountant estimates that the 
necessary amount, nine thousand purses (kises),331 is equal to about half of the New 
Revenue (İrad-ı Cedid). The chief accountant’s suggestion was that no more money 
should be spent from the treasury. The sultan agreed and ordered that spending money 
from the new treasury be stopped while still trying to increase the number of soldiers. 
The chief accountant’s remark that the continuation of the services of the already 
recruited soldiers depended on the timely payment of their salaries exposes another 
dimension of the financial dilemmas in this period.332  
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 The new revenue was used to pay for the salaries of janissaries in various 
fortresses when the imperial budget failed to do so.333 For instance, the New Revenue 
paid for salaries of the janissary artillerymen at the Ivarin fortress.334 Similarly, Hotin 
fortress’s janissaries and armorers were paid some 76,000 piasters towards their 
salaries.335 The janissaries could go for months or even years without being paid due to 
their engagement in economic activities, their social networks, and group solidarity 
which ensured internal cohesion and discipline. Belonging to the corps entailed more 
than financial incentives only. However, this was not the case with the newly recruited 
soldiers; professional soldiers needed to be paid their salaries on time if discipline was to 
be maintained. However, betrayal of the fiscal discipline as such would prevent the new 
revenue from growing into a fully independent budget. 
 When the new revenue ran out of funds, it had to be supplied with money from 
the imperial mint. The officials were mindful of the negative psychological impact such 
news could create. The government tried to keep such borrowing between the new 
revenue and the imperial budget secret since it would expose that “there is no money in 
the New Revenue and money is being taken from the Mint.”336 In 1806, the government 
had been unable to pay for the salaries of the soldiers in the Menteşe regiment housed in 
the Üsküdar barracks337 although the New Order recruits were supposed to receive 
monthly payments. At the end of his rule, Selim III confessed that he had spent all his 
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money on the “Paspanoğlu problem” and asked the Mint to “try its best to make two 
thousand purses.”338  
The new budget was not free of mismanagement and corruption. The sultan had to 
issue stern warnings to the vizier İbrahim Efendi, who was responsible for the 
management of the new budget, for his “disregard” for the New Revenue regulations, as 
he was making too much money off of the mukataa income. The sultan insisted that he be 
extremely careful and not waste “even a piaster” if he does not want to provoke the 
sultan’s fury.339 This is yet another indication of the government’s failures to create an 
efficient way of financing the newly created corps. Inability to pay soldiers on time and 
mismanagement were only some of the many problems plaguing the new revenue. 
Ultimately, the government failed to transform the new revenue into an independent 
modern budget used only for the purposes of creating a modern army. 
 Included in the New Order regulations was the Ottoman government’s 
requirement that all persons who would be given or who would assume military fiefs 
upon the death of a fief-holder to present themselves in person in the imperial capital to 
undergo “examination.” Such an examination was to determine whether the would-be 
fief-holder was in fact an active military person.340 This regulation must have been 
introduced because many fief-holders did not reside in the district where they held fief-
holdings. Such government efforts to ensure fiscal discipline must have created 
discontent among fief-holders who enjoyed the financial benefits of a flexible system. 
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From the government’s perspective, income from fiefs could only be enjoyed directly by 
active military personnel. But the reality was that fiefs exchanged hands between various 
financiers and many of them were not in a position to assemble soldiers to fight wars, as 
the center would have liked. 
 A similar recommendation for examination was made for the holders of tımar and 
zeamet in Cyprus. These individuals should show up in person and attendance (yoklama) 
would be taken every three years just like how the governor of Baghdad recently had 
done it.341 However, the government made an exception for those who were protecting 
the Cyprus fortress upon a recommendation that their appearance in person before the tax 
collector would be sufficient.342 Although it was decreed that the distribution of the fiefs 
in Cyprus were to be made based on the New Order rules343 just like the other provinces, 
the exception seems to have been applied to the entire island344 later on, as travel from 
Cyprus may have proven cumbersome.  
 Janissary pay tickets (esame) were one of the major targets of the New Order 
efforts to rationalize and discipline the government expenditures. The government 
documents revealed the practice of these pay tickets being accumulated in the hands of 
certain individuals and circulated among janissaries. When a certain janissary left the 
corps for one reason or another, his pay ticket was kept within the corps instead of being 
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returned to the government. It had become a common practice that the pay ticket of a 
deceased345 or absent soldier would be kept by and transferred between the regiments.346  
 One government document claimed that of more than half of fifteen thousand 
swordsmen’s (dalkılıç) pay tickets were vacant (mahlul). The salaries being paid towards 
these vacancies should have been returned to the imperial treasury (beytülmal). The 
government forbid any “transfer of pay tickets” in an effort to “bring order” to these 
practices as late as 1807.347 The sultan was sensitive to the matter of “transfer” of pay 
tickets between different regiments within the janissary corps. Upon the janissary agha’s 
request to give some 73,000 piasters worth of janissary zeamet to a certain solakbaşı, the 
sultan opted to listen to the agha’s advice probably because he wanted the income to 
remain within the same regiment instead of being transferred to another one.348 In other 
instances, the imperial treasury simply overtook the salaries due to janissaries who had 
died. The government returned to the treasury some 5,701 piasters that would have been 
paid for the daily services of 209 janissaries in the fortress of İsmail.349 Furthermore, the 
government tried to prevent the circulation of resources within and among the soldiers. 
Those soldiers who resold their miri could be punished with jail time; however, the 
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government avoided delivering such punishments publicly fearing the soldier’s affiliation 
with the janissary corps.350 
 While trying to establish a semblance of fiscal discipline within the military, the 
state had to spend more money to supply the provisions for the army. The state used to 
buy foodstuffs for the army at artificially low prices mandated by the government in the 
past, which led to the producer’s unwillingness to sell their crops to the government. 
Selim III had to introduce measures for the government to purchase at the actual market 
prices in an effort to address the producers’ discontent and make available necessary 
provisions for the army’s use.351 The government’s efforts to match market prices proved 
to be an extra burden on the imperial finances.  
Of the many challenges this new experiment had to face, availability of financial 
resources both to attract and recruit soldiers in large numbers as well as to support them 
financially remained the most important one. The government’s attempts to put its 
financial house in order through fiscal discipline and rationalization practices achieved 
mixed results at best. These measures were not applied universally and exceptions were 
endemic while they had the effect of bringing together individual soldiers, local notables, 
and over-taxed populations in their discontent against the New Order army and the 
revenue.  
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Manning the New Army 
 Soldiers for the new army were recruited from among the unemployed youth of 
Istanbul and from other urban centers in Anatolia supplied by local notables such as 
Çapanoğlu.352 Also, the expansion of the New Order army to Anatolian provinces, 
through Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha’s efforts, served to increase the size of the army in a 
substantial way.353 Nevertheless, the size of the army remained modest in the face of the 
domestic and international challenges facing the central government. More importantly, 
the military effectiveness of the new units was not a given. While there were strict rules 
to protect them from the problems that plagued the old army units, it proved difficult to 
establish discipline among the new forces as well.  
The new soldiers found their pay insufficient and would occasionally leave their 
barracks to engage in trade and other occupations in the nearby marketplaces. This 
caused soldiers to miss the drills sometimes and led to lack of discipline,354 a handicap of 
the old army corps that the new units were supposed to be immune from. The number of 
soldiers was greatly reduced in 1798, for instance, when desertion became a common 
occurrence355 especially because of the government’s deployment of the new forces 
against the French in Acre in the wake of the French invasion of Egypt. The New Order 
army officers often facilitated desertion, as they could hold onto the pay tickets of the 
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deserters.356 According to one calculation, the ratio of deserters to all the registered 
soldiers could be as high as fifteen percent.357        
 The Ottoman government tried subsequently to man the new barracks in Levend 
and Üsküdar by recruiting youths from various regions in Anatolia in addition to 
recruitment in Istanbul. Such recruitment efforts had to be accompanied by financial and 
other incentives for the soldiers as well as for the residents of the localities where 
recruitment took place. This was done so that people would not try to prevent their youth 
from enlisting for lack of sufficient incentives. For example, the new recruits were to be 
paid monthly salaries as opposed to tri-monthly and they could be promoted as higher-
rank officers in the future,358 as opposed to having to remain within the same rank 
throughout their career. The recruited soldiers would be subject to rotation as opposed to 
constant training and drills. They would also be exempt from taxes such as tekalif-i 
örfiyye, şakka, avarız-ı divaniye, and imdad-ı hazeriye.359  
 Such exemptions were not restricted to individual soldiers. In an order concerning 
recruitment of youths from Seydişehir, a small town south of Konya in central Anatolia, 
the government offered tax exemptions for all the residents of villages of the town360 
subject to recruitment orders. Istanbul’s expectation was to recruit two to three youths 
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from each village to be trained and taught the “art of war.”361 Local community leaders 
often bargained with the state to receive tax exemptions in return for recruitment.362 
Promises of tax exemptions were not always honored because it could mean reduction in 
local notables’ financial resources. At times, local notables tried to disrupt the process, as 
they would be deprived of their own income from the collection of such taxes.363 Even 
the overseer of the new revenue could foresee that recruitment of soldiers through tax 
incentives could trigger reaction by the notables and result in rebellion in the Rumelia 
provinces.364 
 There were also symbolic privileges attached to recruitment. To increase the 
“excitement” of the soldiers and show them that they were privileged over “other 
classes,” they were given “green” uniforms365 and “western shawls”366 for their use. 
Clearly, these enticements are indications of the broader recruitment difficulties, as 
youths (even if unemployed) were not in a rush to join the war effort.  
 After 1802, provincial officials and Anatolian notables also supplied the Levend 
and Üsküdar barracks with men for two or three year periods.367 In this way, 
professionally trained soldiers in Istanbul could be sent back to the Anatolian provinces 
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and the new army would have created a loyal group of military men in the provinces in 
addition to the ones in the capital. In return, local notables could benefit from bolstering 
their forces at the local level. In the absence of universal conscription,368 tensions 
between the center and the provinces could not easily be overcome, as the government 
continued to rely on the preferences of the local officials and notables in order to recruit 
soldiers for the new barracks. Universal conscription could have potentially solved this 
problem but the Ottomans only started to discus this at the end of Mahmud II’s reign after 
the abolition of the janissary corps.369   
 As of 1803, the sultan ordered that new barracks were to be built in different 
Anatolian cities to house and train New Order soldiers. By 1807, about 1,500 soldiers had 
been recruited, housed, and trained in Anatolia. Efforts to extend the New Order army to 
Anatolia remained weaker because of the opposition to this endeavor. On the one hand, 
new taxes were being imposed to support the new barracks instead of the central 
government directly paying for the costs. On the other hand, the central government 
found it difficult to impose its will as local forces were mingled with the local people a 
lot more than in the capital. The government’s inability to increase the new army’s size 
through recruitment in Anatolia resulted in lack of support for the new measures as well 
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as the sultan himself. During the Kabakçı rebellion,370 for example, these forces did not 
support the imperial government and fight the “rebels,” which indicates their lack of 
commitment to the whole project in the first place.371 
 There was also a serious difference between the New Order army soldiers in 
Levend and Üsküdar barracks and those in New Order barracks in Anatolia. The officials 
complained that the rules written down for the New Order army were not being followed 
in the Anatolian barracks.372 It was difficult for the government to maintain the same 
standards across the board among the forces in Istanbul and in Anatolia. While Istanbul 
forces were under the direct oversight of the imperial military and political elites in the 
capital and its funding being watched over more carefully, the forces in Anatolia relied 
on the financial and military capabilities of the provincial governors and local notables. 
The inefficiency of the imperial bureaucracy appears to have been endemic throughout 
the reign of Selim III and the management of the new army would have been no 
exception. 
 Despite the government’s efforts in new recruitment by making it attractive to 
join the new corps, the state still had to rely on local notables and existing units to deal 
with domestic threats. Pre-New Order recruitment problems continued in the aftermath of 
the establishment of the New Order army. The sultan had to threaten those who did not 
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show up for duty by stripping their privileges (gedik)373 and even of their fiefs if they 
insisted on their disobedience.374 It was not only individual soldiers who did not show up 
but also certain pashas, who had been given the duty to go against rebellious pashas or 
notables, who failed to follow up on the government’s requests.375 The center’s failure to 
mobilize soldiers as well as pashas against domestic threats must have contributed to the 
government’s inability to make recruitment for the New Order army attractive in the eyes 
of the general public.  
 
Local Resistance to Recruitment 
 Recruitment efforts created local unrest in Anatolia partly because the 
government pursued an inconsistent policy in terms of tax-exemption incentives. In an 
order dispatched to Kütahya and Karaman, for instance, it appears that it was not the 
entire town (as was the case with Seydişehir) but only the households of the soldiers who 
would be exempt from the taxes. Regardless of the number of soldiers they provided, the 
families willing to let their children join the new forces in Istanbul would be exempt from 
some major extraordinary taxes such as tekalif-i örfiyye, tekalif-i şakka, avarız-ı 
divaniyye, and imdad-ı hazeriye.  
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These measures, however, created discontent and people in the locality harassed 
families of recruited soldiers by blocking their sheep and other animals from grazing. The 
local notables and influential people did not agree with the government’s measures either. 
The source of the discontent seems to be the preferential tax-exemption policy itself as 
people are quoted as saying, “you are exempt; you do not pay taxes (tekalif) as we do!” 
Such disturbance prevented local military officials (alaybeyi) from recruiting soldiers and 
prompted orders from the center to the effect that local notables or any other rebel 
resisting the government recruitment should be punished for harassing others. The delay 
in the recruitment caused by the resistance of the local people in Kütahya and Konya 
resulted in the local alaybeyis’ request that they be given a couple of months to recruit the 
necessary number of soldiers (about 2,000).376 
 This kind of delay because of local resistance was complicated by the logistical as 
well as psychological difficulties. There were two options for the government. The first 
option was to send the already registered soldiers to the capital in which case the 
recruitment would be completed during the upcoming spring season. The second option 
was to wait for the spring to send all soldiers together. The military officials, responsible 
for recruitment were charged with bringing the recruited soldiers to the Üsküdar barracks, 
suggested that the latter was a better option because splitting the soldiers and sending 
them to the center little by little would cause “disappointment” among the soldiers. The 
reason for such a disappointment is not given in the document but one can infer that 
being singled out would not have fared well with these newly recruited soldiers. In the 
meantime, they suggested, the soldiers should be paid five piasters monthly for food as an 
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incentive to keep their morale high although they were not serving as soldiers in their 
barracks just yet. The officials recognized that paying for their food locally would be 
more expensive but it was necessary if the desired number of soldiers were to be 
recruited.377  
 Local resistance was not limited to supplying manpower for the new army. 
Exploitation of the local natural resources for the new army was also resisted. In a report 
dated March 1793, we learn that the government had to settle for lower quality wood 
from the Sakarya region to build three hundred large gunstocks from “dark tree wood” at 
the imperial arsenal of artillery as was required by the New Order. The Dervişyavan 
village in Varna, which had plenty of the right type of wood, and the district of Yenipazar 
were sent orders along with nine hundred piasters for the cutting down and purchase of 
the wood. Residents of both Varna and Yenipazar “hesitated and opposed” the deal 
finding the compensation insufficient. Some of the residents cooperated and cut down 
some wood but the amount was not large enough for the project. Next, the government 
decided to postpone the acquisition of the lumber to next year to be taken from Wallachia 
and Moldavia with only half the amount of lumber to be acquired from Wallachia at this 
time. It was remarked that demanding more would arouse the “hatred of the subjects.” 
Finally, it was commented that lumber from Salonika would not stand the heat from the 
sun so there was no other option but return the nine hundred piasters and contend with the 
available wood from the Sakarya.378 This example shows that the government’s inability 
to offer competitive prices for the natural resources could be an important factor in 
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causing resistance by the people against the most basic requirements of building a new 
army. 
 It was not only the local people who were unwilling to go along with the 
recruitment efforts. Some local affiliates of high-level officials could also try to obstruct 
recruitment efforts for the newly established barracks in Istanbul. Two individuals, one of 
whom was a local affiliate of Hüseyin Pasha, were executed for obstructing recruitment 
of soldiers from the town of Beypazarı for the Üsküdar barracks in Istanbul as they 
opposed the conscription orders.379 The relevant document does not specify the reason 
why these individuals opposed the orders but the government’s following actions give us 
clues. The document notes that the officials explained the imperial order for conscription 
to the local populace “letter by letter.”380 We can speculate that the individuals, executed 
for opposing the recruitment effort, actually represented the local discontent in this 
province. The broader problem for the new army to overcome was not so much teaching 
soldiers the new methods and technologies of contemporary warfare, but rather, to be 
able to recruit, control, manage soldiers, and supply provisions for the newly established 
corps in the first place. Even if these conditions were met and conscription was 
successful, there was no guarantee that the new soldiers in the new barracks would fully 
submit to the logic of the new army.381 
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Resistance to the Expansion of the New Order Army 
 In addition to the recruitment and funding issues, the imperial government’s 
expectations of the new army were under pressure from the internal disorder (local 
notables’ rebellions) and external wars (such as Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 or 
the Russian invasion of the Principalities in 1806). In response to such challenges, the 
government tried to increase the size of the new army very quickly, which resulted in loss 
of intended discipline and order among the new army’s soldiers. “The rapid increase in 
the number of men in the corps had far outstripped the drill facilities … so that it was 
impossible for all men to practice and drill daily.”382 Overcrowding of the corps and 
unwillingness of the individual soldiers in the face of harsh discipline and low pay were 
the main reasons why the new corps were now faced with the same problems that the 
Ottoman elites had always complained about the old army. The government’s financial 
problems did not allow “professional soldiers” to be fully paid for by the government.  
 Pressed by the urgency of war, the Ottomans had to recruit soldiers for wars on an 
irregular basis while trying to build the New Order army. Military pressures by the 
Russians had already caused large immigrant influxes into the capital. The Ottomans had 
to both manage such irregular immigration and to recruit men to defend the borders of the 
empire. An imperial order recognized the difficulty in recruiting married men and men 
with children for the war effort. As a solution, the sultan ordered that single men, who 
had come from Anapa – a Russian port city on the Black Sea – living in the Tophane 
neighborhood in Istanbul, be recruited for the Anapa fortress’s defense against the 
Russians. These bachelors would be paid fifty guruş as travel allowance and sent back to 
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Anapa.383 However, such haphazard arrangements efforts incurring sporadic expenses put 
extra strain on the imperial budget. 
 The government used the New Order army against internal disturbances in 
addition to external threats. In fact, it has been argued that one of the major incentives for 
the government to expand the new army to the provinces was to confront the insecurity 
caused by bandits as well as the local notables, which in the process served to militarize 
the provinces further.384 In May 1802, for instance, soldiers in Levend and Üsküdar 
barracks were mobilized against Nimetoka Pasha who had gathered two thousand 
“troublemakers” (haşerat) of his own and was marching against Bergos. The government 
ordered that all the irregulars and officers in the New Order army to be deployed, as it 
was seriously worried that bandits could cause embarrassment by reaching Istanbul given 
the “fatigue” experienced by the soldiers.385 Such deployment could increase the fighting 
experience of the new army but fighting against internal opposition (in the form of 
banditry) could possibly prevent them from preparing for more serious confrontations 
against the more orderly Russian and Austrian armies. Such engagements clearly limited 
the new army’s ability to grow its size and capabilities to mount a credible threat to 
foreign armies in the long run.  
 The New Order army’s success against the French forces in Acre during the 
invasion of Egypt is often cited as a success story. The governor of Acre, Cezzar Ahmed 
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Pasha, reportedly said, “let my tongue dry up if I ever spoke against them.”386 Although 
the veracity of the governor’s actual words is open to debate, particularly because the 
quote is cited by the ideologically motivated Koca Sekbanbaşı (discussed in the first 
chapter), the New Order army may have had a limited success against the French forces 
as it was only 200 New Order soldiers that were sent to aid Cezzar Ahmed Pasha to fight 
against Napoleon’s forces attacking Syria.387 This may have been a good opportunity for 
the Ottoman government to test the new army’s effectiveness and expand the army in 
Anatolia through the construction of new barracks. However, Selim III recognized 
himself that the soldiers trained in the capital and in Anatolia were not very impressive. 
Furthermore, those trained in Anatolia did not appear as effective and disciplined as those 
from the capital.388 
The expansion in Anatolia would happen in the hands of Çaparzade Süleyman 
Bey and the governor of Karaman, Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha.389 A plan to set up new 
barracks in Ankara was part of the expansion of the New Order army.390 An ardent 
supporter of the New Order army, Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha was given the task of 
extending the reforms and recruitment efforts to Anatolia and later on to Rumelia. He 
was initially involved in the New Order efforts in Karaman.391 In October 1801, he 
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suppressed a rebellion in Bozkır.392 His efforts earned him the governorship of 
Karaman.393 However, his heavy-handed methods gave him a bad reputation, which 
meant that he would face resistance elsewhere. 
 The people of Konya rebelled against Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha when he was 
appointed as the governor of the city in the spring of 1804. The opposition claimed that 
his appointment was meant to raise soldiers for the New Order Army’s Üsküdar barracks 
and blocked the pasha’s entrance into the city.394 While the pasha was able to enter the 
city secretly at first, he could not withstand the rebels with his two hundred men and was 
forced to leave.395 The government sent orders threatening the general public with force if 
they did not allow order to be established.396 Another local notable, Çaparzade Süleyman 
Bey, had to interfere to secure peace between the locals and Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha. 
He was ordered not to “hurt” the people of Konya and head back to the imperial center 
following Cabbarzade’s efforts to calm the situation in Konya.397 Cabbarzade reported 
that the people were not inclined to revolt if it were not for the injustices committed by 
Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha. He added that the people of Konya were strong enough to 
rebel against the imperial authority but chose not to do, so it was only fitting for the 
government to treat them with forgiveness despite their past misbehavior.398   
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 It was not only local notables vying for influence or local people unhappy with 
recruitment and taxation efforts but also certain local administrators who were discontent 
with Abdurrahman Pasha’s efforts to expand the new army. When he heard that the 
province of İçel would be given to Abdurrahman Pasha, the mutasarrıf of İçel, Ahmed 
Pasha, threatened that he would resist, which forced the sultan to cave in and leave the 
province under his rule.399 
The people of Konya were eventually forgiven for their rebellion but also warned about 
severe punishment if they were to rebel again.400  
 Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha’s relatively limited success against the bandits in Çorlu 
and Filibe convinced the sultan that Abdurrahman Pasha could expand the New Order 
army to Rumelia but this idea was postponed in the face of the presence of powerful local 
notables such as Paspanoğlu and Tirsiniklioğlu and the public’s opposition. Outbreak of 
the Serbian peasants’ rebellion in Belgrade forced the government to put off such plans 
for the time being and Abdurrahman Pasha went back to Anatolia.401 He set out to expand 
the New Order army into Konya, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir, Beyşehir, Akşehir, Alanya, 
Antalya, and Isparta while Çaparzade Süleyman Bey did the same in Bozok, Kayseri, 
Çankırı, Kastamonu, Ankara, Amasya, and Tokat.402 While it is unclear how well this 
effort worked in all these central Anatolian cities but when Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha was 
sent to help suppress the Serbian rebellion and expand the New Order army to provinces 
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in Rumelia, he had already been delayed by a year because of the Konya rebellion.403  
 People of Edirne heard the news of Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha’s arrival in their 
city and decided to rebel as they interpreted this as the New Order’s expansion into their 
city. The government tried to assure them that the pasha was being sent there only to help 
the Rumelia governor Ibrahim Pasha fight the Serbian rebellion.404 As the people in 
Tekirdağı405 and Edirne were not convinced, in the summer of 1806, the people of Edirne 
refused entry to Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha, by closing down the bazaar and shops in the 
city for several days. The local people, notables, and the ulema in the city agreed that the 
janissary issue has to be respected,406 implying that the Kadı Abdurrahman’s plans to 
implement New Order measures in Edirne would not be tolerated. While he was 
successful in suppressing the rebellion in Silivri, Babaeski, and Elmalı, the pasha had to 
pull back, as his army could not secure provisions from the locals.407 The central 
government understood that it could not win this fight so it ultimately had to 
acknowledge the strength of the local opposition to Kadı Abdurrahman’s arrival. In the 
end, the pasha was ordered to declare to the residents of the city that he would not try to 
enter the city, one time capital of the empire whose ulema, corps members, and shop 
owners needed to feel as secure as those in the capital.408 This episode shows the level of 
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deep mistrust by the local populations and notables of the New Order project as a whole.  
 The central government failed not only to expand the new army into Rumelia but 
also to establish effective control over the areas under the influence of the local notables. 
This rendered the government helpless in the face of the Serbian rebellion as well as 
further Russian encroachments in this region.409 While the local populations’ intentions to 
oppose the new army may have been different than those of the local notables, it is clear 
that there existed a confluence of interests between the locals, the ulema, the janissaries, 
and the notables in the Rumelia region.      
 It also demonstrated the apparent failure of the New Order army in confronting a 
domestic rebellion supported by a variety of local notables whose interests in opposition 
to the center aligned at this point. Tirsinikli Ismail Agha, who had been loyal to the sultan 
until then, joined the alliance between Ali Pasha of Janina, the notables of Filibe 
(Plovdiv), Edirne, and Pazarcık, İsmail Bey of Serez, and Paspanoğlu of Vidin against the 
imperial center. After Tirsiniklioğlu’s assassination in August 1806, Alemdar Mustafa 
would take over his ayanlık of Rusçuk and force Selim III to make concessions.410 
 
Disillusionment with the New Order: The Case of Tayyar Mahmud Pasha 
 The New Order became part of the power politics between different notable 
families and the central government in late eighteenth century. When the Caniklizade 
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family in the Amasya and Sivas region failed to satisfy the central government’s 
expectations against the Russians during the 1787-1792 wars, the government assigned 
the provinces under their control to the Çapanoğlu family “in return for their support of 
the New Order army.”411 Tayyar Mahmud Pasha of the Caniklizade family opposed the 
New Order once Selim III moved to punish the family for the loss of Anapa in the 
Caucasus to the Russians.412 This opposition was clearly linked to the struggle for power 
among local notables rather than being an ideological one. In this context, supporting as 
well as opposing the New Order of Selim III determined who would be favored by the 
central government in the regional power struggle. As opposition to the New Order 
became a rallying point for Tayyar Pasha, the center was interested in re-centralizing the 
distribution of local resources while using the support for the New Order as a loyalty test 
for the local notables.413 Proper analysis of opposition to the New Order needs to take 
into account this dimension of politics of local hegemony and control over resources 
among local notables.  
 The level of discontent with tax collectors among the local populations largely 
due to extra taxes imposed upon them as part of the New Order measures made it 
possible for local contenders for power to champion the anti-New Order cause. In 1801, a 
striking example of local resistance to tax collection occurred. The people of Sivas 
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refused entry to the tax collector (mütesellim) appointed by the governor of Sivas. The 
official reporting the incident commented that the tax collector Hüseyin Pasha had made 
a reputation for himself in Diyarbakır and elsewhere as an unjust official and drawn the 
ire of the locals by bringing along with him “so many soldiers.” Hüseyin Pasha “dared” 
collecting 15,000 to 20,000 piasters from Niksar and its environs upon which the local 
people surrounded his residence. The governor suggested that the state needed to get rid 
of Hüseyin Pasha by hanging him. He recommended that Tayyar and Mustafa Pashas and 
Cabbarzade were ready to march against Hüseyin Pasha from separate directions. When 
Cabbarzade attempted to enter the city to get Mustafa Pasha (the governor of Sivas) 
released, he was unsuccessful because the people had acquire soldiers from neighboring 
Divriği and dug trenches around the city. The locals cited the Pasha’s previous “crimes” 
elsewhere but this was probably not the only reason for their resistance. The fact that they 
could attract soldiers from neighboring regions to join them in resisting the governor and 
his men demonstrates the kind of alliances created between the local population and 
soldiers.414 Abuse by government officials could also push locals to seek help from local 
notables such as Cabbarzade.415 
 Tayyar Pasha became an example of a disillusioned government official who 
turned against the government and eventually revolted against the New Order.416 
Although he expressed his willingness to work for the sultan along with some of his six 
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thousand men,417 he seems to have gone “astray” by opposing the New Order. Resistance 
to the New Order could appear in the form of rivalry between local notables, as officials 
like Tayyar Pasha and local notables vied for the support of local populations who were 
discontented with the extra taxes and new recruitment ran high. 
 During 1800 and 1801, Tayyar Pasha was appointed to Rumelia to deal with the 
banditry problem. The central government had dealt with the French invasion of Egypt 
and was now refocusing its efforts to reassert government control over the Balkans. 
Tayyar Pasha spent two years dealing with the situation and was negotiating with bandits 
to resettle them in Anatolia. The effort was often hampered, as the government could not 
pay the soldier-turned-bandits the promised bonuses (ulufe).418 Tayyar Pasha was pleased 
to hear that he was given the control of Trabzon but disappointed to find out Amasya’s 
control had been given to Cabbarzade, his long time competitor.419  
 Tayyar Pasha set out to challenge Cabbarzade and moved against Amasya.420 
Although the government was preparing to promise the tax income of the upcoming year 
to Tayyar Pasha in an effort to appease him, he took over Turhal and claimed that this 
was done under the authority of the sultan and by a religious edict of the Sheikhulislam. 
Tayyar Pasha’s forces marched against Cabbarzade’s region and propagated that they 
were going to “abolish the New Order” and “end the injustice.” Tayyar Pasha was able to 
garner support from the ulema and janissaries and tried to expel Cabbarzade’s tax 
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collector in Tokat and Sivas. Tayyar Pasha was able to kick the local tax collector out of 
Sivas and was marching against Tokat and Amasya.421 While Cabbarzade was able to 
retake Tokat, the government was considering ending Tayyar Pasha’s duty and ordering 
his execution.422 The fact that Tayyar Pasha sought to increase his influence in the region 
through exploitation of the anti-New Order feeling indicates the unfavorable reception of 
the New Order measures among the local populace.  
The promise to end the New Order meant, for the locals, an end to extra taxes and 
to recruitment for the new army. In fact, this was expressed in government documents, 
which reported, “…the people of our time are inclined to revolt.”423 The report claimed 
that the people could not make up their mind about whether to lean toward Tayyar Pasha 
in the absence of a government order to the contrary. When Tayyar Pasha’s men claimed 
that they were under the authority of the imperial center, the locals felt they had no 
choice but to accept them. The report added that it had been relatively peaceful to recruit 
soldiers from the region until Tayyar Pasha made it his mission - at least in rhetoric - to 
abolish the New Revenue. The report warned that if this problem is not taken care of 
soon enough, the revolt could spread to the more heartland regions such as Kayseri and 
beyond.424 It is clear that Tayyar Pasha’s promise to end the new taxes and recruitment 
resonated with the local people. As the pasha used this discontent to increase his 
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influence locally, the irony was that the center was unable to reach the locals to make its 
case but relied on local notables to do just that.  
 
Conclusion 
In setting up the New Order army, there was no doubt in the Ottoman elites’ mind 
that achieving absolute discipline and loyalty in the army would contribute to military 
success. The new enterprise, however, had to face many difficulties, most of which were 
related to broader political, economic, and social problems of the empire. Yet the 
Ottoman elites focused on the most pressing military difficulties. As the financing proved 
inadequate, establishment of an independent new army had to proceed rather slowly. The 
effort could not be spelled out openly, as the reforming elites needed to avoid triggering a 
reaction against the new army. While the New Order measures included expansion and 
reorganization of the existing army as well as the institution of a new disciplined army, it 
is difficult to argue that there was a clear recognition or an attempt at addressing the 
broader problems destined to prevent military reform from accomplishing an overhaul of 
the entire army. 
Financing the new army proved extremely difficult and was guided more by the 
logic of centralizing and rechanneling of existing resources than creating new ones. A 
truly modern budgetary discipline was also lacking, which meant that the government 
regularly tapped into the New Budget to finance expenses unrelated to the maintenance 
of the New Order army. Corruption and inefficiency in the new budget’s management 
could not be prevented, leading to the replication of old financing problems. The 
government tried to rationalize the finances by introducing disciplinary measures into the 
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financing of existing soldiers including the janissary pay tickets. The government was 
able neither to make it financially attractive to enlist in the new army nor to prevent 
disgruntlement against the newly introduced financial measures. More broadly, there was 
a broad failure at rendering the financing of the Ottoman war machine effective to meet 
the challenges of the time period. 
Similar problems continued to dominate the efforts to man the new barracks and 
enlist soldiers throughout the empire. This was due to the unwillingness of the local 
notables to go along with the government’s efforts to restructure center-periphery 
relations as well as local resistance to recruitment efforts. The New Order army barracks 
and enlisting for them were received in Anatolia and Rumelia as the center’s effort to 
collect more taxes and more men for internal and external war efforts, which were highly 
unpopular. The central government’s failures combined with its efforts to extract more 
resources led to various local revolts as well as disillusionment of powerful government 
officials who had in fact been loyal to the cause of the New Order. While the central 
government clearly failed to transform the New Order army into a viable alternative to 
the existing forces, the Ottoman public as a whole as well as various power brokers 
became largely disillusioned with and skeptical about the entire enterprise.  
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Chapter 4 – Janissary Soldiers and Social Networks Resist the New Order 
 
Reordering and Disciplining the Janissaries 
 The establishment of the New Order army was accompanied by continued efforts 
to re-order and discipline the janissary corps as well as other existing corps. The janissary 
soldiers resisted the government’s efforts to discipline their corps and to establish the 
New Order army simultaneously for a broad set of reasons. While these reasons may 
have included the commonly repeated charge of the janissaries’ desire to “protect their 
privileged status,” this is only part of the story. After all, in a time of financial crisis, 
political instability and pressing wars, it is difficult to argue that the janissaries were in a 
particularly privileged situation.  
In a similar fashion to the resistance of the fellahin against conscription in the 
context of Mehmed Ali’s efforts to create a modern army in Egypt,425 there existed 
continuous resistance among the janissaries against the disciplining nature of the new 
army. The Egyptian fellahin resisted conscription and the modern army’s disciplining 
mechanisms through various avenues. These included corruption and inefficiency of the 
bureaucrats who were recruited to the new army from among the fellahin,426 certain cases 
of mutiny against higher officials,427 denying authorities full surveillance of 
themselves,428 soldiers’ refusal to give accurate information about their health 
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conditions,429 soldiers’ refusal of medical treatment,430 and subversion of rules such as 
access to prostitutes in the military camps.431 Similarly, the janissaries resisted the 
government’s attempts to discipline and reorder their corps through resisting officer 
appointments, resisting drills, refusing to adopt modern clothing, threating the 
government with potential mutinies, and staging various mutinies. Unlike the fellahin, 
however, the janissaries were not simply the objects of modern disciplinary measures 
implemented by the government. They wielded power that could activate a broad 
coalition from various segments of society and threaten the very survival of the central 
government.  
To be sure, the janissaries suffered from the inefficiencies of pre-modern armies 
just like their contemporaries such as corruption, desertion, mutiny,432 and inability to 
mobilize quickly and efficiently.433 Their mutinous behavior could also affect the 
decision-making mechanisms of the state434 while inhibiting the army’s ability to move 
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swiftly.435 Yet, in the late eighteenth century, their inefficiency did not necessarily derive 
from a narrowly defined resistance to a new army that threatened their privileged position 
as the traditionally historiography has argued. At the same time, an argument can be 
made that the janissaries felt threatened by the growing new army. One estimate puts the 
number of New Order army’s soldiers at 22,685 and of janissaries at 98,539 as late as 
1806.436 The contrast in numbers is staggering but it can still be considered a large 
enough threat for the janissary corps as an institution. Moreover, implementation of fiscal 
rationalization and military discipline undermined the very logic of the janissary corps 
and threatened the sense of comradeship and belonging along with their esprit de corps. 
In addition, the janissaries’ long established relations with the society at large positioned 
them as a bulwark against the central government’s measures that upset similar interests 
of local populations around the empire. 
 One of the foremost complaints by the modern Ottoman historians about their 
own field is the prevalence of the state-centered view of the historical events they study. 
As has been explained in many works, the sources the historians use have a considerable 
influence in this. On the one hand, we often lack systematic statistical studies (for 
instance, there is no systematic statistical studies of the janissary salaries, whose 
evolution over time would be relevant for this study) that can provide us with at least the 
foundations for a solid overview of the phenomenon we are researching. However, we 
need not forget the fact that it is also historians themselves who have had difficulty 
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thinking critically about these sources. Adoption of the state-centric viewpoint of the 
documents often results in an elitist perception towards the various groups involved in 
historical events. In the context of the New Order, which is supposed to be a 
comprehensive reform program (implying a conscious and clearly articulated agenda for 
positive change), the opponents of the New Order appear as villains in the story.  
Transformation of the Ottoman polity in this time period was not undertaken only 
by a handful of so-called reform-minded bureaucrats. The “villains” have to be part of the 
story, as they are active participants/determiners of this process as much as the modern 
historiography’s “good guys.” Through their resistance, contestation, defiance, and 
revolts as well as their active participation in the reform process (consciously or 
unconsciously) suggested new directions the Ottoman state should take. If we include all 
parties as groups competing (surely) for their interests, but more importantly, over the 
way the policies should be made, we would be doing more justice to not only the realities 
on the ground but also to our historical understanding. This chapter attempts to 
understand the complex challenges the janissaries posed for the reform efforts because of 
their ties with various segments of the society both horizontally and vertically.  
There is a strong connection between the street violence and the popular culture. 
Crowds could be mobilized as a result of pre-existing social solidarities based on urban 
networks.437 Social protest took various forms including petitioning as well as 
denouncement of government measures.438 Janissaries themselves were deeply embedded 
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in these social networks and they did not always react with violence. The famous 
overturning of the cauldron (kazan kaldırma) happened at the end of negotiation 
processes that did not yield results to satisfy the janissaries and their social networks. 
Actively involved in the marketplace, the janissaries had a stake in the maintenance of 
market conditions, hence the very interests of their social networks. E. P. Thompson 
argues that social protest, in eighteenth century Britain, was intimately connected to a 
“consensus as to the moral economy of the commonwealth in times of dearth.”439 
Successive failures in war efforts in the Ottoman context were the driver of social unrest 
and the Janissaries were adversely affected by economic conditions. When the central 
government demanded extra taxes and men to supply the new army with recruits, various 
socio-economic groups such as villagers and townspeople resisted such attempts through 
open disobedience (rebellion) as well as through more subtle ways (false declarations as 
to number of men in the household, desertion, tax exemption claims etc.).440    
 The Ottoman government, however, identified the main problem for the military 
losses as corruption, disorderliness, and lack of discipline among the janissary soldiers. 
The solution was to discipline the janissaries. Some of the fiscal problems concerning the 
janissary corps had to do with financial irregularities in how pay tickets were held by 
individual janissaries. The Ottoman officials called for an urgent re-ordering and 
reorganization of the janissary pay tickets. The main complaint was that those who did 
not deserve to be paid (ones who had not shown up during the military campaigns) had 
been receiving payments. An individual holding several pay tickets as well as the practice 
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of transfer of a pay ticket to another janissary in another regiment were practices that had 
become commonplace over the previous centuries.441 The pay tickets had been resold and 
exchanged in a pseudo stock market system involving government officials as well as 
local power brokers. This “lucrative business”442 was a heavy burden on the imperial 
budget but one that benefited various circles within the imperial power structure itself.  
 Resistance and occasional rebellions by the janissaries in the face of government 
measures adversely affecting the janissaries’ power and status are nothing new. As early 
as the seventeenth century, the janissaries defied the authorities for reasons such as the 
impact of currency debasement on their salaries or when controversial appointments were 
made to the upper ranks of the corps. While the instances of rebellion in Istanbul are 
better documented, it is important to note that such mutinies could spread over the 
provinces and even be emulated by local power-holders such as the emirs in the Arab 
provinces.443  
 In the late eighteenth century when mobilization of janissary soldiers in numbers 
that were on the books became virtually impossible,444 the government decided that easy 
circulation of janissary pay tickets constituted violation of the laws of the Janissary 
Corps. Promotion through bribery - which would ensure janissary control over 
recruitment and awards system in the Corps - within the janissary ranks was also 
condemned. The government tried to put an end to such practices and labeled those 
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involved as “traitors.”445 The officials’ deliberations on the janissaries aimed to “bring 
the janissary corps back to its ancient order (nizam-ı kadim) by changes in certain 
areas.”446 Attempting to rationalize the finances in the janissary corps created discontent 
among the janissaries as well as those officials benefiting from the system. Ultimately, 
the government failed to bring fiscal mayhem in the janissary corps under control.447 
 Since the janissary corps represented much more than a simple military unit that 
could be done away with, the Ottoman officials were content with establishing a new 
army alongside the existing forces. Yet, the move towards a more rationalized system of 
recruitment, finance, and hierarchy in military forces through the establishment of the 
new army went hand in hand with similar measures in the janissary corps. The 
government ordered that a new division of rifle gunners (tüfenkçi neferatı) within the 
janissary corps be drawn up. The government tried to ensure janissary compliance and 
prevent their estrangement from the reorganization measures by enlisting new gunners 
from among the janissaries.448 They were to drill in using rifles twice a week and the 
government spared funds for the necessary ammunition.449 The Ottoman government 
made funds available to make the janissaries study the “science of rifles” and for training 
and drills with rifles.450 Janissary comrades were paid to start rifle drilling; they even shot 
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some bullets in the sultan’s presence and received tips for the exercise.451 The training of 
the janissaries was not rigidly separated from the New Order army’s training in that 
sense. Janissaries were given new training and they did not oppose such measures in their 
entirety. It is not entirely clear how long the janissaries continued to conduct rifle drills 
but the reason for the failure of the enterprise seems to stem from the fact that it was not a 
well-funded project to ensure a wholehearted participation by the janissaries.452 
 In trying to bring the army to the warfront, the Ottomans tried to extract a certain 
number of soldiers from among the janissaries, which implied some level of 
reorganization of the janissary regiments. Reorganization, however, created discontent 
among the janissaries especially because their ties with their own regiments could be 
severed. During the winter of 1791, the government was trying to assemble the army to 
go to campaign against Russia in the upcoming spring. In a document discussing the 
recruitment of the janissaries, we learn that an imperial council had been convened and 
ordered the chief officer of irregular troops (sekbanbaşı)453 to raise and deploy soldiers 
from especially Istanbul and the provinces.  
The sekbanbaşı, however, had not yet announced this order to the janissaries 
because of the large size of the number of soldiers. He suggested that the soldiers should 
be organized in a way to collect 200 soldiers from each of the 30 regiments (orta) of the 
janissary corps totaling 6000 soldiers in order to keep a count of soldiers who did and did 
not actually join the campaign. Organized in this manner, the usual problem of desertion, 
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which could leave each regiment with only 30 men with auxiliary duties by the time they 
arrive in Silivri (just outside Istanbul), could be prevented. The larger target of 30,000 
men from various corps for the campaign in the spring could be met with this kind of re-
organization.454 In preparing for the upcoming campaign, the government officials were 
well aware of the desertion problems and they could expect it to happen again. Although 
the main causes of desertion in pre-modern armies were “lack of food and pay,”455 the 
Ottoman officials’ solution was to make the number of soldiers more ascertainable and 
quantifiable by organizing them into new regiments as opposed to leaving it up to the 
regiment leaders to bring their regiments to the war front. Government’s reorganization 
efforts in this way violated the relative autonomy enjoyed by the janissaries. 
 The Ottoman government needed easily identifiable units of soldiers for 
recruitment purposes. Intermingling of various military corps obstructed “legibility”456 in 
the literal sense of the word. The advantage of mingling of the various corps for the 
individual soldiers seems to have been that a soldier could claim affiliation with a corps 
to receive the protection of that particular corps. The traditional janissary uniforms seem 
to have been worn not only by the janissaries themselves but other military corps such as 
boatmen and imperial guards (bostancı) in Istanbul making it difficult for the government 
to distinguish these different groups. When instructed to organize 30 new regiments out 
of the janissary corps in 1789, for example, the sekbanbaşı complained that these various 
groups wore each other’s uniforms, which made his job difficult. He reported that, just 
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recently, a janissary, who had previously been bailed out by a higher-level officer 
(odabaşı) of the janissary corps, was released after being captured for another crime he 
had committed. From now on, the boatmen and the imperial guards should hang out with 
their own group and they would be punished if they wore one another’s uniforms.457 In 
trying to assemble and organize soldiers for the army, the government needed more 
clearly identifiable and quantifiable units, which would create discontent as their 
established practices were being violated. 
 While trying to impose legibility as such, the government was not unaware of the 
existing realities on the ground where there was the long accepted phenomenon of 
janissaries who could fight and those who could not. We learn, in a dispute over the 
inheritance of a certain janissary named Kahveci Mehmed, that he left one-third of his 
estate to certain local notables in Yenikapı, Istanbul. Since he was a member of the 
seventy-first regiment of the janissary corps, the remaining part of his estate would 
belong to the public treasury. However, a dispute with the religious endowment (waqf) 
that managed this property at the time of his death ensued and the question was whether 
the religious endowment had a right to seize the military (ocaklu) property, especially 
given that the janissary in question was not claiming to be a janissary only through a 
muster roll (esame) but he in fact held a revenue for livelihood (dirlik). The sultan 
decided that the endowment could not take over the property in question as it belonged to 
the military class.458 What is interesting in this episode is that we learn that the 
government distinguished between a “real janissary” and a “janissary in name only.” The 
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practice of claiming janissary titles through a muster roll had transformed into a fact of 
life but it seems to have been recognized that janissaries who could not show anything 
else such as a dirlik did not count as true janissaries in the eyes of the government.  
 From the military efficiency perspective, there were problems the government had 
in assigning janissaries to specific duties. In a memorandum to the sultan, it is advised 
that the janissary commander (ağa) should be warned about some of the common 
practices among the janissaries. These practices included movement of individual 
soldiers between different regiments, registering with several regiments at the same time, 
and desertion. An individual janissary could move from one regiment to another with the 
permission of that regiment’s commander. An individual janissary would register with 
several regiments in order to receive more than one salary. Desertion “without fighting 
bravely in battlefield” was also commonplace.459 Another document mentions that the 
New Order soldiers stationed in Hamid, Kastamonu, and neighboring districts were 
bribing their superiors to desert their assigned stations in Anatolian towns and head to 
Istanbul.460  
 These practices prevented the government from using the janissaries as an 
effective military force during military campaigns since the bookkeeping records must 
have exaggerated the number, hence, the strength of the janissary corps. From the 
perspective of the janissaries, however, these practices were their way of dealing with the 
government’s demands for service without creating the necessary conditions. It was 
possible only through these irregularities that they could maintain a reasonable amount of 
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income. When that was not possible, the soldiers would not hesitate to desert the 
battlefield. 
 From a fiscal standpoint, reform of the pay ticket (esame) system seemed 
inevitable. Yet, from the standpoint of the janissaries, these irregularities allowed them to 
maintain the janissary corps’ group solidarity and attractiveness for newcomers. By 
continuing to pay those who had not taken part in the campaigns, the janissaries could 
take care of their comrades and maintain their group solidarity instead of making 
distinctions, hence creating frictions, between those who attended the campaigns and 
those who did not. Also, holding several pay tickets as a result of vacant positions 
(mahlul) mostly due to deaths of individual janissaries instead of surrendering them to the 
government would make it possible for them to transfer pay tickets across different 
regiments. This must have helped janissaries keep to themselves the decision about who 
fills in the vacant positions, thus, controlling who enters the Corps and who does not.  
 The government tried to prevent this practice by promising to give an award, 
amounting to 10 percent of the pay ticket, to whoever informed the government of the 
vacancy.461 However, it was probably not very common that an individual janissary 
would inform the government of such a vacancy, especially because of the esprit de 
corps within the regiments. And finally, promotion through bribery, if true, indicates a 
lack of a strictly merit-based promotion system. Instead, the influence (financial and 
otherwise) and connections of an individual janissary within the corps must have 
mattered more than his qualifications as a military person. All these practices, deemed to 
be outright corruption by the government’s military and fiscal efficiency perspective, 
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were closely related to maintenance of social cohesion and solidarity within the janissary 
corps. 
 For the purposes of military efficiency, group solidarity462 among the janissaries, 
expressed in a variety of ways, constituted a serious problem. One of the ways in which 
the janissaries resisted the government’s control over them was through protection of 
janissary “comrades” (yoldaş) even when they may have committed crimes. In one such 
instance, the janissaries of the forty-second division of the janissary corps stationed in 
Candia (Kandiye) refused to hand over comrades of their division who had been found 
guilty of murder and invasion of people’s homes. In such situations, only the janissary 
officers (serdars) could detain or punish an individual janissary. Involvement of an 
outsider was considered against the law.463 In the case of the janissaries in Candia, it 
appears that they were unwilling to punish members of their corps. Furthermore, when 
these soldiers were finally captured and imprisoned inside the barracks until their 
punishment was decided, some other janissaries freed them. The state official reporting 
this event expresses fear about a possible spread of such subversive acts to the other 
divisions of the Corps. Although the details of the mentioned crimes are not mentioned in 
the document, what is clear is that the state had to break the resistance of janissaries who 
prioritized their comradeship over punishment of one of their own. Although this may be 
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seen as a typical corruption story, it is important to note that the janissaries saw it as an 
intrusion violating their communal solidarity.464  
 What the historians have labeled as corruption and unruly behavior on the part of 
the janissaries often derived from the fact that the janissaries contested and negotiated 
what the Ottoman government expected of them. There were several things that 
prevented the janissaries from simply following the orders of the government. The code 
of honor, interpreted in a variety of ways, enabled them to negotiate, contest, and resist 
what they saw as the intrusions into their communal identity. Interpretations of this 
unwritten code were not always uniform, which allowed them flexibility in their 
relationship with the government. While they could resist a reform measure for it being 
an infidel invention speaking to Muslim sensibilities, they could also invoke their 
opposition to excessive wealth of the reformers speaking to their non-elite connections.  
 The janissary soldiers could also organize among themselves to demand their 
salaries that had not been paid to them. In one such instance in Bosnia, Kara Hamza and 
Kara Hüseyin of Istolca established a “society” among themselves and “used” the issue 
of salaries to promote their cause in the words of the central government. They demanded 
that the income from certain mukataa and cizye in Bosnia should be used for payments of 
janissaries.465 The government’s accusation that these janissaries were “trying to advance 
their cause” is noteworthy in itself. Furthermore, it is reported that they were able to 
convince the Saraybosna’s ulema and eşraf. This event points to the fact that the 
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janissaries could organize around a cause and convince local leaders to endorse their 
efforts. 
 The janissaries’ opinions mattered in the appointment of their leaders as well. 
Janissary soldiers’ approval of the Janissary Agha was taken into consideration in behind-
the-scenes discussions about appointment of the janissary officers (aghas). Such 
discussions were sensitive and the government officials were extremely careful so as not 
to expose their preferences publicly. Documents relating to internal discussions of such 
matters, however, reveal that the caliber of a prospective janissary agha as well as his 
influence and respectability among the janissaries were important considerations for the 
state elites.466 
  In addition to their collective action, their long-established connections with the 
society at large prevented them from following the government’s orders. Whenever there 
was a conflict between the demands of the government and the interests of their allies 
(notables, merchants, commoners), they gave it a second thought before following the 
orders of the government. Their internal esprit de corps combined with their societal 
connections rendered them rendered them unruly, rebellious, and corrupt in the eyes of 
the government – a view often adopted by historians as well. 
 
Compensating the Janissaries 
 The imperial inability to provide funds for the war effort or the composition of a 
new army of a great size would hamper the government’s efforts to turn the army into an 
effective fighting machine required to wage wars effectively. The janissaries’ ability to 
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devote themselves to the campaigns was greatly imperiled by the lack of timely financial 
rewards. The soldiers had to worry about their livelihoods during the campaigns and they 
even ended up borrowing from local financiers against their future earnings, getting 
trapped in a vicious cycle of debt and borrowing. Yearlong delays had become 
commonplace, which can partly explain the “creative” ways the janissary corps came up 
with finding income, such as circulating and exchanging their pay tickets in a stock-
market-like fashion. When the government tried to implement measures to end such 
practices, it triggered janissary discontent, particularly because these financial 
mechanisms helped them survive. There were larger financiers benefiting from this 
situation but for the low-level janissaries, easy circulation of these pay tickets must have 
been essential. Delays in payment of janissary salaries simply exacerbated the need to 
resort to borrowing as well as manipulation of janissary pay ticket practices. 
In the 1790s, for instance, the compensation owed to the janissaries protecting 
various fortresses throughout the Balkans continued to be a source of difficulty for the 
central government. The payments for the service of the janissaries stationed in the 
fortresses of Belgrade, Bender, Hotin, İbrail, and Akgirman were yet to be paid in 
October 1793.467 In a document discussing the back-wages owed to the janissaries 
protecting various fortresses in the eastern parts of the empire, we learn that the 
janissaries stationed in the fortress of Anabolu found themselves heavily indebted 
because they had not received any payments from the central government from 1771 
through 1780. The officials themselves described the situation of the janissaries as 
“miserable” because of their debt. The document reveals a deal struck between the 
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janissaries and the central government upon the payment of these past wages. The 
janissaries agreed that they would give up past wages (since 1780) if the government paid 
the current salaries of the janissaries (1796) in the fortress of Damascus on time. The 
government’s condition for this deal was that the janissaries would submit accurate 
records of janissaries who were absent and present.468  
 Janissaries did not necessarily rebel when faced with financial problems. We learn 
from a document concerning the salary payments of the janissaries and their affiliates 
(yamaks) stationed in the fortress of İnebahtı that these soldiers left to the imperial 
treasury almost half of their salaries earned during the previous two decades. In return for 
payment of their salaries for the year 1796 along with some 80,227 guruş for the first of 
these two decades, some 797 soldiers in İnebahtı fortress accepted that they would not 
receive their salaries for a whole decade. It is also mentioned in the same document that 
the state had to sell some imperial property in the vicinity of İnebahtı to pay the due 
salaries amounting to 80,227 guruş.469 Beyond the generally known enormous budgetary 
problems, there seems to be an implicit acknowledgment of the soldiers’ extra-military 
engagements. Or else, how would they be able to survive without their salaries for two 
decades? As the government could not pay the janissaries in a timely manner and allowed 
them to engage in trade and other economic activities, the janissaries remained on the 
government payroll but continued to experience financial difficulties. 
 Such difficulties seem to have continued later in the decade in other parts of the 
empire. The janissaries of the fortress of Belgrade were in a dire situation in May of 1803 
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for not having received their salaries of the previous two years. Having paid the salaries 
for the year 1800 from tax-farming rents (mukataa) in Niş area, the government officials 
discussed the payment of the salaries for the years 1801 and 1802. A comment by the 
İrad-ı Cedid accountant stated that it is not an imperial custom to pay salaries due for two 
years at once, so the janissary salaries for 1801 would be paid once the proper summaries 
(icmal) are submitted.470 This shows us that it had become commonplace to pay the 
janissaries at various fortresses several years late. 
 According to the long-accepted custom, the expenses of the serdarship of the 
kazas would be paid for out of the independent budget of the janissary corps so the kaza 
serdarship would be given to the corps. However, by 1805, the abuse of this custom by 
the local notables was noted in the imperial documents. Local notables of certain kazas 
were auctioning off these serdarships to “unqualified” individuals against the accepted 
custom. The sultan issued orders to both the Rumelia and Anatolian governors that they 
prevent such abuses and punish the responsible ones.471 Clearly, attacks on such 
privileges and entitlements of the janissary corps (which they saw as protected by the 
ancient imperial customs) by the local notables or their allies in the central government 
would create discontent among the janissaries. 
 One of the main problems of the central government’s own doing was that the 
janissaries appointed to various localities were not compensated for properly. In the case 
of Palestine, for instance, the local governor had to rely increasingly on local sources of 
financial resources as well as to supply men for the local janissaries. As recruitment from 
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among the local population became a necessity, local (yerliyan) janissary became a 
separate category of soldiers who would identify their interests more and more with the 
local interests.472 Such distinctions among janissary groups as the local and imperial led 
to exploitation of such differences by local and military leaders throughout the eighteenth 
century. These differences became instrumental in opposing the New Order as well when 
the local janissaries often sided with the local interests against the imperial janissaries.   
 
Mobilizing the Janissaries 
 The willingness on the part of the janissaries in the military campaigns, hence 
military success, was closely related to satisfactory pay. The janissaries in the fortress of 
Belgrade gathered together and went to Belgrade’s governor, Vizier Osman Pasha. They 
asked for extra rations saying that it was a traditional rule of military campaigning (kaide-
i seferiye) that they be given more rations than usual. The government’s order to the 
governor was that this request should be ignored and they should be given the regular 
rations.473 The government’s inability to meet such expectations combined with its 
demands for participation in the campaigns must have created discontent among the 
janissaries. 
 The janissaries were not always at odds with the government’s demands in terms 
of supplying men for the military confrontations. In 1790, several thousand janissaries 
were sent from Istanbul to Danube to fight as marines in the navy under the leadership of 
                                                            
472 Amnon Cohen, “The Army in Palestine in the Eighteenth Century: Sources of Its 
Weakness and Strength,” Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies 34, no. 1 
(1971): 44–45. 
473 BOA, C. AS, 39384 (19 March 1789). 
 165 
Mehmed Pasha against the Russians.474 In 1791, when they were asked to supply five 
hundred janissaries to be under the command of the navy, five hundred janissaries seem 
to have obeyed the order and joined the navy although they were not trained as sailors. 
Janissary participation in the navy alongside trained sailors was not an uncommon 
practice.475 Yet, the fact that the order regarding this appointment mentions that the 
janissaries had come to join the navy by “their own wish,”476 indicates that the 
government was not always sure that the janissaries would respond positively to such a 
request.  
 The Ottoman government used an amalgam of threats as well as rewards in order 
to convince the soldiers to report for duty. These included threats against those who did 
not join the campaign the government intended to engage in. In an order for recruitment 
of soldiers for the upcoming campaign in 1790, the government ordered the janissaries 
and all of the capable [males] to gather in Anatolia. The order included strongly worded 
reminders/threats against those who might not show up for the campaign.477  
 Threats were often combined with rhetoric appealing to the Islamic sensibilities of 
the intended audience. An order sent to the governor (mutasarrıf) of Bozok and Çankırı, 
Çaparzade Mir Süleyman, blames the lack of effort on the part of the soldiers for the last 
couple of years for desertion even before facing the Russian and Habsburg armies. As a 
result of laxity (rehavet) of the soldiers of Islam, the infidels were able to inflict their 
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sedition with relative ease. Encouragement through the use of rhetoric for the war was 
accomplished through the government’s argument that ghaza and jihad are absolute 
religious obligations upon the able ones. If those able men do not perform their 
obligations, they will be punished and made examples for others. Further, since this will 
mean that they have let Islamic lands “to go under the feet of the infidels,” they would 
not receive the Prophet’s intercession in the afterlife.478 Those who practice jihad will 
receive their rewards whereas those who abstain from jihad would be relegated to the 
level of commoners (reaya).479 Religious rhetoric couched in this way indicates the 
government’s desperate effort to recruit soldiers with a discourse that combines earthly 
and other worldly punishments while at the same time blaming the soldiers for their lack 
of enthusiasm for the war effort. 
 Efforts to achieve military mobilization were accompanied by efforts to mobilize 
the general public. Complaining that those in the capital, Istanbul, were not making the 
sacrifices that the soldiers were making in frontier zones, the chief judge (şeyhülislam) 
suggested to the sultan that those who do not attend the mosques to pray for the victory of 
the Ottoman armies should be reported. Convinced that this would have a spiritual 
impact, the sultan asked that the necessary orders to that effect should be sent to the local 
judges throughout the empire.480  
 The government placed a strong emphasis on religion as a source of military and 
social mobilization in this time period. Praise and criticism, promises of reward and 
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punishments, often in line with Islamic sensibilities, are repeatedly used in the 
government’s rhetoric. In an effort to appeal to the janissaries, the ‘past glory’ of the 
janissary corps was cited in recruitment orders. As one such order puts it, “everyone 
knows through history books as well as the elders of the corps that all these [past] 
conquests and ghazas were the result of the fact that the soldiers of the corps of the 
exalted threshold, especially the janissary soldiers, worked really hard, did not turn away 
from wars, remained steady and patient, and became victorious through much effort.” 
Having acknowledged the value of the true spirit of the corps, the document goes on to 
identify those who were recruited into the corps as state soldiers (miri), who did not 
understand the “spirit of the corps” (ocağı bilmeyen), and who did not work for religion. 
These were the ones who deserted even without facing the enemy. The soldiers of the 
corps (ocaklu) and the janissaries, on the other hand, had worked really hard as foot 
soldiers in trenches and in siege making, which were not necessarily one of their 
specialties. They had always obeyed the ancient law and worked for the sake of 
religion.481  
 While using the rhetoric as described, the sultan often dismissed newly appointed 
janissary aghas because they proved not to be “useful” men, as they could not bring 
janissaries under their command to the war front. Such failure could be labeled as 
“treason” by the sultan.482 At the same time, assembling the janissaries who could take 
part in actual fighting seems to have been subject to negotiation. In a record from the fall 
of 1799, the call for janissaries from Aleppo to arrive in Damascus as soon as possible 
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seems to have been ignored at first. The official reports that Es-Seyyid Ibrahim Agha had 
delivered the order and read it aloud in the presence of higher-level janissary officials. In 
return, these officials had promised that the janissaries able to fight (harb ü darb erbabı) 
would be ready in mid-month.483 In addition to the fact that there was a need for 
repetition of such an order to mobilize the janissaries, it is also significant that there was 
a distinction between janissaries “able to fight” and those who could not. This indicates 
the general understanding that there was a significant portion of the janissaries in Aleppo 
who could not fight. How formal this distinction is difficult to determine but it seems to 
have existed and accepted by the state elites and administrators.  
 By describing an ideal janissary corps, the Ottoman officials were able to argue 
that it was a small minority within the janissaries, not the janissaries as a whole, who 
were unwilling to fight and disobedient to the ancient and sacred laws of the corps. By 
invoking religious rewards, the appeal was made to the janissaries’ sense of valor as 
defined by the government. This kind of appeal was simple rhetorical tools common in 
the Ottoman documents; yet, we see a sense of urgency and even helplessness on the part 
of the government that seems unable to exert its coercive powers to recruit soldiers. 
Hence, it attempts to define two types of corps soldiers: patriotic and unpatriotic. Such a 
distinction, however, would not fare well with the janissaries because they did not 
necessarily consider these ‘outsiders’ as alien to the corps. As late as 1807, the 
government was still having to threaten the janissaries in Istanbul and elsewhere that the 
consequences of not joining the war effort would be grave. The government’s desperation 
and appeal to the janissary aghas reflected in official documents attest to the fact that 
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reporting to duty for the war effort on the part of the janissaries on a desirable scale was a 
“lost cause.”484 
 It is important to note that it was not only the janissaries who found aspects of the 
New Order objectionable and even transformed them through their resistance and 
negotiation. A report from Humbaracı Corps’ chief officer, Seyyid Mehmed Efendi, 
attests to this fact. Seyyid Mehmed Efendi first declares that Humbaracı Corps accepts 
the New Order regulations and pledges that his soldiers will remain within their barracks 
(indicating that they will not revolt). Yet, the chief officer requests at the same time that 
the fiefs be assigned to the descendants of the soldiers, a practice the New Order 
regulations clearly banned, when the fiefs become vacant in case of the death of the fief-
holder.485 This instance of negotiation with the New Order regulations shows us that 
soldiers outside the janissary corps did not necessarily embrace the New Order. 
 
Janissary “Fanaticism” 
 The new clothing, especially the headgear worn by the New Order soldiers was a 
source of tension. The janissaries had their traditional distinctive clothing that was an 
important marker of identity and status. It was not only a matter of military efficiency or 
expediency for the janissaries. Their clothing and other markers such as tattoos, knives 
etc. were part of their being a “janissary comrade.” As Quataert explains, “clothing and 
headgear helped give status and a sense of identity to members of the specific religious, 
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ethnic, and occupational communities in Ottoman society.”486 As a group with a high 
sense of social solidarity, the janissaries were no exception. Their “resistance to martial 
fashion” 487 was due to the fact that they felt their identity was being attacked.  
 Various aspects of military uniforms and headgear, such as their color and the 
religion of their producers carried significant symbolic value for the janissaries.488 As 
these were markers of soldiers’ group solidarity and identity as a janissary, they also 
became a source of conflict in the application of the reform measures by the Ottoman 
government. The symbolic meaning of clothing was strong enough to be part of the 
trigger for the famous Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion, which would end Selim III’s reign. 
Selim III communicated to his close advisors his plan to require janissary affiliates 
(yamaks),489 who had been stationed on both sides of the Bosphorus to prevent foreign 
ships from entering the Straits, to drill and wear the new uniforms. According to another 
source, the sultan expressed his intention to go to the Friday prayer on May 23, 1807 
wearing the uniforms. In both reports, the Captain of the Irregulars (sekbanbaşı) is said to 
have warned the sultan about the possible consequences of such an act.490 
                                                            
486 Donald Quataert, “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-
1829,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 3 (1997): 407. 
487 John P. Dunn, “Clothes to Kill For: Uniforms and Politics in Ottoman Armies.,” 
Journal of the Middle East & Africa 2, no. 1 (January 2011): 85. 
488 Janissaries preferred blue instead of red and the tailors making their uniforms were a 
specialized corps of Muslim artisans despite the fact that it was the Jews of Salonika who 
supplied the bulk of janissary uniforms. See Gilles Veinstein, “Sur La Draperie Juive de 
Salonique (XVI-XVII Siecles),” Revue Du Monde Musulman Et de La Mediterranee no. 
66 (1992): 55–61. 
489 Yamaks were irregulars recruited in times of need for extra manpower and were often 
attached to the janissaries. 
490 Gilles Veinstein, “Sur La Draperie Juive De Salonique (XVI-XVII Siecles),” Revue 
Du Monde Musulman Et De La Mediterranee no. 66 (1992): 55–61. 
 171 
Angered by such a warning, the sultan turned to the Commander of the Imperial 
Guards (bostancıbaşı),491 for his opinion. His telling response was that he would “not 
only make them wear the uniforms but even hats if so ordered.”492 The soldiers resisted 
the sultan’s order by saying, “we do not accept anything new, we will go on as we are 
accustomed to. Let the bonus and the uniform be yours.”493 Halil Haseki Aga threatened 
them with killing the rebellious ones among them and repeated what he said to the sultan, 
namely that he would have them wear even hats. The ensuing fight cost Halil Haseki Aga 
and later on “British”494 Mahmud Raif Efendi, who had authored one of the treatises 
defending the New Order, their lives.495 These janissary affiliates consulted and joined 
with the janissaries in Istanbul and revolted under Kabakçı Mustafa’s leadership, whose 
previous career is virtually unknown to historians.  
 Kemal Beydilli has argued that this event was the culmination of a conspiracy. 
Köse Musa Pasha and Şeyhülislam Topal Ataullah Efendi, who were against the New 
Order, had been agitating the janissary affiliates about the prospect of being forced to 
wear the new uniforms. Since these soldiers were discontented elements due to attempts 
at their reorganization, they could be used for the aims of certain pashas.496 Whether or 
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not this was actually a conspiracy to undermine the New Order project is beside the point. 
What is important here is that what has often been interpreted as a reactionary revolt 
derived its source from resistance to new uniforms representative of the New Order’s 
disciplinary nature not simply from the soldiers’ opposition against a progressive 
innovation. This could only have served as ignition of a wider discontent with the 
military reforms being implemented. Being forced to wear modern uniforms, by itself, 
could not have resulted in a rebellion to bring down the entire reform project but it 
resonated with broad segments of the existing janissary corps who felt that their status 
and communal identity was being threatened by the proposed changes penetrating their 
daily routines, drill structures, and even uniforms.   
 It seems that the janissaries presented themselves as the protectors of religious 
identity and made “being Muslim” part of their discourse against the New Order. In 
Tekfurdağı (modern day Tekirdağ), when the notables of the district refused to comply 
with the New Order and were about to go to the Friday prayer, the qadi of the city 
reportedly said, “executing this imperial edict was more important than observing the 
Friday prayer.” It is reported that “a few youths from the janissary group”497 killed the 
local judge after he made this comment. Whether or not such an event actually occurred 
is as important as the fact that the janissaries were perceived as the real protectors of 
religion even against the local judge himself who was supposed to represent the religious 
authority in the city. 
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Janissaries' Relations with Socio-Economic Groups 
 The janissaries were affiliated with and had profound connections to various 
societal groups. They established such relations over previous centuries through their 
involvement in economic activities and processes of socialization in the public space. 
Coffeehouses were places for social engagement and interaction among many groups 
including the urban merchants, guild members,498 and local notables among others. Yet, it 
would be erroneous to assume that they served all groups in the same way. The more 
organized the social group, the stronger the political influence of that particular group. 
When combined with the fact that the janissaries could carry arms, their influence in 
these social spaces could be much stronger than others. They could even dominate some 
of them and we have evidence of certain coffeehouses being called a “janissary 
coffeehouse.” One could identify even the specific regiment to which a particular 
coffeehouse belonged, as the janissary signs would be on display on the walls of the 
coffeehouse. To a contemporary, it was probably not very difficult to figure out the 
political alignment of these coffeehouses.499  
It was not a new phenomenon during the reign of Selim III that the janissaries 
gathered and discussed politics in coffeehouses. As one of the most common public 
spaces available to them, coffeehouses served as venues for socialization500 as well as 
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politicization for the janissaries. “By the seventeenth century, janissaries not only 
gathered and criticized the state but actually planned riots while in these 
coffeehouses.”501 Especially in the imperial capital, the coffeehouse became a “principal 
institution of the public sphere, a channel and site of public communication, and as an 
arena linking the socio-cultural with the political.”502 Given that the janissaries were 
often stationed in the urban centers throughout the empire, availability of coffeehouses 
made it natural for them to spend their leisure time in coffeehouses and establish relations 
with various socio-economic groups.503 
 These societal connections constituted a serious impediment for the Ottoman 
government’s recruitment efforts in the late eighteenth century. At the same time, it is 
telling that the government did not consider it an anomaly that civilians could be involved 
in military affairs. In a petition to the government, a former janissary captain of the 
fortress of Kaş, Kör Hasan Ağazade Eyüb Ağa, asks to be given the job of digging of 
trenches around the fortress. In his letter, Eyüb Ağa claims that the owners of some 190 
shops around the fortress used to voluntarily serve as soldiers without ulufes in time of 
need but now had abandoned the area due to lack of attention to them. However, the 
government’s investigation found out that the fortress needed trenches and manpower to 
dig them. Further, these shop owners need not be recruited as soldiers (the government 
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would have to pay them which would be an extra financial burden) since they would 
naturally help, as they are the inhabitants of the fortress and they constitute the bulk of 
the local people. What is interesting here is that the government did not take issue with 
these commoners to be part of the defense of the fortress, which makes it harder to argue 
that the military versus non-military distinction was seriously maintained in practice.504  
 Local people could avoid enlisting for the army by claiming to be janissaries. 
What is also interesting is that the government officials did not necessarily dispute such 
claims and often honored them. In one such instance, Çalıkzade Halil Ağa had been 
provided with funds and given orders to recruit and register one thousand foot soldiers 
from Bolu and its environs. Halil Ağa reported that since all of the people (reaya) in Bolu 
were janissaries, imperial (miri) soldiers could not be enlisted from Bolu. Instead, he 
suggested, the desired number of soldiers could be recruited as serdengeçti. As is 
explained in the document, an imperial soldier would only have to receive his imperial 
salary until the end of his service and could not claim anything else from the government. 
In contrast, a serdengeçti was by definition entitled to a one-time sum of enlistment fee 
(ulufe) paid for by the sultan just like janissaries. Thus, the government gave up the idea 
of recruiting one thousand imperial foot soldiers from Bolu acknowledging that 
recruitment of serdengeçtis would cost the government a lot more. Instead, the funds 
available for this recruitment effort would be redirected to Rumelia kaymakam Rüstem 
Zaimzade Mustafa Ağa for recruitment of the desired number of soldiers.505   
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 While the government was trying to recruit soldiers in the most cost-efficient 
way, the common people avoided participation in a not-so-profitable enterprise. The 
implication in Halil Ağa’s report is that people would be willing to enlist as soldiers only 
if they were paid a considerable sum. When attractive pay was missing, people subverted 
the government’s recruitment efforts by claiming to be janissaries. Similarly, when an 
order for recruitment of cavalrymen was proclaimed in Çorum and Osmancık, most of the 
people claimed to be janissaries and refused to provide men for the army.506 The fact that 
the Ottoman officials did not explicitly dispute such claims underlines the relative 
paralysis of the state’s coercive abilities during this time period as a result of 
overwhelming preoccupation with war efforts. It also points out the fact that the people 
negotiated and shielded themselves against state coercion through a claim to membership 
in the Janissary Corps, ironically another state institution.  
 Claims by the locals that they were janissaries, hence they had privileges, drew 
strong reaction by the governors appointed by the imperial center. In a petition and a 
thinly veiled threat by the janissaries of Vidin against the sultan, the janissaries 
complained about the governor of Rumelia, stating that the governor had apparently 
“sworn to kill all who claimed to be a janissary save the 7 year olds.” He had already 
severed the heads of eight janissaries and forced janissary officers (Sekbanbaşı) to kill 
their own junior officers (odabaşı). He sent their heads to the capital claiming that these 
belonged to the Belgrade exiles. Among the janissary complaints was that the governor of 
Rumelia had killed (without guilt) the former kulkethüdası and all traders from Vidin and 
confiscated their property. The janissaries of Vidin concluded their letter with a warning 
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that Vidin would witness a rebellion (ihtilal) although they did not wish that.507 Besides 
the unjust practices of the governor in the eyes of the janissaries, it is important to note 
that the governor was furious over large groups of people claiming to be janissaries in the 
Balkans. 
 One of the incentives for the common people to both support and protect the 
Janissaries and claim to be a janissary themselves seems to be the military persons’ tax-
exempt status. For artisans and merchants, entering the janissary ranks and acquiring 
janissary pay tickets would guarantee “full exemption from all imperial taxes (except for 
those imposed by Islamic law).”508 When janissaries were summoned from a certain 
locality, the local population could have a say in the category under which the local 
janissaries were drafted. In one such instance, the local population insisted that the local 
janissaries would leave the town under the serdar flagship instead of as dalkılıç.509 This 
must have had to do with the prestige of the town or it may have had taxation 
implications for the locals as drafting of soldiers often implied tax exemptions or other 
real and symbolic privileges.  
A classic discussion on the janissaries, as discussed in the first chapter, has to do 
with the janissaries’ engagement in the economic sphere despite their supposed “purely” 
military nature. The fact that a janissary widow could demand to inherit her husband’s 
estates shows that the janissary inheritance was possible and this must have led to broader 
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ties with the society at large.510 Janissary participation in the economic sphere and tax-
exemptions local populations could benefit from through affiliation with the janissaries 
created a coalition around shared interests, which needed to be defended against the New 
Order measures. 
 When the New Order was to be implemented by powerful pashas who supported 
the project, such as Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha, the common people and the janissaries 
forged alliances to resist the New Order. One of the clues as to the existence of such 
alliances is the social legitimacy that being a janissary carried with it. People of 
Tekfurdağı (modern-day Tekirdağ) in 1806 refused to comply with the imperial demands 
for supplying soldiers as required by the New Order. Their defense is reported to have 
been “we are janissaries and our ancestors were also janissaries, hence, we do not accept 
the New Order.”511 This defense, by itself, does not prove any real direct connections 
between the “people” of Tekfurdağı and the janissaries. However, what it does show us is 
the fact that “being a janissary or descendants of a janissary” provided people with a 
discourse against the imperial demands of manpower and financial support for the new 
project. Resistance to the New Order does not seem to have been strictly limited to the 
urban areas. When Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha moved against Tekfurdağı and the Balkans 
to extend the New Order army to the city, the villages around Çorlu resisted and fought 
the Pasha’s troops causing him to realize that he would not overcome the resistance and 
he would have to go back to Anatolia.512 
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 Banditry in Rumelia in this time period is well documented. Janissaries played 
their part in this phenomenon as well. Many janissaries and their associates joined with 
the famous local bandits. In an order sent to Karaferye (Veroia/Veria, Greece) on 6 July 
1797, we learn that the local people of the town asked the town’s military commander 
(serdar) to prevent the return of five janissary-turned-bandits to their town because of 
their harassment of the poor of the town. It had initially been reported that these 
individuals had fled the town before the arrival of an official (çavuş) sent from the center. 
However, it turns out that these janissary-bandits had not left the town but found refuge 
with a local notable named Molla İsa who was accompanied by other notables.513 The 
janissary-bandits were trying to go to Bosnia with the help of these notables. The local 
notables, who were also accused by the center of wronging the local people, were helping 
these janissary-bandits. Although we cannot ascertain the degree of truth about the 
accusations leveled against the janissary-bandits and the local notables, it is certain that 
there was a network established between these two groups and they used it to escape 
government scrutiny.       
 Janissary presence was not always welcome as they could involve themselves in 
competition in the market place, as it was not out of ordinary that they had strong 
influence in local business environment by virtue of their close-knit networks. We see 
such anti-janissary feeling among the residents of Filibe (Bulgaria). Following a fire in 
the marketplace, the people of Filibe petitioned the government expressing their 
discomfort with janissary presence in the district. Janissary captains were living in the 
market for a while and three separate fires had taken place since the arrival of the 
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janissaries in their district. Although the people could not tell exactly if the janissaries 
perpetrated these fires, it was a distinct possibility in their eyes that the janissaries would 
cause mischief. Accordingly, the janissaries needed to be sent to another district.514 
Regardless of whether the janissaries actually committed these crimes (which would be 
focus of traditional historiography to show their corruption), it is clear that the 
janissaries' presence in the marketplace was a source of discomfort for the local 
tradesmen and other residents as their involvement in economic activity created 
unnecessary economic competition for the locals.    
 Andre Raymond documented the connections between the merchant classes and 
the military (and more specifically the janissaries) in Cairo.515 Raymond finds that there 
existed two distinct parties among the military class with regard to their role in economic 
activity. While one party favored their economic involvements and commitments, there 
existed a “reformist” camp that advocated the janissary corps to be brought back to its 
barracks. The idea that the janissaries were not supposed to be involved in economic 
activity and that reform entailed them getting out of economic activity, hence 
professionalization, is a late eighteenth century discussion. This argument portrayed an 
ideal state of affairs where the military and the population were strictly separated and 
compartmentalized was the general rule prior to the eighteenth century. Yet, the 
reformers had a vested interest in presenting the issue in this manner to be able to argue 
for a restructuring of the traditional military forces such as the Janissaries. 
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 The fear was that such discontent could be expressed through the armed groups 
like the janissaries. The crowds’ politicization as a result of their relations with the 
janissaries was a serious concern for the state. “Power in the bazaar and in the street was 
exactly what the classic constitution of Ottoman society had been designed to prevent. 
But once the janissary corps had evolved into a kind of militia, melting into a population 
with whom it married and whom it fathered, it was impossible to prevent the participation 
of the Istanbul crowd in matters of war and peace and in other questions affecting the 
fortunes of the state.”516 
 It should not surprise us that the janissaries were involved in local politics in the 
capital as well as in the provinces as they had developed extensive relationships with 
different segments of the society. This was the case also for Mosul in late eighteenth 
century. What is more interesting, however, is that although they were supposed to 
impose the center’s will on the provinces, the establishment of the New Order army 
alienated the provincial janissaries, as much as it did the local notables who interpreted it 
as the center’s attempt to regain its ability to monopolize violence and war making. The 
Jalili family in Mosul served as “contractors” and profited from “privatization and 
commercialization of the process of making war.” Interpreting the new army as an end to 
their position, the Jalili family was joined by the janissaries in a “generalized rebellion.” 
But in this case, the center was able to defeat their coalition thanks to the “help of the 
mercantile and landowning elite of the city.”517  
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 Janissaries’ relations with local groups could also be adversarial. In a document 
from Aleppo dated October 1797, we learn that a group of janissaries got into a fight with 
a group of local elites (sadat-ı kiram), which resulted in the deaths of a few local elites 
and one janissary. While the document does not mention the specific reason for the fight, 
it does talk about the local residents who were harmed (we do not know exactly whether 
this was physical or psychological only). What we do know is that the local authorities 
reported to the center that the local people complained to them about the janissaries’ 
behavior. In the local qadi’s note to the document, there is talk about the janissary 
groups’ (ocaklu ahalisi) disobedience to their own officers and their involvement with the 
affairs of the other groups and the general public. The document calls for punishment of 
such behavior and reports that the janissaries agreed to obey their traditional rules (which 
reportedly prohibited them from minding the business of the civilian population). This 
document points to the fact that the janissaries competed with various local networks and 
a discourse about their prohibited involvement in non-military affairs was used against 
them. This discourse indicates the increasing power of the argument about what 
janissaries should look like, i.e. act like soldiers proper and nothing else.518 
 In Izmir, for instance, janissaries competed with Venetian tradesmen. In a report 
about a fight between the janissaries and the Venetians, we learn that a customs official 
(Venedik yasakçısı), who was also a comrade of the thirty-first regiment of the janissary 
corps, was shot dead following an argument with a Venetian tradesman. The fight broke 
out after an Austrian acrobat staged a performance in the city town without permission. 
The janissaries gathered at the court and asked the judge to hand them over the Venetian. 
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Eventually, the janissaries stormed a commercial building (han) in the French quarter and 
a firefight occurred between the janissaries and the Venetians. The incident turned into a 
major confrontation between the Venetians and the local Muslim community.519 Once 
again, we see janissaries displaying group solidarity in considering the killing of one of 
their own by the Venetians as a collective attack on themselves and the larger Muslim 
community. At the same time, this clearly shows there existed tensions between the local 
community and Venetian traders prior to this incident. Such incidents were not unique to 
the late eighteenth century. Janissary involvement in the politics of maritime trade in 
Izmir dates back to early seventeenth century. Janissaries, along with some sipahis, 
“illegally prohibited Venetians from purchasing cotton” and appeared as protectors of the 
rights of porters employed by the Venetians.520  
As such, the view that the janissary involvement in the economic sphere was the 
direct cause of the military defeats throughout the eighteenth century needs to be revised, 
as the janissaries were involved in the economic sphere during the earlier centuries when 
the Ottomans enjoyed great military successes. The fact that the janissaries had become 
embedded in the society may have undermined their military ineffectiveness in the late 
eighteenth century to a certain extent but the broader weaknesses of the empire had a 
more consequential role in the state’s military failures.  
The janissaries’ connection to the Bektashi sect is often cited but the extent of this 
connection is under-researched. Selim III’s connection to the Mevleviyye order (tarikat) 
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is known and he may have used Mevlevism as a counterweight to the Bektashi order in 
ideological as well as in real political terms.521 The great Mevlevi figure Şeyh Galib 
praised, in his poetry, Selim III’s efforts to “modernize military instruction, the 
manufacture of gunpowder, the foundry, and corps such as the cannonries and 
artillerymen.”522 However, it is difficult to argue that this meant unconditional Mevlevi 
support for the New Order. In fact, the head of the Mevlevi tarikat from 1785 to 1815, 
Hacı Mehmet Çelebi, joined the opposition to the New Order because of his connections 
to the provincial notables whose interests ran counter to Selim III’s centralizing 
policies.523 While the janissaries’ connections to the Bektashi tarikat may have rendered 
it impossible for them to strike an alliance with the Mevlevis in Istanbul, the janissaries’ 
connections with local notables in Anatolia provided them with a different sort of alliance 
(political and social) that could trump the ideological affinity between Selim III and 
Mevlevism. 
 
Local People Use Janissaries against the Center 
Already in the sixteenth century, the janissaries in Damascus had been well 
established in the local community and married into some of the leading families. They 
also had tax collecting duties, which they exercised without opposition by the local power 
holders. Their ties to the society became problematic only when the central government 
preferred to employ the janissaries of Damascus instead of the janissaries of Aleppo in 
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tax collection duties.524 The janissary ties to the locals by themselves were not regarded 
as unacceptable or out of the ordinary even in the sixteenth century. The fact that these 
ties complicated the government’s plans to exercise its authority locally was part of life 
already.  
In the politics of tax collection within a center versus province dynamic, the 
janissaries could represent the interests of the local communities and disobey the central 
government depending on what kind of ties they had established with the local 
communities. As part of the growth of local Ottoman ruling groups, local janissaries 
became more and more involved in the local communities, who in turn benefited from 
privileges the janissaries could provide.525   
 Discussions about the extent to which the Ottomans were able to extend their 
control over the provinces have been the subject of various scholarly debates. Depending 
on the time and locality, historians found that Ottoman control varied from region to 
region. Ottoman influence did not necessarily correlate with distance from the Ottoman 
center. For instance, Ottomans could exercise more authority over Damascus as opposed 
to Aleppo in the sixteenth century despite the latter’s closer proximity to the center.526 
This was demonstrated in the center’s preference of Damascene janissaries over Aleppo 
janissaries in overseeing the financial affairs of Aleppo in the second half of the sixteenth 
century. Yet, the Ottomans could not contain the eventual domination of the Damascene 
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janissaries over Aleppo’s local politics. What is more important for our purposes here is 
that the Ottoman center was sensitive to the kind of influence the local janissaries could 
exert over the local affairs in Aleppo. In the late sixteenth century as well as the late 
eighteenth century, we see janissaries emerge as one of the local factions527 and become 
involved in local power struggles between local administrators of Damascus and 
Aleppo.528 Furthermore, the Ottoman center was not able to get Damascene janissaries 
out of Aleppo completely.529 This points to the fact that the janissaries in various 
localities in the peripheries could carve out their limited autonomy and disobey the center 
in favor of their local interests as early as the sixteenth century when the Ottoman state is 
supposed to have exerted the greatest control over its territories.  
 In the eighteenth century, there was at least a two centuries old history of 
janissary presence in these localities in one form or another. They could have tax-
collection privileges in addition to their involvement in various guilds in competition 
with the local ashraf in Aleppo. The janissaries were increasingly locally recruited from 
among the locals and rural migrants as a result of reduction in troop numbers that were 
sent from the imperial center. This meant that the locally recruited janissaries could have 
tribal as well as rural origins.530 
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 The janissaries could also be involved in center versus periphery struggles as 
much as local power struggles between different groups. In one such instance, when the 
janissaries in Aleppo found out that the government was going to try and punish them for 
their unruly behavior, around four to five thousand of them ran away from the city. The 
governor of Aleppo reported that a coalition of the governor’s forces and the local people 
would execute the janissaries if they ever returned to the city.531 The government made a 
pact with the local people that would prevent the return of the janissaries. The deal 
stipulated that if the people of Aleppo allowed janissaries back in the city they would 
have to pay 150,000 piasters as a fine. What is interesting is that the local notables in 
Aleppo accepted this deal.532 
 One of the consequence of relations between the people and the janissaries or 
their affiliates was that the Ottoman state often tried to break these connections by 
disciplining the behavior of the people in a locality. The people of Aleppo swore to 
capture and deliver the “seditious and rebellious bandits and affiliates of the Corps” 
(erbab-ı fesad ve ihtilal olan eşkiya ve ocakluyan) if they were ever to return to Aleppo. 
Aleppo janissaries, four to five thousand of them, heard that they were going to be 
punished so they left the city. If their leader returned, the local people and the governor 
would execute them.533 The people of Aleppo were read the government’s orders in July 
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1802 not to accept rebellious janissaries into their locality. If not, they would have to pay 
the government 150,000 gurus.534  
In line with the process of so-called decentralization in the eighteenth century, the 
Ottoman administration was relatively weakened in various provinces. As the influence 
of the local power groups increased, the relative power of the soldiers and administration 
officials sent from the center was reduced. In Damascus, parallel to the decreasing 
control of the Ottoman center over the eighteenth century, the janissaries sent from the 
center started to include local people,535 especially because the janissaries were integrated 
into the society as local craftsmen were increasingly militarized and established close 
connections to the janissaries.536 
For instance, in 1739, local yerliya janissaries had allied with the Damascene 
power groups and were able to expel “mercenary” troops of the Ottoman center. Yerliya 
janissaries could become instrumental in the local actors’ assertion of their own control at 
the expense of the imperial center’s control.537 While this was an “unintended 
consequence” for the Ottoman center, this example makes it clear the extent to which the 
janissaries could become integrated into the society and resist the imperial center that 
sent them to the particular locality in the first place. Examples of successful alliances 
between the imperial forces and local rebels were not restricted to the late eighteenth 
century. In 1703, the janissaries and timar holders joined the rebels in Jerusalem to 
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oppose the mütesellim.538 This phenomenon has been studied under the rubric of decline 
of Ottoman imperial control in the Arab provinces, which often overlooked the fact that 
the janissaries’ connection with the local networks and power groups went beyond 
superficial and occasional alliances and participation in power struggles. Clearly, they 
relied on participation in the local economy and extensive business networks, especially 
since the opposition to the center meant that their stipends and salaries would be cut off 
by the imperial center.539 
For the locals, the janissary garrison could signify a lot more than a symbol of the 
imperial control. In Aleppo, for instance, membership in the janissary garrison meant 
various means of economic, social, and political advancement such as performing police 
duties, contributing troops to the imperial army, and tax exemptions.540 The janissaries 
themselves took part in public and private sectors of the economy as well as in the 
administrative structures such as the governor’s consultative council over the course of 
the eighteenth century.541 Similar to the situation in Damascus, the janissaries became 
involved in local resistance to imperial control exercised by the governor in Aleppo in the 
late eighteenth century. This was clearly not an ideological fight for them but protection 
of their interests that were aligned mostly with those of the local power-holders. In their 
fight against the alliance of the governor and a group of local ashraf in 1805, their prize 
consisted of the acquisition of a “monopoly over the import and sale of sheep, food 
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supply, land, orchards, and various trade guilds.”542 The janissary control over Aleppo 
lasted until 1813 when the Ottoman governor was able to eliminate the janissary leaders 
and reestablish Ottoman control in the city.543  
 There existed a strong correlation between decreased Ottoman control over these 
localities and the increased autonomy of the local power-holders. These local power-
holders used their connections to the janissaries and the yerliya janissaries became a tool 
for the local governors or leaders to oppose the Ottomans in localities such as 
Damascus.544 The janissaries in Anatolia rebelled against local power-holders as well. 
Especially in North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt) and certain Arab provinces (Damascus),545 
the distinction between the local janissaries and the imperial janissaries was somewhat 
clear-cut. Men from Anatolia filled the janissary ranks and ended up launching a 
rebellion against the dey of Algeria in 1811. In this context, however, they were not 
powerful enough to take on the dey and the rebellion failed.546 For our purposes, this 
shows that the janissaries, who had not established long-term relationships with the local 
population or power groups, could not exert influence to the degree that the janissaries in 
other provinces could due to such strong connections.   
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated that the government’s effort to discipline the 
janissaries and “bring order” to the corps was largely a lost cause. This cannot be 
explained away by the conventional frameworks that focused on janissary 
insubordination, as an example of a military clique that tried to protect its narrowly 
defined corporate interests. We have to factor in the government’s inability to transform 
the janissaries into an effective fighting force, as they no longer were merely soldiers 
partly as a result of their long-established profound ties to the society at large. Janissaries 
had become part of a social and economic reality that had little to do with their service as 
a military fighting force. Furthermore, lifetime professional military service required 
modernized and rationalized financial structures the Ottoman government was able to 
offer neither to janissaries nor to the New Order soldiers. Unable to spur a socio-
economic transformation throughout the society that would render the janissaries true 
soldiers in the modern sense, the imperial center’s efforts to create a modern army as well 
as to reform the janissaries were largely unsuccessful.  
 The rationalizing and disciplining logic of the New Order provoked opposition 
from various segments of the society, including the janissaries. However, the janissaries’ 
reaction was more complex than simply opposing the New Order measures. The 
janissaries’ reaction to reform efforts can be described in three different attitudes: 1- they 
obeyed the government’s orders to re-organize and rationalize the corps organizationally 
and financially; 2- they resisted measures that infringed upon their collective identity; 3- 
they opposed measures that targeted their ties with socio-economic groups. None of these 
attitudes was displayed in isolation and they often overlapped with one another.  
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 The socio-economic realities surrounding the janissaries allowed their allies in the 
broader society to resist the government’s attempts to infringe upon their own autonomy. 
Local people utilized their connections with the janissaries to rebuff and resist the 
government’s attempts to tax them more and integrate the peripheral forces into the 
center. In this dynamic process, reform efforts had to be modified as a result of the 
resistance of the society. Similarly, the janissaries had to adjust their own organization 
and finances accordingly. This was not a zero-sum game between the government and the 
janissaries, or between the reformers and conservatives in ideological terms. The imperial 
center was in the business of rationalizing and disciplining its finances and military; 
however, key segments of Ottoman society resisted the newly emerging modernizing 
logic of the reform measures.  
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Chapter 5 – Local Notables and the End of the New Order 
 
Local Notables’ Relations with the Center 
Conventional wisdom would suggest that we analyze the resistance to New Order 
by local notables in various provinces through a zero sum game perspective couched in a 
center versus periphery dynamic.547 According to this perspective, the center-periphery 
conflict occurred as a result of the struggle to control the economic resources in the 
provinces and because of the center’s efforts to recentralize power.548 There is no doubt 
that the central government was interested in concentration of power in its own hands and 
the creation of the New Order army was certainly part of this plan. However, there 
existed much more of a symbiotic relationship between the center and the local notables 
in the late eighteenth century than traditional historiography would have us believe. In 
other words, the causes of the resistance to the New Order were not always founded on 
ideology and were not as confrontational as often depicted.  
Local notables tended to increase their regional influence and the New Order 
efforts were constantly negotiated between the center and the local notables. This 
contestation took place in a time of greatly dispersed loci of economic and political 
power and in the context of numerous domestic and international crises.549 A review of 
the emergence of the local notables throughout the eighteenth century is in order, as it 
would help explain their alliances with socio-economic and political groups as well as 
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their opposition to the New Order army. 
Some recent studies argued that the rise of the notables was not necessarily at the 
expense of the power of the center.550 They have argued that this development must be 
understood within the context of privatization and decentralization policies of the ancien 
regime as part of the “evolution of the modern state.”551 Ariel Salzmann suggests a 
reinterpretation of the local notables as “microeconomics of state power that continually 
redefined the polity and power of the ancien regime”552 instead of perceiving them as 
mere troublemakers, as described by the imperial center. In Dina Khoury’s words, “to a 
significant degree the state ‘made’ provincial power elites, as much as provincial power 
holders made the state at the local level. Provincial elites localized the hegemony of the 
state.”553 At the same time, intra and inter-elite struggles were reflected in the provinces 
between households that could be considered replications of the imperial palace on a 
smaller scale.554 While the imperial bureaucrats maintained the relations between the 
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localities and the imperial center, the local notables often sought favor with the power 
groups in the center, rendering households a “nexus between center and province.”555 
Especially in the economic sphere, the local notables acted as powerbrokers often 
lobbying through their representatives in the center. The well-established tradition of 
bargaining and negotiation556 with the imperial center continued in the eighteenth 
century. The difference perhaps was that the notables were now able to claim semi-
autonomous status as opposed to the bandit leaders of the earlier centuries who were 
more likely to individually settle for an appointment to a government post. In the 
eighteenth century, however, the local notables most often were not individuals with a 
small retinue of soldiers. They acted on the model of the Ottoman imperial households557 
by establishing social, economic, and military ties to their locality. Thanks to the lifetime 
tax-farming (iltizam) system, they also continued to enjoy their privileges as local tax-
collecting agents of the center.558  
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through assuming military fiefs 
(arpalık), positions such as deputy governorship (mütesellim), and lifetime tax-farming 
leases, they were able to accumulate wealth and exercise influence over the local 
administration.559 In the process of “transformation of the provincial fiscal system from a 
                                                            
555 Hathaway, “The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt,” 44. 
556 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
557 Hathaway, “The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt.” 
558 Engin D. Akarlı, “Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad al-Sham and Egypt, 
1740-1840,” in La Vie Sociale Dans Les Provinces Arabes a L’époque Ottomane 
(Zaghouan, Tunusia: CJEPO, 1988), 2–3. 
559 İnalcık, “Centralization,” 30–33. 
 196 
fief/prebend-oriented to a tax-farm-oriented system,”560 local notables’ power and 
influence became permanent in the eighteenth century. In trying to respond to military 
challenges by the Habsburgs and the Russians, the Ottomans attempted to adapt their 
military forces and instituted a new fiscal system561 in order to fund the military 
engagements. According to İnalcık, this was one of the major causes of the increased 
influence of the local notables, who benefited from long-term leases from the center.562 In 
addition, the commercial revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth563 centuries 
enabled them to benefit from local trade, which was less vulnerable to political 
upheavals,564 and to rely less on government appointments. When bargains were to be 
struck with the center, the notables did not only speak for themselves but also for the 
society at large, as they assumed the dual role as agents of the center and the 
representatives of local interests, thanks to their connections in their locality as well as in 
the center.565 
 The central government depended on military assistance by local notables in 
times of war and offered them official titles and administrative posts. Hacı Ahmed Ağa of 
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the Karamanoğlu family, for example, was given the guardianship of Sancakburnu 
(muhafızlık) and the governorship of Izmir (voyvodalık) in 1769 when the Ottomans 
declared war on Russia.566 The Porte recognized the local notables in Rumelia and 
offered them official status in return for men and supplies for the war preparations against 
Russia.567 The center relied on even the more troublesome notables, such as Kara 
Mahmud Pasha of İşkodra, who had previously survived a military expedition sent by the 
center to punish him. The central government had no choice but to solicit the services of 
men at the disposal of such notables.568 Following the Austrian march against Bosnia in 
1788, Kara Mahmud Pasha was given the title of vezir and the province (eyalet) of 
Anatolia, in return for which he was to defend Yeni Pazar (Novi Pazar, Serbia).569 When 
faced with an international crisis, the Ottoman government sometimes incurred difficulty 
in raising troops and leading them to war, forcing it to rely on local notables. 
 The local notables increase in autonomy rendered the Ottoman center more and 
more reliant on their support. However, the interests of the notables did not always lie 
with the Ottoman center and they “rejected the entire concept of their power as derivative 
from or pertaining to the state.”570 Nevertheless, they continued to negotiate with the 
center often exchanging material support for political recognition but such recognition by 
itself remained an insufficient incentive to recruit enough manpower and other resources 
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for the war effort. The Ottoman center was often far from being the only option for the 
notables, which meant that they were concerned about political legitimacy in the eyes of 
local populations just as much they were intent on acquiring political recognition and 
autonomy from the Ottoman center. International competitors, as in the case of 
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, tempered the attractiveness of recognition and legitimacy drawn 
from the imperial center. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was a provincial administrator who was 
able to play the international context to his advantage at least to a certain point without 
really breaking off with the Ottoman center.571 Notables often had to follow a careful 
strategy balancing their local interests with the demands of the Ottoman imperial 
center.572 At times, they could manipulate local affairs by allowing a state of controlled 
anarchy as a means to sustain autonomy from the central government.573 
 The imperial center sought military help from local notables not only in wartime 
against international threats but also in its efforts to reorganize the army through 
establishing the New Order army. Notables such as İsmail Bey, Ayan of Serez, and 
Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey, Derebey of Central Anatolia all supported Selim III in setting 
up the New Order army in Anatolia.574 The central government’s increasing reliance on 
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military help of the notables was partly because of the janissaries’ inefficiencies.575 
However, the notables had connections with the janissaries as well, which makes it 
difficult to argue that janissary inefficiency could be made up for by the military strength 
of the local notables, as these two groups were never fully independent of each other in 
the first place. Moreover, the local notables and local janissaries often had shared 
interests and resisted the New Order in an alliance against the central government.576  
It was the local notables and their local allies that ultimately ended the New 
Order. When Selim III tried finally to extend the New Order army to Rumelia through 
Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha, the effort met with a stiff resistance from a coalition of the 
local notables in Silivri, Tekfurdağı, and Çorlu. Kadı Abdurrahman’s New Order soldiers 
failed in their endeavor and the infamous “Edirne Incident” would seal the fate of the 
reform efforts, as it represented the beginning of the end for Selim III’s rule.577 The 
center’s demands from the local notables in helping to build the new army combined with 
its inability to contain international threats created discontent among the notables, who 
were themselves under pressure locally to provide security and economic welfare.  
 
Chaos in the Balkans: The Banditry Phenomenon 
 The insecurity created by widespread banditry and international threats in the late 
eighteenth century rendered the Balkans an enormous challenge for the imperial center 
and arguably doomed the New Order to failure. The banditry phenomenon in the Balkans 
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was a result of a variety of factors, the most important of which was the disorder caused 
by roaming unruly soldiers and recruits as a result of the wars with the Russians and 
Austrians. Whereas the center could not contain post-conflict instability, the local 
notables were able to control the disorder at least to a certain extent. The central 
government sent pashas with large armies to end banditry but it did not work because 
they could not address the underlying socio-economic problems. Notables were probably 
well positioned to deal with it because of their influence and familiarity with local 
conditions.  
At the same time, it was no secret that the mountain bandits constituted a source 
of power to be won over between the notables and the center, as their shifting alliances 
could be beneficial for different political actors. It would help notables to assert their 
power locally. While notables had closer control over the local bandits, they did not 
require as much discipline as the center would. The central government’s control was a 
lot more diminished than that of the notables but the center was more interested in 
discipline, as the new logic of governance categorized undisciplined forces as a 
dangerous source of instability. In contrast, the local notables saw an opportunity and 
benefited from discontent created by banditry.  
 Some studies have presented the Celali rebellions of the seventeenth century as a 
comparable phenomenon to banditry in the Balkans.578 In both instances, it is argued, 
similar problems were experienced mainly because of the lack of central authority. 
Taking the view of the central government, Özkaya considers local notables such as 
Paspanoğlu as a rebel upon whom was bestowed the rank of pasha in a similar fashion as 
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the bandits in the sixteenth century.579 Moreover, Özkaya depicts the protection offered 
by such notables for the bandits in negative terms and does not delve into any discussion 
of networks created between bandits, notables, and local populations as a result of the 
widespread banditry in the Balkans in this time period.580 Özkaya identifies the wars of 
1768-1774 and 1787-1792 as the reason why banditry in the Balkans became so 
commonplace in late eighteenth century.581 When bandits come under the notables’ 
protection as sekban, Özkaya does not consider the significance of this as a potentially 
stabilizing factor but sees it as the notables’ attempt to simply take advantage of these 
elements at the expense of the center.582 At the same time, he acknowledges that the state 
failed to take care of the needs of the soldiers, contributing to their disarray. According to 
him, when combined with corruption and ineffective governance by state officials, who 
went onto involve themselves in the local affairs for personal benefit, the situation was 
ripe for the emergence of the banditry phenomenon.583 
 Anscombe argues that there was a major difference between the deal-seeking 
bandits of the seventeenth century584 and the Albanian brigands of the late eighteenth 
century; the latter did not look for deals with the central government. Rather, they were 
interested in “taking advantage of the state’s weakness.”585 There did not exist many 
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rewards to be gained through the service for the state, which meant that the brigands were 
motivated by “obvious opportunities for immediate enrichment.”586 Clearly, the state did 
not have much to offer due to its financial problems and Selim III was seriously 
uncomfortable by the fact that the state could not control the bandits. The sultan 
expressed his frustration by saying that the bandits’ activities [and the government’s 
inability to contain them] had caused shame to the state.587  
The bandits did not seek employment from the government, as the center lacked 
such incentives as offering offices as was the case in the earlier centuries. Consequently, 
the bandits sought protection from and employment with local notables such as 
Paspanoğlu. Another problem the government experienced was that many of the irregular 
forces it relied upon to deal with bandits were cooperating with bandits or switching their 
allegiances, as many of them were of the same ethnic background (Albanian) as the 
bandits.588 Some bandits offered to switch back to the government’s side but the state was 
unable to offer the financial incentives Paspanoğlu could.589  
 The Ottoman efforts to deal with banditry in the Balkans were hampered by 
financial constraints as well as the government’s mistrust of its own officials. For 
instance, in August of 1789, the voyvoda of Eflak asked the central government for 
additional funds to deal with bandits in the village of Çarnış. The government’s response 
was that he would be provided with funds from the New Order treasury once he managed 
to expel these bandits but not before. There seems to have been a clear distrust in the 
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voyvoda’s ability to use the funds effectively against the bandits. This was also probably 
because the government wanted to reward success against bandits instead of funding the 
effort to go against the bandits from the start in a financially difficult period.590 Such 
conditionality of funding indicates a lack of trust as well as insufficient government 
resources to deal with banditry. 
 The central government also relied on local notables and appointed certain pashas 
to various provinces to deliver harsh punishments to be exacted on the bandits. In 
addition to local notables such as Çapanoğlu and Karaosmanoğlu, the government 
ordered soldiers to be raised from Anatolia and sent to serve under the Rumelia governor 
Hakkı Pasha’s command in February 1796.591 Such orders included specific directives for 
prevention of desertion. While soldiers were recruited from Çankırı, İskilip, and Kırşehir, 
districts such as Aksaray, Niğde, and Çankırı were opposed to providing soldiers. People 
of Ankara, in particular, were opposed to the assembly of all recruited soldiers in Ankara 
before deployment to Rumelia via Istanbul probably because they did not want to host so 
many soldiers, even briefly, as they would have to provide provisions for the soldiers in 
the meantime.592 It took more than a month for all the soldiers to be deployed to Rumelia 
in the end, which indicates the local displeasure with having to provide soldiers to be 
deployed against domestic problems such as banditry in the Balkans.593  
Hakkı Pasha’s efforts in Rumelia resulted in many severed bandit heads to be sent 
to Istanbul but the problem was not going away. If anything, the locals were supporting 
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and protecting the bandits sometimes out of fear of bandits, and other times, because they 
had closer relations with the bandits than the pashas sent by the central government. The 
government even ordered that the names of local residents be collected in a register to 
identify those leaning toward bandits, whom the local notables would have to deliver to 
Hakkı Pasha.594 Such methods backfired, however, as the local notables chose to support 
the bandits anyway. Hakkı Pasha’s heavy-handed policies did not bring about the end of 
brigandage and cost him the governorship of Rumelia in the summer of 1797.595 
 Archival documents indicate a “bandit-turned-janissary” phenomenon in the 
Balkans in the 1790s. Five such janissaries who had engaged in banditry were thought to 
have run away from the town of Karaferye once they found that execution orders for 
themselves had been issued by the central government. Serturnacı Abdullah was ordered 
to kill them if they ever returned to Karaferye but it was found out that the janissaries 
were hanging out with the bandit leader Molla Isa, who was intending to go to Bosnia.596 
This is significant in the sense that there was close association between individual 
janissaries and bandit leaders in towns such as Karaferye, which called for the central 
government’s intervention into the local power struggles.597  
 Local notables in Edirne found their own solutions as well so that the bandits did 
not “destroy our villages and estates.” Some local notables decided to recruit sekban 
soldiers from among bandits, which meant that they were giving money to bandits to 
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protect themselves. Notables also paid villagers in their region to keep quiet about this 
arrangement. The government frowned upon this practice and urged everybody in Edirne 
(including the notables, elites, villagers etc.) to fight the bandits with everything they had 
(guns, knives, scythe, ax etc.). If the local notables continued this practice in the future, 
the government promised that they would be punished.598 It is unclear to what extent such 
threats were effective, as the government had to renew assignments of various pashas to 
take care of the banditry issue throughout Selim III’s period. Great insecurity and 
disorder created by the banditry became a source of instability while at the same time 
derailing the government’s efforts to exert control and expand the New Order army in the 
Balkans. 
 
Paspanoğlu, Janissaries, and Yamaks 
 Paspanoğlu Osman, the local notable of Vidin, presented the most formidable 
challenge against the government’s efforts to pacify bandits and the success of the New 
Order in the Balkans.599 Paspanoğlu’s relationship with the imperial center was rocky 
throughout Selim III’s reign. Paspanoğlu’s father Ömer Ağa was the local notable of 
Vidin and he fought the Austrians in the wars of 178-1791, yet Koca Yusuf Pasha600 
eventually executed him. His son, Paspanoğlu Osman, spent a couple of years in exile but 
was able to restore his status in Vidin after he proved his utility in fighting the Austrians 
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just like his father had done. However, Paspanoğlu proceeded to take advantage of the 
rebellion of the yamaks in Belgrade and champion the cause of anti-New Order feelings 
triggered by the newly imposed taxes, in an effort to increase his local influence and 
autonomy.601 Paspanoğlu’s story was not very different from other local notables who 
opposed the centralizing efforts of Istanbul in the late eighteenth century but his 
challenge epitomized the constellation of various domestic and international challenges. 
 Many studies still adopt the state-centered view602 when examining the forces 
resisting the centralizing efforts of the Ottoman government. For instance, some scholars 
attribute the reasons for Paspanoğlu resistance against the New Order to his conservative 
spirit, reactionary policies, and dedication to the old order.603 At the same time, much 
evidence is provided that Paspanoğlu enjoyed “wide base of support”604 from the 
janissaries, yamaks, brigands, and the masses. These different groups seem to have all 
independent reasons for supporting Paspanoğlu. While the janissaries felt threatened by 
the ‘reforms’ just like Paspanoğlu himself whose rule would be diminished by 
centralization efforts, brigands looked for employment and the broader public sought tax 
relief. As this overlap of interests is not presented in a positive light, Paspanoğlu appears 
as an opportunist who took advantage of the impoverished individuals to turn Vidin into 
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the “hub of discontent with the sultan and his reforms.”605  
 International forces also had a hand in the instability in the Balkans from the 
Ottoman government’s perspective. Unrest in Belgrade predated the resistance to the 
establishment of the New Order army, as Austria (Nemçelü) was agitating the locals in 
Belgrade to rise up against the Ottomans. As a result, several villages in Belgrade rose up 
against the government in the spring of 1788. Ottomans sent some 3,000 soldiers to quell 
the unrest but to no avail at first. At the end, through the intercession of Izvornik, a deal 
was struck between the Ottoman government and the villagers.606 As much as it became a 
central battleground between Paspanoğlu and the Ottoman government to further their 
respective influence, Belgrade also became a battleground between the Ottoman center 
and outside players such as Austria. In the meantime, Paspanoğlu sought to expand his 
influence taking advantage of the international powers’ interest in continued instability 
and the Ottoman failure to respond adequately. 
 Paspanoğlu’s first rise against the center occurred in 1795 when the janissaries 
and yamaks of Belgrade rebelled and attacked the local Christians’ properties, pushing 
them to the side of the commander of the city. The Christian population aligned 
themselves with the imperial center and fought the janissaries607 but there were also other 
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Christians among Paspanoğlu’s supporters,608 a fact that attests to the diversity of groups 
from which the local notables could draw support. Upon their expulsion from Belgrade, 
the janissaries sought refuge in Vidin, Paspanoğlu’s stronghold.609 As the notable 
supported them by offering ammunition and provisions, the center tried briefly to lay a 
siege around the city of Vidin but abandoned the effort, as the winter was approaching.610  
On a document dated 31 May 1795, we learn that some 8,000 yamaks, who had 
been exiled from Belgrade, marched against Belgrade. They attacked the Belgrade 
fortress and lost against the forces of Mustafa Pasha, the Belgrade fortress’s governor. As 
more than half of them were killed, some 400 of them sought refuge in a synagogue, 
which was set on fire by the governor’s forces. The governor reported that those who 
escaped would probably be assisted by the city of Vidin and regroup in the Hisarcık area 
to attack Belgrade once again. He reported that necessary orders to support the fortress 
were sent to various officers charged with taking care of these bandits.611 Reports by the 
deputy lieutenant governor of Niş and Şahsuvar Pasha, however, stated that Mustafa 
Pasha was stuck inside the fortress. They added that Mustafa Pasha was able to fight the 
rebels nevertheless612 but this might have been an effort by the local government officials 
to show to the center that things were under control and they were capable of defending 
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their territories.  
The government was prompted to consider a new commander to lead the regional 
efforts against the rebels without much success, as many of the individuals considered for 
the job had various handicaps in terms of their capabilities and government’s trust in 
them.613 One interesting detail provided about this episode is that Paspanoğlu was 
promising to give support to these rebels in the following words, “ammunition and 
necessities are from me, the effort is from you.”614 The notable’s support for the yamaks 
triggered Hacı Mustafa Pasha and Gürcü Osman Pasha’s march against Vidin but the 
imperial forces were unable to continue the siege because the winter was approaching. 
The sultan subsequently issued an order of forgiveness for Paspanoğlu on the condition 
that he does not support the Belgrade yamaks.615  
 Paspanoğlu was able to command and benefit from the Belgrade rebellion. Rebel 
leaders such as Börüceli Köse Mustafa joined Paspanoğlu in Vidin and they agitated 
those expelled from Belgrade to regroup and attack Belgrade once again.616 Some ninety-
two rebels had managed to escape to Vidin and found support from Paspanoğlu who 
provided them with shelter in an inn. Paspanoğlu made sure that the yamaks were 
medically treated and he forbid anyone from going in and out of the inn. In the 
government’s eyes, Paspanoğlu was helping them undertake their seditious ideas. 
Paspanoğlu reportedly argued that Vidin yamaks’ rebellion was because they had not 
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been paid their salaries, which he promised to pay himself. Paspanoğlu apparently 
threatened that he could not guarantee that the yamaks would not attack Eflak if their 
salaries were not paid. The central government calculated the risk of Paspanoğlu entering 
Eflak and concluded that the governor of Vidin would not be able to raise enough men to 
confront both the Belgrade rebels and the troublemakers in Vidin. Thus, it was 
recommended that some sekban soldiers should be recruited.617 One of the most 
interesting aspects of this episode was that Paspanoğlu championed the cause of the 
Belgrade yamaks and was able to threaten the government as their patron and protector. 
The center, in return, tried to counter the notable’s strength through more recruitment, 
further straining the imperial budget while unable to contain the rebellion.  
 Repeated orders against the yamaks in Belgrade were sent to regional 
commanders and governors in Rumelia618 but to no avail. The yamaks expelled from 
Belgrade were secretly convening in Vidin once again with the help of Paspanoğlu. The 
commander of the Vidin fortress was helpless in confronting Paspanoğlu. The 
government seems to have made an effort to seek help from his regional competitors 
against Paspanoğlu but it was largely unsuccessful. At least some local notables had 
reasons to align themselves with Paspanoğlu as they feared for the loss of their mukataa 
revenue or that they would be the next ones in line to be dealt with after the government 
took care of the brigand rebels. The solution, from the government’s perspective, was to 
charge the governor of Rumelia with the task of taking care of the yamaks expelled from 
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Belgrade and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha’s nephew Mehmet Pasha would join him.619 
 Paspanoğlu’s relations with the local janissaries are well known. In an effort to 
deprive him of the legitimacy associated with the janissary title, the government declared 
that Paspanoğlu was not a janissary and he would be executed.620 The exact manner in 
which Paspanoğlu and the janissaries collaborated is not entirely clear. It seems that they 
worked to establish their control over the lands, which normally belonged to local 
peasants in Vidin. The Janissaries purchased the legal titles (tapus) to lands that the 
villagers had access through tax payments. In effect, the janissaries were “depriving 
villagers of their legal possession rights on the land”621 by circumventing the peasants’ 
use of the land by purchasing the title deeds of these lands. Their justification seems to 
have been that “property rights on land in the border areas belonged exclusively to 
Muslim soldiers from these fortresses.”622 Paspanoğlu himself was involved in 
divestment of the lands from the peasants.623 There was obviously land to be grabbed and 
the manpower janissaries provided Paspanoğlu with would prove to be crucial in 
increasing his power. The janissary discourse of the Muslim ownership of the land could 
be possible only if there existed an authority such as Paspanoğlu to recognize the validity 
of such a claim. In the context of widespread disorder in the early 1790s, known as the 
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Kircali unrest,624 conditions were ripe for Paspanoğlu’s patronage of the janissaries 
whom he could offer land ownership in addition to other material support. 
 The newly appointed governor of Vidin undertook certain measures that alienated 
janissaries and resulted in their implicit threat to rebel in a letter to the sultan. In their 
account, the governor had sworn that he would kill “all who claim to be a janissary save 
the seven year olds.” He had already severed the heads of eight janissaries and killed their 
sekbanbaşı and sent the severed heads to the capital declaring that these belonged to the 
exiles of Belgrade. The governor also killed the former kulkethüdası who was in fact 
innocent. He killed all tradesmen just because they were from Vidin and confiscated their 
property. The janissaries concluded by threatening that their frontier (serhad) Vidin 
would surely witness a rebellion if the situation remained the same although this was not 
what they would have preferred.625  
Clearly, the governor did not see much difference between the yamaks from 
Belgrade, the janissaries in Vidin, and tradesmen of Vidin. The governor’s actions are 
reflected from the point of view of the janissaries and it is not easy to definitively 
authenticate their account. Nevertheless, from the government’s perspective, there existed 
an association between the people, the janissaries, the rebel leaders, and the local 
notables, which challenged the government’s authority in this region. At the same time, 
some residents of Vidin ran away from the town to remain outside the rebellion, which 
indicates that there were small groups who did not necessarily align themselves with the 
janissaries or tried to get away from violence. They reported that there were other 
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residents of the town willing to escape but they were not be able to do so.626 While these 
local people of Vidin did not specify the reason why remaining outside the rebellion 
would prove impossible, the tone of the report suggests that the majority of people in 
Vidin joined the rebellion, which would prove impossible for a minority group to remain 
on the sidelines of the conflict.   
 Eflak’s voyvoda, in the meantime, attempted to achieve the expulsion of 
Belgrade’s janissaries from the fortress of Ada by trying to convince Zeynel and Köçek 
İsmail to abandon Paspanoğlu through bribery. İsmail had rebelled against the 
government the year before and took hold of the fortress of Ada. He had subsequently 
joined Paspanoğlu and the voyvoda now wanted to rid the Ada fortress of bandits 
supporting Paspanoğlu. In trying to convince İsmail, the voyvoda argued that he had 
nothing to fear from Paspanoğlu, as he had a fortress as imposing as Ada. He added that 
İsmail should at least expel those loyal to Paspanoğlu if he could not kill them. The 
voyvoda offered that he would intercede on İsmail’s behalf and he would be given money 
and “many more royal gifts.” In his response, İsmail said that he had convinced Muhafız 
Pasha to help drive out the expelled yamaks. However, he added, he would need money 
to convince Zeynel. The voyvoda concluded his report with a request for three to five 
thousand piasters, the loss of which, he argued, would be the worst-case scenario if this 
deal did not go through.627 As this example demonstrates, Paspanoğlu’s alliances were 
not necessarily built on a common ideological cause but on relatively shaky alliances 
built on common interests as well as fear of Paspanoğlu’s power in the region. In this 
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case, the center seems to have opted to send the money to buy Zeynel’s allegiance, who 
was depicted as a notable of Ada in a spy report from Vidin a month later.628 As Zeynel 
could shift his position through the government’s financial incentives, he could be given 
titles such as a notable in this manner. 
 Paspanoğlu, for his part, played this kind of politics of shifting allegiances and 
alliances relatively well, as he appears to have sought intercession for himself through 
Turnacı Agha. He suggested that he had never challenged the sultan and all he tried to do 
was to serve the state. He argued that it was because he could not control all the soldiers 
from attacking and rebelling in the face of an enemy army of a hundred thousand.629 
Paspanoğlu was referring to the chaotic situation in the Balkans at this time where mobs 
of soldiers roamed around outside and against government control. What Paspanoğlu did 
was to patronize some of these groups and use them to enlarge his influence. While 
Paspanoğlu enjoyed the support of large groups of janissaries in this manner, he could not 
rely entirely on their allegiance or full compliance. He had to expel seven regiments of 
janissaries who eventually joined the forces of Vidin kapıkethudası.630  
 Competition between Paspanoğlu and the local commanders loyal to the central 
government over the loyalty of soldiers in various localities continued unabated. Belgrade 
commander Vezir Mustafa Pasha reported that while he was preparing a major attack on 
Vidin under Paspanoğlu’s control, additional forces should be sent to the fortress of Ada 
because Paspanoğlu might try to run from Vidin to Ada. Although the government had 
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achieved Köçek İsmail’s cooperation through bribery, Paspanoğlu still had many 
supporters in Ada. Vezir Mustafa Pasha asked the voyvoda of Eflak to provide the 
provisions for these additional soldiers. Vezir Mustafa Pasha issued orders to various 
other towns around Vidin to ensure no assistance was given to Paspanoğlu and various 
pashas close to Paspanoğlu could be neutralized through relocation.631 Despite the 
government’s success in bribing the fortress of Ada into cooperation, Paspanoğlu 
remained popular there. Next year, Paspanoğlu summoned the help of Albanians and 
another mob (in the government’s vocabulary) from Sarıgöl and Albania by sending them 
money. The government took measures to block any Albanians from heading toward 
Vidin to help Paspanoğlu.632 Paspanoğlu continued to agitate other groups such as the 
mountain bandits (who had already rebelled against the center) to join his forces. The 
local officers asked the government to send Cabbarzade who commanded 5,000 
Turcoman horsemen, as these bandits could “cover a distance of twenty hours in one 
night.”633 
 It was not only financial incentives that Paspanoğlu offered various groups to 
achieve their allegiance. He reportedly propagated to the janissaries that the government 
was planning to abolish the janissary corps, which the government officials qualified as 
fabrications even the government could not conjure up. Although Paspanoğlu had been 
pardoned and he was supposed to behave, the officials noted, he had gathered janissaries 
and others around him and invaded the environs of Danube with 8,000-10,000 soldiers. 
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Not all the janissaries joined Paspanoğlu and he did not shy away from attacking them 
also. Local officials once again agreed to gather in Rumelia and march against 
Paspanoğlu’s stronghold, Vidin.634 Local officials suspected that Paspanoğlu had set his 
eyes on attacking Wallachia,635 as Paspanoğlu continued his pressure on Belgrade. The 
governor of Rumelia reported that Paspanoğlu sent a rabble of bandits to the fortress of 
Belgrade. The people of Semendire joined the bandits and the group came to the vicinity 
of the fortress (as close as an hour and a half away) without confronting resistance. At 
this point, the forces of the kaymakam of the town of Bölüce fought them but the rabble 
entered the suburbs of the fortress. Finally, the fighters (dilavers) inside the fortress 
attacked the group and killed most of them.636 The rebel leaders were captured along with 
some 170 men and around 200 men died in the clashes.637  
 The news of Paspanoğlu’s defeat in Rusçuk, a city he had attacked in the 
company of 10,000 men, could mean that the tide was turning against Paspanoğlu. 
However, commanders marching against Paspanoğlu’s allies (Macar Ali) in Rusçuk 
admitted that the additional forces they brought with them did not fight the bandits. The 
commanders had to rely on their own forces and some locals of Rusçuk to drive Macar 
Ali’s 8,000 bandits out of the city.638 Paspanoğlu’s forces had been defeated and returned 
to Vidin. Paspanoğlu reportedly did not feel entirely safe from the chiefs of these 
irregular groups who had just been defeated and did not know what to do. People of 
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Niğbolu feared that they might attack the fortress of Niğbolu as they observed some 
armed men coming from Rusçuk. If there was an attack on the fortress, they promised to 
fight Paspanoğlu’s forces.639 As we have seen so far, alliances were fluid and depended 
on which way the balance of power could tilt or if there were strong enough incentives to 
join one side or the other. 
 Now, the joint forces of local government officials were going after the bandits 
loyal to Paspanoğlu in Ziştovi, Plevne, Sırklıoğlu, and Deliorman. Kule and Niğbolu 
fortresses were also under siege, the governor of Silistre Osman Pasha reported.640 By 
March, Niğbolu fortress had been conquered and one of Paspanoğlu’s best men (the 
apple of Paspanoğlu’s eye) Otuzbiroğlu had been killed.641 The Rumelia governor 
reported that the fortress of Belgradcık near Vidin had also been taken but Paspanoğlu 
had already burnt the haystacks and the governor was in need of provisions to be sent 
from Eflak and Nemçe.642 Belgradcık’s capture and the overall losses on Paspanoğlu’s 
side prompted some 1,200 Albanians to desert Paspanoğlu and seek refuge in 
Belgradcık.643 Other associates of Paspanoğlu such as Borçalı Hüseyin Alemdar, a certain 
Osman Aga and Köse Mustafa’s brother switched their allegiance from Paspanoğlu to the 
sultan as well.644 
 The fluidity of allegiances was exemplified by the difficulties the governors 
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experienced in incorporating former bandits by enlisting them as sekban forces. Some 
mountain bandits who had been forgiven by the government and joined the Rumelia 
governor were now refusing to go to Sofia from Filibe. The governor allowed some 700 
sekbans to remain in Filibe, as they promised not to cause trouble until the arrival of 
Kapucubaşı Kara Ahmed Ağa from Edirne. Some 600 sekbans refused to go to Niş with 
the governor claiming that their salaries had not been paid and they simply left. The 
officials reported that these sekbans were “inclined towards” Paspanoğlu.645  
 In the spring of 1798, awaiting additional forces from the center, the Rumelia 
governor Mustafa Pasha was busy trying to gather cannons to attack the Vidin fortress 
but Paspanoğlu’s guerrilla tactics seemed to be working.646 Skirmishes continued through 
the spring,647 however, the governor’s forces were not strong enough and they were 
divided among themselves. Paspanoğlu was able to push them away from Vidin thanks 
especially to 1,000-2,000 horsemen he sent out against the governor. Both sides captured 
small numbers of fighters who were exchanged afterwards. The governor also presented 
the brigands with the choice of being sent back home or being enlisted as sekbans.648 
Paspanoğlu tried to attack the fortress of Kalafat but failed to capture it.649 While the 
center did not help the governor enough to defeat Paspanoğlu, it was not always easy for 
Paspanoğlu to mobilize his own forces either. Some aghas in Vidin asked Paspanoğlu to 
provide them with fatwas that would allow them to shoot at the imperial forces; otherwise 
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they would be considered infidels.650 As such, allegiance and loyalty of soldiers as well as 
notables on both sides were subject to manipulation, bribery,651 and questions of 
legitimacy. Sekbans recruited through such methods often proved unreliable. For 
example, sekbans of Belgrade surrounded the Rumelia governor’s tent and demanded 
their pay despite the fact that the governor had already paid Karslı Ali Pasha substantial 
sums to be distributed to the sekbans. However, these new recruits were unsatisfied, 
which demonstrates the tricky business of stabilizing the Balkans in this period.652  
 The navy commander Küçük Hüseyin Pasha supported a major effort against 
Paspanoğlu in the summer of 1798. However, the alliance of local notables on which the 
government relied to march against Paspanoğlu proved unsuccessful. Local notables 
sought to increase their influence but they were not necessarily committed to an all out 
war against Vidin. Paspanoğlu was fortunate as the 80,000 strong force assembled against 
him did not achieve his demise because the French invasion of Egypt came at an 
opportune time and aided him. The navy commander Hüseyin Pasha had to steer the navy 
toward Egypt. Once again, Paspanoğlu was issued an imperial order declaring 
forgiveness by the state on the condition that he would not agitate the janissaries again or 
cause trouble in Vidin’s environs.653  
 Bandits from Vidin attacked the forces of Belgrade’s governor Mustafa Pasha, 
and at first, his forces were able to push them back.654 The yamaks in Belgrade were 
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warned about causing trouble but Mustafa Pasha thought that without yamaks being 
contained, this measure would not be enough to control the situation in Belgrade.655 One 
of the ways to ensure that there was no unrest was to pay the sekbans in a timely manner. 
Musa Pasha had pawned his own estate in order to pay one month’s salaries of the 
sekbans to prevent them from attacking the fortress of Niğbolu, but there were still two 
months’ worth of payments the sultan should have paid. This was the only way to prevent 
a potential uprising. In addition, the Albanian fighters had arrived in the vicinity of the 
fortress and they had created additional pressure on the fortress.656 This situation made 
the notables of Belgrade nervous and they demanded that Mustafa Pasha expel the 
yamaks he had employed. Notables argued that the yamak forces were acting against the 
law and if they were not expelled, blood would surely be spilled, the qadi of Belgrade 
warned.657 This request seems to have been accepted as the Janissary Agha in Belgrade 
wrote to Mustafa Pasha about the expulsion of the yamaks.658  
The yamaks’ expulsion from the city does not seem to have helped to resolve the 
banditry trouble in Belgrade. The Rumelia governor reported that the 10,000 men under 
his command in Edirne were not enough to control the bandits in the region and he had to 
supplement them with more men and cavalry forces.659 Paspanoğlu continued to agitate 
(in the government’s words) the yamaks in Belgrade and the local administrators found it 
difficult to avoid submitting to Paspanoğlu who was able to solicit the support of yamaks. 
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The yamaks had overtaken estates that belonged to the local people in Belgrade.660 The 
government threatened the yamaks, who were apparently digging trenches around the city 
and preparing to resist the center’s forces, with removing their titles and affiliation with 
the janissary corps and expelling them from the city.661 Negotiations resulted in the 
government’s acceptance to pay the yamaks and other forces’ sums (ulufe) out of the 
jizya collected from Belgrade and distribution of 300-500 janissary pay tickets to reach 
an agreement to return the estates to their owners.662 As all sides agreed to submit to the 
rule of Belgrade’s Muhafız Mustafa Pasha and keep the order,663 local people reported 
that they were pleased that the estates were returned to them.664  
 In the meantime, the difficulties in Belgrade seem to have pushed Mustafa Pasha 
to seek reappointment to Bosnia where he promised to recruit new soldiers.665 Despite the 
deal with the local village heads that the “ancient” estate system would remain in place 
(which meant that a semblance of calm and order had been established),666 Mustafa Pasha 
reported that he feared for his own life, as the Belgrade rebels threatened him with 
revenge for the killing of one of the bandit leaders, Kara Ismail.667 Mustafa Pasha’s fear 
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came to pass soon afterward,668 which is a testament to the precarious situation the 
central government’s officials found themselves in when dealing with the janissary 
affiliates such as yamaks, local bandits, local notables, and often a coalition of the three. 
Whatever relative peace and order were briefly established at various points in Rumelia, 
the situation was always subject to setbacks and resurrection of opposition over various 
issues. 
 The Belgrade muhafız, who succeeded Mustafa Pasha, recommended to the 
government that a deal should be struck with Paspanoğlu because if the center sent new 
forces to Belgrade to deal with these rebels, the rebels in Vidin would surely come back 
to the aid of their comrades in Belgrade. Thus, there was no other way but to offer 
Paspanoğlu some sort of favor.669 Paspanoğlu’s appeal was not limited to the janissary 
affiliates expelled from Belgrade. Soldiers in the Belgrade fortress continued to defy the 
authority of the commanding pasha and expressed their loyalty to Paspanoğlu. In turn, 
they were threatened with losing their provisions if they did not submit to the sole 
authority of Muhafiz Pasha. While they seemingly accepted the pasha’s authority, they 
continued to cause trouble by getting greedy (in the official’s words), by demanding 
speedier delivery of provisions. The officers predicted that if sufficient amounts at levels 
the rebels demanded from the estates previously were received, the situation would 
remain calm for the time being. However, they also recommended that the local qadi and 
the fortress’s commander should be ordered out of the city if the center were to go ahead 
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with its plans to dispatch forces to deal with the rebels in Belgrade.670 Reports from 
Belgrade indicated that soldiers sent from outside would not be accepted by the soldiers 
and local people in Belgrade and fighting would ensue.671 Local people and the notables 
even gathered in the local qadi’s presence to declare that they had heard rumors about 
Albanian units being dispatched from Albania to Belgrade and that they would resist such 
a move.672  
 Clearly, Paspanoğlu’s influence among the soldiers and the broader population 
remained one of the major challenges for the officials appointed from the center, which 
failed to exert its authority convincingly. Having proved his relevance, Paspanoğlu 
promised calm and order in the region in return for his appointment as the governor of 
Vidin. He further demanded that no future governor would be appointed to Vidin673 and 
sought intercession through the Janissary Agha,674 probably because of his close 
connections to the janissaries and their affiliates in Vidin and Belgrade. His local 
challenge to the imperial authority allowed Paspanoğlu to seek the intercession of the 
Russian consul on his behalf as well.675 Paspanoğlu affiliates continued to pose problems 
despite his negotiations with the center.676 Even when Paspanoğlu seemingly proved 
useful by providing Eflak voyvoda with his soldiers, loyalty of the soldiers was very 
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fragile as they reportedly joined with the bandits.677 Paspanoğlu had great influence over 
these rather unreliable bands of soldiers and various bandit leaders who continued to 
roam the countryside,678 yet, the banditry phenomenon was larger than any single force or 
notable could contain in its entirety.  
 Paspanoğlu emerged as a powerful local notable, who vied for power and regional 
influence with the center by both exploiting and representing the local grievances, 
janissaries’ and yamaks’ discontent, and the vacuum created by the widespread banditry. 
This was a regional perfect storm in which different groups opposing and resisting 
against the center came together. Their energy was channeled through Paspanoğlu’s 
struggle against the center, complicating the New Order army’s implementation and 
expansion in the Balkans. The center had to revise its plans accordingly by prioritizing to 
limit the local notable’s activities while attempting to secure order.  
 
Securing Order and Expanding the New Order Army in the Balkans  
 The central government attempted to employ the services of various local 
notables throughout Selim III’s reign to deal with banditry and establish its control over 
the Balkans. It also tried to expand the New Order army in the Balkans through such 
notables. Such efforts had at best minimal positive results and local notables’ 
commitment to the New Order was often elusive. Tokadcıklı Süleyman Ağa, 
Tirsiniklioğlu, and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha were some of the major local notables the 
government struggled to establish alliances with and benefit from their local power and 
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influence in exerting and expanding its control. Analysis of these efforts will help us 
understand the limits of the center’s ability to assert its will and ultimately the fate of the 
New Order army’s expansion. 
Tokadcıklı Süleyman Ağa is a stark example of a government official whose 
allegiance to the center was less than exemplary, as he was disillusioned by the central 
government’s inability to pursue a realistic strategy against the bandits. The government 
relied on Tokadcıklı’s efforts to deal with bandits but it eventually alienated him as a 
result of failure to implement the settlement policy successfully. Tokadcıklı’s claim to 
local notable status started as early as the summer of 1798 and the government undertook 
measures to prevent this claim by sending forces against him. His entrance into 
Gümülcine, killing of several locals, and his looting of their property was enough for the 
government to declare him one of the bandits.679 His claim to notable status and fight 
with local power-holders İsazade and Mestanzade in Gümülcine resulted in the 
government’s orders for Tayyar Pasha to march against Tokadcıklı.680  
Within two years, however, we find Tokadcıklı fighting on the side of the 
government forces against other bandits.681 While he fought against bandits such as Kara 
Feyzi, the government recognized that Tokadcıklı’s fight might not be finished in the 
winter so the government tried to recruit additional forces from Trabzon and Amasya for 
the spring fighting season.682 It was probably not only that Tokadcıklı’s forces were 
insufficient but also that there were other reasons why this was necessary. Some reports 
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mention that Tokadcıklı’s forces had ties with the mountain bandits. Furthermore, such 
reports were strong enough that the people of Edirne strongly resisted Tokadcıklı’s 
arrival in their city.683 Tokadcıklı seems to have been hated by the locals of Edirne684 and 
the government is urged by the local qadi not to appoint Tokadcıklı to Edirne.685  
 Eventually, it seems that local resistance to Tokadcıklı’s appointment led the 
government to make him the voyvoda of Gümülcine instead.686 This was clearly not the 
end of his vying for power at the expense of other local notables.687 Power struggles 
among notables prevented collaboration among them in controlling the bandits. Thus, the 
government had to utilize newly trained forces from Levend and Üsküdar against internal 
disturbances such as banditry. Again, the New Order soldiers were not sufficient in 
number and neither were they trained to deal with dispersed and unruly forces such as 
bandits but the government continued to issue orders for new recruits from districts such 
as Sivas and Karaman.688 Such use of the new recruits for domestic security needs points 
to the dual use of New Order forces, which could unavoidably entangle supposedly 
professional soldiers in internal power struggles among local notables. Dual use was 
required also because of the unreliability of and bad behavior exhibited by forces such as 
those of Tokadcıklı himself.689  
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 Tokadcıklı had been given the full on task of dealing with the banditry in Edirne. 
When it was recommended that Serbestzade be appointed to Edirne as bostancıbaşı, 
Serbestzade wanted to leave some of his forces in Edirne and go back to his region, 
Canik to deal with the ongoing rebellion there. Tokadcıklı suggested that Serbestzade’s 
forces not go into war but protect some critical passages. The government urged 
Tokadcıklı to finish off the bandits as soon as possible and the sultan ordered 
Serbestzade’s appointment expressing a fear that the bandits in Edirne may be able to 
march all the way to the capital.690 Disturbances in Edirne restarted in the spring of 1802 
but it subsided once the government accepted to offer amnesty for the rebels.691 The 
people of Edirne refused to provide foodstuffs for the army because of the local notable 
Dağdevirenoğlu’s “provocation” according to the government officials.692 
Dağdevirenoğlu seems to have agitated the local people against the extension of the New 
Order army to Edirne in 1802 when the news of Abdurrahman Pasha’s arrival reached the 
city.693 
 The government seems to have pursued a settlement policy toward the bandits by 
offering them certain regions to settle in an effort to create stability in regions west of 
Edirne. In order to facilitate the government settlement efforts, Tokadcıklı had pulled his 
soldiers out of Hasköy and left the region.694 Tokadcıklı reported that bandits under the 
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leadership of Kara Feyzi had moved into Hasköy and he had not attacked them.695 
However, when the bandit leaders resisted resettlement policies, the government ordered 
its local administrators and notables such as Tokadcıklı to use force.696 The bandits seem 
to have been particularly unhappy with Tokadcıklı’s presence. They demanded that 
Tokadcıklı also depart Gümülcine where he was stationed after he left Hasköy. The 
central government cited its previous conciliatory attitude in accommodating the 
demands of the bandits but now it threatened to use force against the bandits.697 
 In the spring of 1803, the government officials fighting the bandits reported that 
Tirsiniklioğlu was corresponding with the bandits and Tokadcıklı’s soldiers were the 
same kind (hemcins) as the relatives of the bandits.698 It is unclear how much of this kind 
of reporting was a struggle between these officials and notables such as Tokadcıklı. In a 
report a month later, Tokadcıklı along with Osman Efendi, who had been appointed to the 
region to oversee the government’s resettlement efforts, appear to have been negotiating 
on behalf of the government with the bandit leaders such as Ali Molla, İsaoğlu, Zeynel of 
Gümülcine to calm down the situation.699 By the summer, however, there were clashes 
between Tokadcıklı and rebel leaders such as Kara Feyzi,700 Mahmud, and Ali Molla.701 
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Ali Molla burned some villages and sought refuge in the Edirne fortress.702 In the 
meantime, the center debated providing Tokadcıklı with a thousand New Order army 
soldiers but the government hesitated out of fear that they too might cause trouble in the 
Balkans like the other soldiers.703 Ali Molla and Kara Feyzi continued their banditry 
through the fall704 and Tokadcıklı advocated a heavy-handed policy against them.705  
 Bandits demanded that necessary provisions be given to them along with the 
imperial orders of amnesty and resettlement. They also warned that they would provoke 
others to rise up against the government unless Tokadcıklı’s body was removed.706 The 
central government admitted that the resettlement efforts had been delayed and 
Tokadcıklı had to be convinced that there was no point for him to remain in Gümülcine, 
especially given that he was sick.707 Ali Molla and his friends accepted to settle in Fire at 
first but they changed their minds. This drew Tokadcıklı’s wrath, who sent his soldiers to 
Fire and burned down the town and had towers built.708 Yet, it seems that he soon 
accepted to leave the town of Fire in order for Ali Molla and his associates to settle 
there.709 Their continued activities in and around Baba-yı Atik, Malkara, and Tekfurdağı 
resulted in the government’s orders to the effect that the local notable of Edirne would be 
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aided by New Order forces from Levend barracks as well as from Anatolian barracks, 
such as those in Bolu, Kütahya, and others.710 Tokadcıklı tried to keep channels of 
communication open with the rebels and refused to pursue them relentlessly as he must 
have recognized the futility of trying to deal with banditry through heavy-handed policies 
only.711 
 At this point, Tokadcıklı seems to have stopped listening to the orders from the 
center, which portrayed him as having provoked and agitated the rebellions in Fire and 
Edirne.712 Now, the government would employ the services of Sirozlu Ismail Bey to calm 
down the rebellion in Edirne and fight Tokadcıklı himself who had been fighting the 
bandits.713 The central government went further and secretly provided Ali Molla and his 
associates with ammunitions knowing that they would be used against Tokadcıklı.714 
There was yet another rapprochement and the government needed Tokadcıklı’s assistance 
to make sure Ali Molla settled in Fire. The sultan was fearful of the possibility that 
bandits could join forces with other bandits (such as the Manav group) and cause further 
instability especially if Tokadcıklı continued his resistance against the settlement policy.  
The sultan ordered that Ali Molla be offered a position as a local notable within 
six months’ time and an appeal be made to Tokadcıklı to honor the settlement deal he had 
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previously accepted.715 By now, Tokadcıklı seems to have joined forces with Kara Feyzi 
and agitated various bandit leaders to loot.716 By August, the government had decided to 
execute Tokadcıklı717 and sent forces against him.718 Tokadcıklı had appealed to the 
people of Gümülcine to vouch for him by writing to the central government.719 He was 
executed along with some of his relatives and comrades.720 Tirsiniklioğlu, another 
powerful local notable who the center relied on to establish order in Rumelia, conducted 
Tokadcıklı’s execution.721 Tokadcıklı’s case once again demonstrates the center’s lack of 
a broad strategy to deal with disorder in the Balkans, as it repeatedly relied on local 
notables to fight its battles in an ad hoc fashion. Lack of strategy was combined with the 
failure to address the complex partnerships and alliances struck between various groups 
including the bandits and yamaks among others.  
 Tirsiniklioğlu was one of the notables who played a critical role in the eventual 
demise of Selim III’s efforts to reform the army, as he was one of the powerful local 
notables who opposed the New Order. He was powerful enough to manipulate the local 
and international dynamics to his advantage. For instance, in the summer of 1792, there 
were tensions between the Ottomans and the Russians over the appointment of voyvoda 
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to Wallachia. The Russians demanded that the voyvoda should be from among the 
Boyars, which angered the Ottomans. The Ottomans responded that they should have 
punished the Serbians as well as Tirsiniklioğlu by executing them but they contended 
themselves with removing them from office out of respect for [the wishes of] the 
Russians. The Ottomans restrained themselves despite the recent Russian military build-
up in Kemhal. They threatened that if the Russians continued to be unresponsive on this 
issue, it would not end well for either state.722 Tirsiniklioğlu was acting against the 
Ottoman voyvoda through an alliance with the Serbians who enjoyed Russian support. 
The tone of the Ottoman threats suggests that they were helpless, as they had to appeal to 
the Russians good will.  
 Tirsiniklioğlu was involved in power struggles with other notables such as 
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and Paspanoğlu in Rumelia provinces. He was one of the notables 
the center relied on from time to time to establish order. Like other notables, his 
obedience to the center was contingent on changing circumstances and he employed his 
influence in the service of the central government as he saw fit. Tirsiniklioğlu competed 
with his rival Yıllıkzade to control rebel leaders such as Ali Molla, Kışancalı Halil, and 
Manav Ibrahim. When he approached the government for funds to employ the services of 
such former bandits, the government expressed reservations about their reliability and 
refused to pay the requested sum.723 It is difficult to know if Tirsiniklioğlu could have 
kept the situation calm if the center agreed to provide the funds but soon the bandit 
leaders rebelled again forcing Tirsiniklioğlu to pursue them on behalf of the 
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government.724  
 Tirsiniklioğlu’s cooperation with the government was short-lived and he became 
yet another one of the notables disillusioned with the New Order. Tirsiniklioğlu gathered 
some 20,000 soldiers in Çorlu threatening to march against Istanbul through Çatalca.725 
The center tried to utilize the services of Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha against bandits. 
Tirsiniklioğlu figured that he would be next in line to be targeted after the bandits and he 
provoked the bandits to deepen their rebellious behavior. However, his own men soon 
killed him for reasons that are unclear and it may have been Abdurrahman Pasha who had 
arranged Tirsiniklioğlu’s execution.726 It was not uncommon that the central government 
used one of the competing notables against another in an effort to either subdue them or 
limit their regional influence. As Tirsiniklioğlu reversed his position on the New Order 
project, the center had all the incentives to neutralize him. 
 By March 1807, Tirsiniklioğlu had been killed but Harazgirad’s notable 
Kapucubaşı Mustafa Ağa, who was one of Tirsiniklioğlu’s men, asked that he be given 
the title of local notable of Rusçuk. The government accepted this demand at least 
temporarily to prevent him from causing trouble. But the government officials reported 
that he was rebellious and he had already gained the obedience of the notables in the 
districts of Silistre province. Eventually, the government executed him and Mustafa 
Bayrakdar hoped to replace him. The recommendation of the governor was that Silistre 
should be given to Ahmed Aga of Ibrail and Rusçuk and Hezargrad should be given to 
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Mustafa Bayrakdar.727  
 Successive failures to reassert control over the Balkans resulted in the central 
government’s subcontracting of the job to various local notables in addition to pashas 
appointed from the center. As it could not subdue Paspanoğlu, the government decided to 
appoint another powerful local notable, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, as the governor of 
Anatolia commander-in-chief of forces sent against Paspanoğlu in April 1802.728 
However, he seems to have taken his time to assume his new position, as is clear from his 
lack of enthusiasm to counter the bandits. Tepedelenli seems to have negotiated with the 
bandits whereas the center expected him to be more forceful in subduing the rebels in the 
region.729 While the bandits tried to negotiate with the center on their settlement in the 
region in return for ending their rebellion through Tepedelenli as the interlocutor, 
opposition of various other local notables combined with Paspanoğlu’s influence on the 
ground forced the center to forgive Paspanoğlu for a third time and replace Tepedelenli 
with Vezir Hani Mehmed Pasha as the governor of Rumelia.730 
 To what extent Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was reliable from the government’s point of 
view is somewhat ambiguous. Tepedelenli continued to have hostilities with Ibrahim 
Pasha of Avlonya despite the fact that a peace between the two had been brokered. 
Government officials interpreted his actions as vying for office and noted that Ibrahim 
Pasha was much more trustworthy than Tepedelenli and that he should have been 
favored. After all, they argued, he had followed the sultan’s orders and watched out in the 
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past for the interests of the people.731  
 The central government appears to have pursued no comprehensive strategy to 
deal with the disorder in the Balkans and instead kept trying unsystematically and often 
impatiently to employ the services of local notables and various pashas, creating a sense 
of disillusionment. As the government rushed to switch local leaders, it constantly bet on 
different horses on the ground (often out of necessity rather than choice), the relevant 
actors found themselves at odds with the center and distanced themselves from various 
policies they deemed as doomed to failure. More often than not, various leaders the 
government banked on to subdue the bandits recognized the realities on the ground. The 
center kept employing the same strategy in a vicious circle without undertaking a 
thorough reexamination of its policy on the banditry phenomenon, thereby diminishing 
its own chances of tackling the regional insecurity. This pattern of putting out fires 
through traditional methods was at best inconclusive, at worst doomed to failure.     
 
The End of the New Order 
 Selim III was confronted with enormous security, political, financial, and social 
problems as outlined above to push forward his New Order agenda. On his watch, the 
government not only failed to contain the domestic and international security challenges 
but also proved unsuccessful in preventing various rebellions against the expansion of the 
New Order army. The last one of these rebellions was the infamous Kabakçı Mustafa 
                                                            
731 BOA, HAT, 1554 (20 March 1806). 
 236 
rebellion, which brought an end to Selim III’s rule on 25 May 1807.732 Some historians 
labeled this rebellion as an ideologically conservative and regressive (irtica) move 
against the reformist agenda of the New Order elite.733 The rebellion was directed against 
the New Order elites and the sultan Selim III but it would be too simplistic to portray it as 
a regressive rebellion. After all, the course of the events demonstrates that the elites 
supporting the New Order failed to garner any meaningful support from the general 
public or the local powerbrokers throughout the empire. The New Order soldiers did not 
fight the Kabakçı rebellion either, which indicates the less than wholehearted support for 
the reformist enterprise. 
 The chain of events triggering the rebellion started when a total of eleven British 
ships were able to sail through the straits and anchored right across from the Ottoman 
palace on February 22, 1807.734 According to Georg Oğulukyan’s account, there was 
panic in the city, as it was interpreted as an impending British invasion of the capital. The 
palace tried to assemble soldiers for an attack on the ships but on the twelfth day the 
ships left without a major incident.735 An investigation into how these ships were able to 
slip through the straits resulted in the finding that the yamaks charged with protecting the 
Straits had failed to confront the ships. As a result, the sultan set out to both replace the 
yamaks with New Order soldiers and to force the yamaks to wear the New Order 
uniforms, a decision that would trigger the infamous Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion and 
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ultimately put an end to the New Order and Selim III's reign.736  
 The spark for the Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion seems to have occurred on May 13th 
when the yamaks and janissaries stationed in the Straits refused to adopt the New Order 
uniforms.737 The janissaries reportedly said, “we have been janissaries for many 
generations, it is not imaginable or possible that we become soldiers all over again by 
wearing the New Order uniforms.”738 Rebel soldiers reportedly agreed on a code of 
conduct to rally public support for their cause summarized in four articles: 1- no soldiers 
would be allowed to drink wine until after the business is taken care of, 2- no harm 
should be done against the poor and miserly, 3- raising of hands against the people 
(reaya) and foreigners would not be allowed, 4- those who go against these decisions 
would be punished severely, 5- they would march against the Meat Square (Et Meydanı) 
and make their case based on the Qur’anic principles (Kur’an’a göre murafaa olmak).739 
On May 15th, around 1,500 soldiers marched against the city providing guarantees to the 
public that they would not be harmed and calling on them to keep their shops open and 
continue business as usual.740 The rebel leaders’ sensitivity to the public opinion as well 
as political and religious legitimacy should be noted here. They needed to demonstrate 
that their opposition to the New Order was based on legitimate grounds. 
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 Rebels called on the şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and chief military judges of 
Rumelia and Anatolia among others to gather in the Meat Square.741 Rebels gathered in 
the Meat Square and presented their case to the Sheikhulislam, as they claimed that they 
only sought justice but nothing else. The main argument they seem to have made was that 
it was unfair for them to live under such difficult conditions while the sultan lied and the 
poor public died as a result of the state officials’ actions.742 The rebels demanded that a 
long list of officials be punished within two hours. If the government responded to their 
ultimatum and punished these individuals, they would go back to their duties and their 
localities. Some of the individuals included in the list were the Commander of the 
Imperial Guards (Bostancıbaşı) Sırkatibi İbrahim Kethüda,743 the Court Chamberlain 
(Mabeynci) Ahmed Efendi, the Royal Doorkeeper (Rikab Kethüdası) Müsir Efendi, the 
New Order Treasurer (İrad-ı Cedid Defterdarı) Ahmed Bey, and the Master of the Mint 
(Darbhane Emini) Bekir Efendi.744  
In the meantime, the sultan executed several officials, some of which were on the 
janissaries’ list, to appease the rebels.745 Yet, realizing that the rebellion could not be 
contained and it actually targeted his own rule, Selim III abdicated his throne for his 
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nephew Mustafa II.746 Following the sultan’s dethronement, rebels went to the New 
Order barracks and released the soldiers of their duties, which meant the abolition of the 
New Order army.747 According to another source, the sultan renounced the New Order, 
promised to abide by the ancient laws of the traditional [janissary] corps, and deliver the 
persons the rebels requested. The rebel leader, Kabakçı Mustafa, argued that the sultan 
had previously renounced the new army in the same way but acted against what he said, 
thus, Selim III could not be trusted. Moreover, he argued, the janissaries no longer 
wanted Selim III as the sultan. The rebels now demanded the sultan’s nephew, Mustafa 
II, to succeed the sultan.748  
According to another contemporary source, the janissaries responded to the 
sultan’s offer to abolish the New Order army in the following words, “we do not trust 
these words, he will not abolish the New Order; a lot of trouble occurred in Edirne and 
Tekfurdağı as well as in Anatolia and Rumelia, many lives were wasted, the world has 
been filled with injustice, the country has been ruined, he still did not abolish the New 
Order and he will not.”749 It is clear that the rebellious soldiers framed their arguments 
around the theme of justice and ensured that their complaints reflected broader concerns 
of the society that was deeply disillusioned by the ruling elites. This must have resonated 
with the general public, as some fifty thousand people reportedly gathered in front of the 
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palace and demanded the dethronement of Selim III and succession of Mustafa II.750  
 It should be noted that neither the New Order soldiers nor the gunners of Tophane 
confronted or fought the rebels.751 The New Order soldiers had in fact mobilized and 
were ready to march against the rebels but the Lieutenant Colonel Musa Pasha reportedly 
advised them that they should not “move from where they are and wait and see.”752 The 
government officials debated whether to deploy the New Order army soldiers against the 
rebels but decided against such a move as it could result in “Muslims massacring other 
Muslims.”753 Clearly, government officials including those involved in the New Order 
project hedged against the sultan and the New Order project.  
 In the aftermath of Selim III’s removal, elites affiliated with the New Order were 
either jailed or executed. For example, the religious judge of Siroz ordered that two 
former pashas who were ardent supporters of the New Order effort be executed. The 
runaway pashas would be arrested if they ever came to Siroz. The judge cites past 
successes of the janissary corps and loathes the New Order as an “invented” (icad) 
endeavor.754 At the same time, the new sultan seems to have distributed significant sums 
to the rebellious soldiers and some of them were sent back to the Straits. Yet, their unruly 
behavior such as refusing to obey their commanders, to demand more handsome pay, and 
to cause insecurity in the capital755 may have been one of the reasons that invited 
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Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s intervention. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s assessment that the 
“[janissary] corps and Istanbul are in need of correction”756 led to the rebel leader 
Kabakçı Mustafa’s execution and a new rapprochement between the pasha and the newly 
enthroned sultan.757  
The rebels were successful in abolishing the New Order and dethroning Selim III 
and they remained one of the major players in the post-New Order era. However, this did 
not prevent an outside powerbroker such as Alemdar Mustafa Pasha from shaping the 
parameters of the new political game. Positioning himself as such, he was instrumental in 
Mahmud II’s efforts to recruit new soldiers under a new name (Sekban-ı Cedid), yet in 
the same spirit as the New Order army.758 This effectively meant the reversal of the 
Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion’s main objective (which was to put an end to the New Order) 
and ultimately paved the way for Mahmud II to abolish the janissary corps in 1826 in the 
long run. Nevertheless, this was not an immediate success for the reformers, as Mahmud 
II had to wait to command the support of the ulema759 and weaken the local notables to 
revitalize the reform agenda while treading carefully until he gathered enough support 
against the janissaries. Even then, according to some of the sultan’s contemporaries, 
reforms themselves were superficial760 and success of military reform remained elusive 
throughout the nineteenth century.  
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To conclude, the redefined nature of the relationship between the local notables 
and the state throughout the eighteenth century proved crucial in the successes and 
failures of the New Order army in late eighteenth century. Both the central government 
and the local notables relied on one another for establishment of order and political 
recognition while at the same time competing for influence and power. The government’s 
failure to provide security and order was combined with its inability to expand the New 
Order army to the Balkans and Anatolia. Notables took advantage of these failures by 
both navigating and manipulating local unruly forces at the central government’s 
expense. None emerged victorious due to struggles against one another. At the same time, 
the center was not able to assert its authority in any decisive manner either. 
Neither the central government nor the provincial notables were able to fully 
control the banditry phenomenon in the Balkans in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. The government’s tactics of offering status and titles to notables seem 
to have worked only to a limited extent. The vacuum created by the wars and roaming 
bands of former soldiers and bandits could not easily be contained but notables and 
government officials took turns benefiting from the chaos by manipulating different 
groups for their own purposes. Most notables and administrators were either unable or 
unwilling to fight for the center to the end and often employed the bandits to bargain with 
the center.  
The opposition to the New Order army’s expansion to the Balkans seems to have 
been widespread and notables wasted no opportunity to exploit the general discontent 
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against the center. Paspanoğlu was a clear example of this, as he successfully utilized the 
janissary discontent and the disorder created by the banditry phenomenon to his 
advantage. While he manipulated the local and regional dynamics to increase his 
influence, he constantly negotiated with the central government to ensure that he could 
manage the center’s wrath, exemplified by the central government’s several attempts to 
turn other notables against him. The imperial center failed to appreciate fully the local 
dynamics at play, which often resulted in the disillusionment of government officials 
loyal to the center and to the New Order project. As the center could not fully impose its 
will, it was increasingly delegitimized in the eyes of the bandits, janissaries, local 
populations, and even government officials tasked with securing order and peace.  
Overlapping interests of the local socio-economic and military groups brought 
them closer to the notables than to the center. The imperial center could not secure order 
let alone impose new taxes and institute the New Order army in the Balkans. Resistance 
was not due to conservativeness of these groups but their real interests that the central 
government infringed upon. What was at stake for them was not an abstract idea of 
reform but how to cope with insecurity, extra taxes, and the center’s recruitment demands 
among others. These were definitely consequential for the failure of the New Order army 
and it was only natural that the local notables, such as Paspanoğlu, would emerge as the 
voice of the general societal discontent.  
However, the rationalizing and disciplining logic of the modern state would not 
easily recede and it could exist alongside the opposition. The idea of a professional army 
was not completely purged just because there was widespread societal opposition to it. 
Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s involvement in the immediate aftermath of the end of the New 
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Order was consequential. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was not committed to the New Order 
project nor to Selim III himself but to establishing himself as the foremost notable on the 
Danubian front.761 He took advantage of the power vacuum created by the dethronement 
of Selim III to be replaced by Mustafa IV. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha allied himself with the 
supporters of the New Order and may have even been involved in a scheme to reinstall 
Selim III.762 His successful coup in July 1808 culminated in the “assassination of Selim, 
abdication of Mustafa IV and coronation of Mahmud II, and appointment of Alemdar as 
the grand vizier.”763  
Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s effective reversal of the Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion’s 
abolition of the New Order and restoration of the New Order764 would prove crucial for 
the fate of the Ottoman military modernization. While the New Order was abolished as a 
result of the broad discontent among the general population, local notables, and the 
janissaries, the state elites had not abandoned the idea of a disciplined professional 
modern army at the disposal of the center. They would simply have to wait a little longer 
to achieve that objective despite the opposition by Ottoman society at large.
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The main argument of this study has been that the New Order army and the 
opposition it generated need to be treated within the context of imperial state 
transformation instead of imperial decay. I argue that the fate of the empire’s evolution 
was far from certain despite the enormous challenges the center had to cope with. I take 
issue with the traditional historiography that the New Order represented the progressive 
forces in an otherwise conservative society, as this perspective does not do justice to the 
complexities of how the reformers conceived of reform and to the motivations of societal 
resistance.  
I contend that the main challenge for the Ottoman central government was to 
create an effective fighting force at its disposal to deal with domestic and international 
threats. Different segments of the society, in return, challenged these efforts, as the new 
logic of reforms infringed upon their autonomy. However, I also argue that prospects of 
success of the reform efforts as well as how the society would respond to them were far 
from certain. Societal challenge against the center ensured that its ability to project its 
power through a new army remained limited and contested. Resistance by societal groups 
was not ideological but based on interest. Furthermore, the question was not about 
whether or not the reforms would succeed but about how the state transformation would 
proceed and what kind of political, military, economic, and social costs would be 
incurred in the meantime.  
The first chapter demonstrates that various historiographical traditions have failed 
with varying degrees to adequately account for the complexities of the New Order army’s 
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implementation and the opposition to it. Much of the historiography on this period has 
prohibited the emergence of a robust debate on Ottoman state formation, as it has 
provided us with binary oppositions and theoretically restrictive reductionist and 
anachronistic approaches. It has often failed to distinguish the political agendas of the 
Tanzimat and Republican era elites and presented the New Order through their restrictive 
reformer versus conservative prism. This had a lot to do with the fact that the 
modernization theory’s framework overlapped especially with that of the Turkish 
republican era, which conceived of the Ottoman imperial legacy as a liability to be 
overcome. As the republican historians experienced the trauma of imperial collapse, they 
sought to justify the new republican modern state project. In Selim III’s New Order army, 
they saw honest but limited efforts to modernize the state, as the sultan had lacked the 
necessary resolve that the later republican era modernizers possessed. Opposition to the 
New Order was similar to the opposition to the new republic, which ultimately failed to 
understand the civilizing mission of the new enterprise because of their conservative 
ideological outlook.  
In this way, until very recently, perception of the New Order has remained as a 
failed attempt at modernization thanks to the political concerns of much of the 
historiography. More recent historiography has disputed most of the claims of 
modernization theory, decline paradigm, and Turkish republican historiography but it has 
had little impact on the historiography on the New Order. Through a critical analysis of 
these historiographical traditions, this study contributes to a growing group of revisionist 
histories. It not only exposes many of the outdated yet deeply influential assumptions but 
also engages with a new literature that seeks to abandon the modernization theory and 
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decline paradigm as the explanatory frameworks for this era. Instead, it suggests that this 
period needs to be considered in the broader imperial transformations toward the 
adoption of the logic of the modern state.   
The second chapter suggests that a closer examination of the state elites’ opinions 
on the reform (layihas) present a much more complicated picture of how they understood 
the problems facing the empire. In a time of deep political crises, the state elites sought 
ways to restore the imperial center’s ability to impose its will domestically and compete 
internationally through military reorganization and a new army. Military defeats at the 
hands of the Austrians and the Russians had a devastating impact in the minds of the 
Ottoman elites. However, they did not consider this challenge in civilizational terms, 
such as the West versus the East. For them, the problem had to do with the absence of an 
effective fighting machine at the disposal of the imperial center.  
It was no coincidence that the majority of the layihas suggested ways to improve 
the finances of the army and to reorganize the various corps. Their suggestions revolved 
around reorganizing the existing corps, reforming the recruitment practices, and 
establishing fiscal discipline. Their rhetorical justification for these changes was to 
restore the imperial glory of the sixteenth century, which they perceived as the golden 
age of the empire. They argued that the janissaries were mainly responsible for failing to 
mobilize in times of war due to widespread corruption and inefficiency within the 
janissary corps.  
Lacking a clear strategy as to how to go about creating a new army or how to 
address the socio-economic realities on the ground, the Ottoman elites narrowly defined 
the issue mainly as a janissary problem. What they failed to address was the fact that the 
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janissaries no longer represented purely a military force but a socio-economic group at 
the same time. This perspective prevented them from foreseeing the potential for 
resistance against the new army and ways to address it in advance. Their 
recommendations did not address ways to deal with a situation where elite and non-elite 
groups benefited from the lack of rationalized practices within the janissary corps. For 
example, the exchange of janissary pay tickets had become a commonly accepted 
practice benefiting janissary officers but also government officials. Recommendations 
focused on requiring each janissary to be allowed to hold only one ticket and receive 
payments accordingly. This recommendation missed the reality on the ground that the 
janissaries were not able to live off a single pay ticket without extra stipends. It also 
missed that availability of extra pay tickets allowed urban migrants to be integrated into 
the corps. Such financial and social ties would have been cut and this would clearly 
create societal discontent.     
The second chapter also demonstrates that adoption of new military techniques 
including the disciplining practices such as drills was not a major issue for the Ottomans 
or for the ultimate success of the military reform despite the conservative frames of 
reference they employed. Both the proponents and the opponents of the new army 
developed discourses that tried to delegitimize the other party through accusations about 
violating the established order or the ancient laws. The Ottomans had no qualms about 
importing western techniques and methods as they saw fit. They employed western 
advisors and adopted western uniforms in the new army. When the janissaries charged 
that this amounted to betrayal and heresy, their opposition had more to do with trying to 
delegitimize their counterparts than their deep religious convictions against western 
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innovations. Both sides understood the new order army in different and often conflicting 
ways but neither was motivated primarily by cultural or religious hostility. Furthermore, 
these views were not static and evolved over time in such a way that a proponent of 
reforms could end up opposing it along the way. The reverse was also true in that the 
janissaries, for instance, did not immediately challenge the reorganization of the corps 
while they resisted implementation of regular drills.   
The third chapter revisits the establishment of the new army and demonstrates that 
the establishment, funding, and manning of the new army encountered insurmountable 
challenges from the very start. The establishment of the army was underfunded and often 
mismanaged. The new budget, created to finance solely the new army, was not handled in 
the way it was intended. When the state needed it, it tapped into this resource instead of 
devoting it entirely to the creation of the new army. A major handicap for the new budget 
was that it relied on the rechanneling of existing sources and extra new taxes. The 
reallocation of existing sources meant that the new budget did not benefit from a new and 
independent revenue source. Furthermore, extra taxes placed an additional burden on 
commoners, whose contempt for the new order only increased because of the new 
budget. Overall, the financing of the new army suffered from the broader economic and 
financial problems of the Ottoman central government. 
Manning the new army also proved extremely difficult, as the government failed 
to make it financially attractive to enroll in the new army. Recruitment for the new army 
suffered from lack of funds as well as the local populations’ unwillingness to send their 
children to the new army. Tired of extra new taxes, villagers and townspeople sought 
ways to evade taxation as well as to acquire tax exemptions through claiming affiliation 
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with the state, including the janissary corps. These populations also opposed the 
expansion of the new army to their vicinity, as they would have to provide the new 
barracks with men and provisions. These challenges placed limits on the central 
government’s ambitions to create a sizable army with barracks in Anatolia as well as in 
the Balkans.  
State officials charged with enlargement of the new army, such as Tayyar 
Mahmud Pasha, were eventually disillusioned with the New Order cause and ended up 
opposing the center. Tayyar Mahmud Pasha’s case shows that the political alignments 
around the New Order measures were far from fixed and in fact ever evolving. 
Furthermore, the New Order measures were themselves redefined and renegotiated 
thanks to the opposition from various societal groups as well as the disillusionment of 
such officials as Tayyar Mahmud Pasha. These challenges do not mean that the military 
reform was doomed to fail from the beginning but that there was a very dynamic process 
involved. In other words, as the state set out to implement its ambition to create a new 
army, it failed to make it financially viable and to prevent societal hostility. At the same 
time, resistance from the society forced the state to modify its approach as is clear in the 
way Tayyar Mahmud Pasha turned on the government.  
In the fourth chapter, I argue that the government’s approach to the janissaries 
was narrowly focused on their military effectiveness without addressing the broader 
socio-economic reality they represented. As the government attempted to re-order and 
discipline them, the janissaries resisted both as a military unit and as a socio-economic 
group. Their opposition to reorganization of the janissary corps emerged out of their 
sense of solidarity and established order within the corps. The government attempted to 
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restructure the janissaries by rationalizing the system of pay tickets (esame). The 
janissaries interpreted this as an intrusion into their existing rights and autonomy.  
The janissaries understood the government’s insistence on regular and oft-
repeated drills in similar terms. At the same time, their opposition was neither wholesale 
nor uniform across time and space. For example, the janissaries in Aleppo would have a 
significantly different reaction to the new army than those in Vidin. This had to do with 
the differences in the social and economic structures within which the janissaries were 
embedded. When the new order army’s establishment in the Balkans failed to account for 
the socio-economic conditions in place, the janissaries’ opposition were more aligned 
with the broader societal response. In other words, the janissaries represented the interests 
of the local interests as much as they protected their own corporate interests and identity.  
When the government’s rationalizing and disciplining efforts infringed upon the 
interests of the janissaries and the commoners in various provinces, the problem was 
compounded for the central government. As such, the janissaries did not necessarily align 
themselves with the central government’s wishes. On the contrary, more often than not, 
they protected the local interests against the imperial ones. Such a symbiotic relationship 
between the local populace and the janissaries was so strong that the locals claimed 
membership within the janissary corps, which was not always contested by the 
government officials. This indicates a certain level of recognition of the socio-economic 
reality on the ground on the part of the officials sent from the center. In fact, it was 
because of this reason that certain pashas charged with expanding the new army in the 
provinces would wind up opposing the new army.  
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Socio-economic realities in the provinces present a murky picture of instability as 
well as fluidity of alliances and networks. Different military, economic, and social groups 
had their diverse and sometimes conflicting reasons to oppose the New Order, which had 
little to do with ideology but more with what they interpreted as the central government’s 
violation of their interests and autonomy. The contestation of the new order by a variety 
of groups created an increasingly complicated relationships and dynamic patronage 
networks. These networks drew their legitimacy from a variety of sources, including the 
askeri status of the janissaries. The central government’s reform efforts were geared 
toward ironing out such a fuzzy picture in order to bring about legibility.  
The fifth chapter argues that the already transformed relationship between the 
center and the provincial power holders throughout the eighteenth century had a fateful 
impact on the center’s success in setting up and enlarging the new army. The Eighteenth 
century witnessed a reconfiguration and redistribution of power between the center and 
the provinces. Diffusion of power away from the center toward the provinces meant that 
the center had to rely on the tacit approval and cooperation of the local notables to 
succeed in any major enterprise. In this case, what the center wanted to achieve was not 
only to create an effective fighting force but also to monopolize violence, as the logic of 
the modern state dictated. This meant intrusion into and contestation of the power of the 
local notables. The creation of a centralized professional army could mean increased 
submission to the center for the notables. As such, they had a vested interest in opposing 
the new army if they were to preserve and increase their regional influence.  
The case study of Paspanoğlu demonstrates that a local notable could cause major 
problems and challenges for the center when his interests were aligned with the interests 
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of local populace and other groups such as the janissaries and bandits. Paspanoğlu found 
it an opportune moment to challenge the central government in a time of great unrest and 
chaos caused by the banditry phenomenon. Banditry throughout the Balkans was largely 
a consequence of the Ottoman military failures suffered at the hands of the Austrians and 
Russians in the second half of the eighteenth century. As the imperial center failed to 
address either the widespread banditry or the socio-economic problems, it remained 
vulnerable to threats by notables such as Paspanoğlu who sought to increase their 
regional influence. In trying to address this issue, the center relied on traditional methods 
such as using one notable against another. Paspanoğlu was not necessarily ideologically 
motivated and he continued to negotiate with the central government while agitating 
against it at the same time. One possibility for the center could have been to reach a grand 
bargain with local notables instead of trying endlessly to use one against another.  
The local populations and the janissaries understood the contest between the 
center and the provincial notables as genuinely related to their own discontent about the 
new army. The notables ensured that the local discontent was channeled through their 
networks and they did not hesitate to agitate various groups. There is no doubt the 
notables were interested in expanding their influence, however, they also had a better 
handle on the issues in the provinces as the patrons of their locality. In other words, the 
center was more removed from the daily needs and aspirations of the local populations as 
well as local janissaries among others. Notables offered what the center could not and 
they emerged as the voice of the discontent.  
Opposition to the new order army was arguably successful at the end, as the army 
was abolished along with dethronement of Selim III in 1807. However, the idea of a 
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professional army at the full disposal of the central government remained a compelling 
one for the Ottoman elites. Societal opposition put an end to the New Order army but this 
did not mean the termination of the broader imperial transformation and the state’s efforts 
to adopt modern forms of power. Clearly, the limits were placed upon how far the 
rationalizing and disciplining state power could infringe upon the autonomy of various 
socio-economic and military groups.  
Mahmud II would have to address those limits and assert the center’s willingness 
to move forward with a modernized army by abolishing the janissary corps in 1826. He 
would also have to untangle the various networks and neutralize the local notables 
opposed to the emerging new logic of the state. Prior to abolishing the janissary corps, 
Mahmud II ensured that he received the support of the ulema and the local notables could 
no longer threaten the interests of the center in the provinces. It is not entirely clear to 
what extent he was able to create an effective modern army by abolishing the janissary 
corps. Yet, this was perhaps not the main objective anyway. More consequentially, 
consolidation of the center’s sovereignty over the resisting military, political, economic, 
and social groups through employing modern forms of power needed to proceed. It is not 
certain that military reform rendered the empire stronger in the long run. What is clear is 
that the centralized, rationalized, disciplined, and bureaucratic new logic of the modern 
state would govern the empire.  
The complex set of relationships between the janissaries and various societal 
groups meant that the janissaries represented a check on power as projected from the 
imperial center. The janissaries represented and voiced the growing societal discontent. 
When the new army triggered opposition from the society, the janissaries acted as natural 
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allies of the society. In targeting the janissaries, the New Order was actually also 
targeting the society’s ability to meaningfully and forcefully shape the outcome of the 
reform efforts and ultimately the transformation of the state.  
When the state finally abolished the janissaries in 1826, project of modernity 
rendered the society more acquiescent to the encroachments of the central state. In terms 
of military efficiency, the state may have been correct in its diagnosis that it needed to 
eliminate the janissaries because they were no longer an effective fighting force. In trying 
to accomplish this, however, the emerging modern state’s logic stripped the society of 
one of its formidable tools to contest and negotiate state power. In the absence of an 
alternative institution through which the societal discontent could be expressed, the 
state’s assault on the crucial link between the janissaries and the broader society had 
fateful repercussions for the imperial state transformation, as it rendered societal input 
virtually irrelevant. 
In the arguably successful version of this story, Mehmed Ali of Egypt was able to 
create an effective fighting force and a formidable army in a relatively short amount of 
time. Mehmed Ali had several advantages: 1- he was able to finance the new army 
adequately; 2- he eliminated (prior to the establishment of the new army) the potentially 
main opposition group with an independent military base, namely the Mamluks; 3- there 
was no significant armed group as profoundly tied to the society in the same way the 
janissaries were elsewhere in the empire. These factors contributed to the relative success 
of erecting a new professional army obedient to his rule. In fact, Mahmud II was able to 
create a similar army, Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyye, but it is difficult to argue that 
it was as successful as Mehmed Ali’s new army. The long-term consequence of this 
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imperial transformation toward the modern state’s logic was that societal discontent 
expressed by janissaries, notables, and local populations was no more. The modern state 
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